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Abstract
This work consists of two parts. In Part I (chapters 1—5), I shall produce a 
Connectionist Defence of Quine’s Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference, 
according to which there is no objective fact of the matter as to what the 
ontological commitments of the speakers of a language are. I shall start by 
reviewing Quine’s project in his original behaviouristic setting. Chapters 1, 
and 2 will be devoted to addressing several criticisms that Gareth Evans, and 
Crispin Wright, have put forward on behalf of the friend of semantic realism. 
Evans (1981) and, more recently, Wright (1997) have argued on different 
grounds that, under certain conditions, structural simplicity may become 
alethic—i.e., truth-conducive—for semantic theories. Being structurally more 
complex than the standard semantic theory, Quine’s perverse semantic route 
(see chapter 1) is an easy prey for Evans’ and Wright’s considerations. I shall 
argue that both Evans’ and Wright’s criticisms are unmotivated, and do not 
jeopardize Quine’s overall enterprise. I shall then propose a perverse theory 
of reference (chapter 3) which differs substantially from the ones advanced in 
the previous literature on the issue. The motivation for pursuing a different 
perverse semantic proposal resides in the fact that the route I shall be offering 
is as simple, structurally speaking, as our sanctioned theory of reference is 
meant to be. Thanks to this feature, my strategy is not subject to certain 
criticisms which may put perverse proposals a la Quine in jeopardy, thereby 
becoming an overall better candidate for the Quinean to fulfill her goal. In
chapter 4, I shall introduce and develop a criterion recently produced by 
Wright (1997) in terms of ‘psychological simplicity’ which threatens the 
perverse semantic proposal I offered in chapter 3. I shall argue that a 
Language-of-Thought—LOT—model of human cognition could motivate 
Wright’s criterion. I shall then introduce the reader to some basic aspects of 
connectionist theory, and elaborate on a particularly promising 
neurocomputational approach to language processing put forward by Jeff 
Elman (1992; 1998). I shall argue that if instead of endorsing a LOT 
hypothesis, we model human cognition by a recurrent neural network a la 
Elman, then Wright’s criterion is unmotivated. In particular, I shall argue that 
considerations regarding ‘psychological simplicity’ are neutral, favouring 
neither a standard theory of reference, nor a perverse one. In the remainder of 
Part I, I shall focus upon certain problems for the defender of the 
Inscrutability Thesis highlighted by the friend of connectionist theory. In 
chapter 5 I shall introduce a mathematical technique for measuring 
conceptual similarity across networks that Aarre Laakso and Gary Cottrell 
(1998; 2000) have recently developed. I shall show how Paul Churchland 
makes use of Laakso and Cottrell’s results to argue that connectionism can 
furnish us with all we need to construct a robust theory of semantics, and a 
robust theory of translation—robustness that may potentially be exploited by 
a connectionist foe of Quine to argue against the Inscrutability Thesis. The 
bulk of the chapter will be devoted to showing that the notion of conceptual 
similarity available to the connectionist leaves room for a “connectionist 
Quinean” to kick in with a one-to-many translational mapping across 
networks.
In Part II (chapters 6, and 7), I shall produce a Connectionist Defence of the 
Thesis of Eliminative Materialism, according to which propositional attitudes 
don’t exist (see chapter 7). I shall start by rejoining to two arguments that 
Stephen Stich has recently put forward against the thesis of eliminative 
materialism. In a nutshell, Stich (1990; 1991) argues that (i) the thesis of 
eliminative materialism, is neither true nor false, and that (ii) even if it were 
true, that would be philosophically uninteresting. To support (i) and (ii) Stich 
relies on two premises: (a) that the job of a theory of reference is to make
explicit the tacit theory of reference which underlies our intuitions about the 
notion of reference itself; and (b) that our intuitive notion of reference is a 
highly idiosyncratic one. In chapter 6 I shall address Stich’s anti-eliminativist 
claims (i) and (ii). I shall argue that even if we agreed with premises (a) and 
(b), that would lend no support whatsoever for (i) and (ii). Finally, in chapter 
7, I shall introduce a connectionist-inspired conditional argument for the 
elimination of the posits of folk psychology put forward by William Ramsey, 
Stephen Stich, and Joseph Garon. I shall consider an objection to the 
eliminativist argument raised by Andy Clark. I shall then review a counter 
that Stephen Stich and Ted Warfield produce on behalf of the eliminativist. 
The discussion in chapter 5 on ‘state space semantics and conceptual 
similarity’ will be used to show that Clark’s argument is not threatened by 
Stich and Warfield’s considerations. Then, in the remainder of Part II, I shall 
offer a different line of argument to counter to Clark. A line that focuses on 
the notion of causal efficacy. I hope to show that the thesis of eliminativist 
materialism is correct. Conclusions, and directions for future research will 
follow.
For Ana, El Pollico
She had always wanted words, she loved them, 
grew up on them. Words gave her clarity, 
brought reason, shape. Whereas I  thought 
words bent emotions like sticks in water.
—Michael Ondaatje, The English Patient
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Part I
The Inscrutability o f  Reference
El mundo era tan reciente, que muchas cosas carecian de 
nombre, y  para mencionarlas habia que sehalarlas con el 
dedo.
—Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Cien Ahos de Soledad
1THE INSCRUTABILITY OF REFERENCE
1.1 Introduction
In a nutshell, Quine’s Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference claims that there is 
no objective fact of the matter as to what the ontological commitments of the 
speakers of a language are (see below). To become acquainted with this polemical 
thesis, Quine (1960) invites the reader to imagine two linguists whose task is to 
produce rival translation manuals to account for the expressions of an unknown 
language. The linguists, as we shall see shortly (1.3, and 1.4 below), can produce 
rival translation manuals which are mutually incompatible, and yet fit all possible 
evidence.1 The Inscrutability Thesis is the doctrine that there is no fact of the matter 
as to what the extensions of the terms of a language are. Claims about the 
ontological commitments that the speakers of a language incur are relative to which
1 The question o f  just what source o f  evidence should be taken into account must wait until section 
1.2 .
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translation manual we favour. Were this radical thesis to earn its keep, objectivism 
as applied to our ordinary notion of reference, and related semantic notions—truth, 
meaning, etc.—would be in serious jeopardy.
Quine’s most famous illustration of the Inscrutability Thesis comes from the 
‘gavagai’ parable (see 1.3 below).2 Unfortunately, the ‘gavagai’ parable has 
contributed to the proliferation of disparate interpretations as to what thesis it is 
meant to exemplify. Although I shall not seek to elucidate exegetical issues, let me 
introduce a small caveat before kicking off that will help us clarify a potential 
source of misunderstandings, and what the scope of the present work is.
The reader of Word and Object will recall the ‘gavagai’ example as an 
illustration of the Thesis of the Indeterminacy of Translation. Although intimately 
related, the Indeterminacy of Translation, and the Inscrutability of Reference make
2 Throughout his writings, Quine has made use o f  a number o f  examples to illustrate the 
inscrutability o f  reference. In ‘Ontological Relativity’, for instance, Quine mentions in support o f  his 
thesis certain Japanese syntactic constructions, called classifiers. This constructions can be translated 
into English either as mass terms, or as individuative terms (see Quine, 1969a, pp. 35-9, for a 
detailed explanation). Unfortunately, cases like the Japanese classifiers, have lead to some friends o f  
semantic realism to fall into the temptation o f  mistaking the Inscrutability Thesis for a platitude. In 
the case o f  Japanese classifiers, referential inscrutability is achieved by exploiting syntactic or 
semantic resources that one language has, and the other language lacks. However, this can only bring 
referential inscrutability in a trivial way. Quine’s thesis is meant to obtain even when the languages 
under consideration do share the same syntactic and semantic apparatus. Indeed, referential 
inscrutability, according to Quine, is supposed to hold at Home, among fellow speakers (the reader 
may care to consult Kirk, 1986, chapter 5, for an insightful discussion o f  this issue. See also Field, 
1975, p. 396). In my defence o f  the Inscrutability Thesis in Part I o f  the present work, I shall focus 
exclusively upon the ‘gavagai’ parable; example which seems not to lead to the trivializations that 
Japanese classifiers, and other examples that Quine deploys, have lead some commentators to.
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different contentions, and by contrast to what many believe, only the latter receives 
support from Quine’s parable of Radical Translation. Put bluntly, the Indeterminacy 
of Translation claims that two linguists could produce rival manuals of translation 
to account for the sense of the sentences of a foreign language. The Indeterminacy 
Thesis deals with whole sentences, and targets the alleged determinacy of sense 
pursued by the semantic realist by questioning the factuality of the semantic 
relations of synonymy and translation. By contrast, the Inscrutability Thesis deals 
with terms, and targets the alleged scrutability of reference—cf. Quine, 1969a, pp. 
34-ff. Both theses target objectivism in semantics, although at different levels. The 
Indeterminacy Thesis highlights scepticism about the museum myth. That is, the 
existence of meanings as mental items to which words are assigned. The 
Inscrutability Thesis, on the other hand, highlights a deeply interwined, although 
different, myth about reference. Namely, the idea that words can be attached to 
things via mental acts, such that for example the word ‘rabbit’ gets connected to 
rabbits. As I said, and contrary to common wisdom, the ‘gavagai’ example only 
exemplifies the Inscrutability Thesis—cf. Quine, 1970d.3
Moreover, there has been a lot of controversial debate about whether the 
Inscrutability Thesis—were it to be sound—can bring support (directly, or 
indirectly) to the Indeterminacy of Translation. In ‘On the Reasons for 
Indeterminacy of Translation’ Quine is pretty explicit about it, claiming that the 
Inscrutability Thesis does not entail indeterminacy at the sentential level. The
3 To many readers it is not obvious how we can have inscrutability o f  reference without 
indeterminacy o f  sentence translation. See fn. 20 below for some clarifying remarks that Quine 
makes in that respect; remarks that must await until the ‘gavagai’ parable is reviewed in sections 1.3, 
and 1.4.
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Indeterminacy of Translation receives support from another important thesis of 
Quine: The Thesis of Undermination of Scientific Theories by All Possible 
Observation.4 Recent commentators such as Kirk (1986), however, argue that the 
Inscrutability Thesis does entail indeterminacy of sentence translation.5 Granting 
that entailment, nonetheless, should not cause any concern to the foe of Quine. Kirk 
argues indirectly against the Inscrutability Thesis, claiming that (i) inscrutability of 
reference entails indeterminacy of translation, and that (ii) there is no indeterminacy 
of translation. But, obviously, someone’s tollens is somebodyelse’s ponens. In the 
present work, I shall focus exclusively upon the Inscrutability of Reference, and try 
to show that it is correct. In an opposite direction to Kirk’s line of reasoning, it may 
then be argued that the Indeterminacy of Translation holds too—were my defence 
of the Inscrutability Thesis to succeed. Nevertheless, the purpose of Part I of my 
dissertation is more modest, and I shall not address Kirk’s alleged connection 
between reference of terms, and translation at the sentential level.
Before getting started let me briefly outline the programme of this chapter. In 
section 1.2 I shall introduce two caveats regarding the evidential basis, and the 
reading (ontological versus epistemological) that we should follow when reading 
Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis. An appraisal of these two caveats will help clarify the 
main contention, and scope of my defence of Quine’s thesis. In sections 1.3, and 1.4 
I shall review Quine’s project of Radical Translation in his original behaviouristic
4 See Quine (1970d; 1975a); and Wright (1997) for an insightful appraisal o f  that thesis, and its 
putative bearing upon the Indeterminacy o f  Translation.
5 See also Levin, 1979, p. 25; and Davidson, 1984, p. 227, for a positive link between both theses.
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setting.6 In section 1.5 I shall pave the way for an appraisal of a criticism put 
forward by Evans in his seminal paper ‘Identity and Predication’. Sections 1.6, and
1.7 will be devoted to analyzing two counter-examples that Evans offers against 
Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis. I shall exploit a strategy for dealing with Evans’ first 
counter that, on behalf of Quine, Hookway (1988) has developed. However, there is 
a further counter produced by Evans which Hookway doesn’t address. In section 1.7 
we’ll see how a manual, along the lines of the one Hookway advances, manages to 
overcome these further difficulties raised by Evans. Conclusions will follow in 
section 1.8.
1.2 Levels o f  Explanation: Behaviourism and/or Neurophysiology
The lack of factuality regarding what the terms of a given language refer to is a 
claim that carries a lot of weight, and requires at least two important clarifications 
before we can review Quine’s parable of Radical Translation. On the one hand, it 
seems that such a strong contention must depend at least partly upon what sort of 
evidence we take to be relevant to the fact of the matter. In this respect, Quine’s 
approach to semantics is crucially shaped by his naturalism, and the behaviourism 
dominant in philosophy, and the experimental sciences in the 50s. All aspects of 
human activity must be studied under the light of Natural Science. And this 
includes, of course, linguistic activity. In the opening passages of ‘Ontological 
Relativity’, Quine quotes Dewey, to whom he owes academically his inclination 
towards naturalism: ‘Meaning...is not a psychic existence; it is primarily a property
6 The reader familiar with Quine’s parable (W ord and Object, chapter 2) may wish to skip these two 
sections, and jump ahead to section 1.5.
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of behavior’ (Quine, 1969a, p. 27). Quine will adopt this commandment as the basis 
for his analysis of the semantic notion of reference. As a result, Quine proclaims, all 
the objective evidence we can make use of in our search reduces to behavioural 
evidence—in particular, evidence about people’s behavioural (linguistic and non- 
linguistic) dispositions (see 1.3 below). Plausibly, however, by admitting a richer 
evidential basis beyond people’s behavioural dispositions, the room for scepticism 
towards semantic factuality might be significantly reduced.7
Quine (1975c) distinguishes three possible levels of explanation for dealing 
with semantic issues: the mentalistic, the behaviouristic and the neurophysiological. 
The mentalistic level comprehends among others, facts about beliefs, desires, and 
the rest of the propositional attitudes. Many philosophers have argued that data 
involving the intentional (mentalistic) apparatus of the speakers of a language 
reports matters of fact. Quine agrees that if the mentalistic level of explanation 
counted as among the matters of fact that constitute the genuine evidential basis for 
the linguist, translation would be determined, and reference would be scrutable. The 
reader may recall for example Lewis’ (1974) principles of charity, rationality, etc., 
that act as a filter for putative ascriptions to the natives’ beliefs, desires and others 
intentional attitudes they might have towards their environment.8 However, Quine 
(1960, p. 221) denies the alleged factuality of the propositional attitudes. Beliefs,
7 One o f  the first and more important reactions to Quine’s restricted behaviouristic picture is due to 
Chomsky (1969; 1975). Quine’s reply appears in Davidson, and Hintikka (1969). The failures o f  
behaviourism are well-known and I shall not address them here. The reader may consult for example 
Kim (1996) for an overview o f  the main reasons for the collapse o f  behaviourism.
8 Although see Davidson (1984) for reasons on why such ascriptions do not make translation 
determinate or reference scrutable.
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desires, and other mentalistic idioms are fine, insofar as we grasp them in a 
practical way.9 Once we assume for argument’s sake that the mentalistic level is to 
be ruled out as part of a scientific inquiry into semantics, the question is: Can 
naturalism admit other relevant facts beyond the behavioural dispositions of 
speakers? At this point, my defence of the Inscrutability Thesis will differ from 
Quine’s original setting. Quine’s approach to the project of Radical Translation is 
behaviouristic in spirit:
(our) talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just a conceptual 
apparatus that helps us to foresee and control the triggering of our sensory 
receptors in the light of previous triggering of our sensory receptors. The 
triggering, first and last, is all we have to go on. (Quine, 1981a, p. 193).
Quine’s reasons to work at the medium (behaviouristic) level spring from his 
overall effort to naturalize epistemology (see Quine, 1969a, chapter 3) and, at the 
same time, from considerations concerning the process by which ordinary speakers 
acquire their mother language (see Quine, 1970b). Apparently, however, there is no 
reason why a naturalistic approach to semantics could not observe what goes on 
inside people’s heads in addition to observing linguistic, as well as non-linguistic, 
behavioural dispositions. If we are to endorse a full-blooded naturalistic reading of 
semantics, I contend, the neurophysiological level of explanation must be taken into 
account. Mental phenomena, I claim, are not actually reducible to/replacable by the 
behavioural level, but rather by the neurophysiological level underlying behavioural
9 I shall not review Quine’s (behaviouristic) reasons for rejecting the propositional attitudes. In Part 
II o f  my dissertation (chapters 6, and 7) I shall argue, on grounds different from Quine’s, against the 
propositional attitudes, producing a Connectionist Defence o f  the Elimination o f  the Mental.
The Inscrutability o f Reference 8
dispositions.10 In fairness to Quine, this actually appears to be his underlying 
position, explicitely endorsed in a number of articles. So, in ‘Facts of the Matter’ 
Quine clarifies his physicalistic understanding of factuality:
Mental states and events do not reduce to behavior, nor are they explained by 
behavior. They are explained by neurology, when they are explained. But their 
behavioral adjuncts serve to specify them objectively. When we talk of mental 
states or events subject to behavioral criteria, we can rest assured that we are 
not bandying words; there is a physical fact of the matter, a fact ultimately of 
elementary physical states. (Quine, 1979a, p. 167)
Likewise, in the concluding remarks of ‘Mind and Verbal Dispositions’ Quine 
claims:
Until we can aspire to actual physiological explanation of linguistic activity in 
physiological terms, the level at which to work is the middle one; that of 
dispositions to overt behavior. Its virtue is not that it affords causal 
explanations but that it is less likely than the mentalistic level to engender an 
illusion of being more explanatory than it is. (Quine, 1975c, p. 95)
Quine’s comments suggest that scientific explanation in behavioural terms is 
merely a temporary substitute of a fully neurophysiological causal level of 
explanation. The claim, thus, that there is no fact of the matter with regard to what 
the terms of a language refer to, is not objectively guaranteed by the behavioural 
dispositions observed by the linguist, but rather by the physical states underlying 
those dispositions. My defence of the Inscrutability Thesis depends crucially upon 
favouring a full-blooded neurophysiological level of explanation. Thus, in chapters
10 In chapter 7 w e’ll see that replacement o f  mental phenomena, rather than reduction, is the most
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4, and 5 I shall make use of a connectionist (neurobiologically-inspired) model of 
cognition; see 4.4 below. The previous discussion seems to show that Quine could 
make himself at home in such a connectionist setting, transposing thus his old 
behaviouristic arguments for the Inscrutability Thesis into the neuroscientific 
fashion (see chapter 5, section 5.7 below).
On the other hand, the above discussion on levels of explanation has 
sometimes fostered the illusion that Quine’s thesis is epistemological. Before 
closing this section, let me briefly address this issue, since it is vital to fully 
appraise the relevance of the Inscrutability Thesis upon the metaphysical status of 
semantics. Quine himself has not explicitely distinguished ontological and 
epistemological versions of his thesis.11 Some commentators, however, focus upon 
what source of evidence should be relevant to translation, favouring thus an 
epistemological reading. The claim then is that the alleged plurality of translation 
manuals will always be compatible with the totality of acceptable evidence. The foe 
of Quine who targets this epistemological reading may then try to argue (even 
granting a neurophysiological level of explanation) that, were we to take into 
account all ‘physically statable evidence’, there would be a fact of the matter as to 
what the reference of a given term is.
However, under this epistemological reading, the attack would be harmless to 
Quine. Quine’s focus on a behaviouristic level of explanation reflects the point that 
behavioural facts are the only ones relevant to fixing the semantic notion of 
reference. As I mentioned earlier, plausibly, more facts are relevant to semantics—
likely outcome once we endorse a neurophysiological level o f  explanation.
11 See Friedman (1975) for an analysis o f  the distinction between ontological and epistemological 
versions o f  the Inscrutability Thesis.
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e.g., neurosciencific facts. But to exploit the existence of more relevant evidence 
against Quine would be to miss the target. Thinking that we could dissolve the 
inscrutability of reference by checking whether a given neurophyiological state, A, 
(and not B) is the one actually causing mental state A* (and not B*), is missing the 
very point the Inscrutability Thesis is aiming to show. Namely, that it is 
meaningless to maintain that a speaker actually believes A* and not B*, or vice 
versa. The inscrutability of reference is not a claim about hidden 
neurophysiologically determined semantic facts. It is not a matter of lack of 
information about the architecture of the brain. The Inscrutability Thesis claims that 
even if we had all the relevant information about all the elementary physical 
mechanisms responsible for cognition, the choice would remain unsolved. The 
reason, as Quine notes, is simply that we cannot expect to find ‘a distinctive 
mechanism for every purported distinction that can be phrased in traditional 
mentalistic language’ (Quine, 1970d, p. 180). In conclusion, the discussion about 
which facts determine or fail to determine the semantic facts should not lead the 
reader into thinking that Quine’s thesis rests upon an epistemological foundation. 
Its strength must reside in its ontological version, to the effect that the totality of 
acceptable facts—not evidence—fails to determine reference.
Enough of preliminaries. In the next two sections I shall recount Quine’s 
parable of Radical Translation as aiming to support the Inscrutability of Terms. My 
exposition, for ease of explanation, will be faithful to Quine’s original 
behaviouristic setting. Only later (chapters 4, and 5), I shall re-state the thesis in 
connectionist terms, and try to show its full potential in a connectionist, 
neurophysiologically inspired, reading.
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1.3 First Steps in Radical Translation: Stimulus Meaning and Observation 
Sentences
In his well-known parable of Radical Translation,12 Quine brings into play an ideal 
situation in which there is no connection whatsoever between the speakers of two 
different languages. One is the Native language; the other, the linguist’s under 
which the inquiry will take place. The task is to reconstruct the Native language by 
means of a translation manual. This manual, when finally completed, should be able 
to correlate each of the potentially infinite number of sentences uttered by the 
natives with one or more sentences belonging to the linguist’s Home language. The 
linguist is not allowed to correlate Native expressions with those of the Home 
language on the grounds that they pin down the same idea. Quine’s naturalism, as 
we saw earlier, forbids us to visit the Museum o f Ideas (see 1.1 above). Unable to 
pair words with language-independent mental acts, the linguist starts from scratch, 
acknowledging as a genuine evidential basis only the stimulation of her sensory 
receptors. Upon this she will try theories in search of true prediction. The process is 
the following.
12 Due to the enormous amount o f  literature in the last four decades on Quine’s project o f  Radical 
Translation, I shall try to go very briefly in this opening chapter over the details o f  the parable. The 
reader interested in the fine-grained detail is urged to visit the locus classici: Quine (1960), chapter 
2; and (1969a), chapter 1. The reader interested exclusively in the Inscrutability Thesis may consult 
Quine (1969a); whereas, for interesting links between that thesis and the thesis o f  Indeterminacy o f  
Translation, the place to go is Quine (1960). For a very good critical analysis o f  Quine’s 
Inscrutability Thesis, and links to other well-known theses o f  Quine, the reader may care to consult 
Kirk, 1986. See also Wright (1997).
The Inscrutability o f Reference 12
The linguist starts from an articulated web of Native sentences with no 
assumptions as to how they are going to be analytically dissected into their 
constitutive terms (see below).13 The articulated web of sentences is supplemented 
by a behaviourally based distinction between occasion sentences, and standing 
sentences. The Native sentences that the linguist can start checking more easily are 
occasion sentences. Quine defines occasion sentences as those sentences that 
command assent or dissent only if queried after an appropriate current 
stimulation—see Quine (1960), pp. 35-6. Occasion sentences are the ones native 
speakers initially acquire in their own language, and constitute the entering wedge 
into Native for the linguist. The linguist, however, must make use of any semantic 
notion, defined in terms of stimulations, that helps her correlate occasion sentences 
of Native with occasion sentences of Home. To achieve this, Quine makes use of 
the behavioural notion of stimulus meaning:
The stimulus meaning of a sentence for a subject sums up his dispositions to
assent to or dissent from the sentence in response to present stimulation.
(Quine, 1960, p. 34)
By putting together the set of all those stimulations that would prompt the native’s 
assent with the set of all those that would prompt her dissent, the linguist can make 
use of a naturalistic notion of equivalence. Occasion sentences of Native and Home
13 This already represents an advantage for the linguist. Namely, that she can start to devise her 
manual o f  translation regardless o f  what objects singular terms refer to. In ‘Five Milestones o f  
Empiricism’, Quine reminds us o f  a salutary maxim introduced by Bentham. It reflects the idea that 
the minimum significative semantic unit is no longer the word, but rather the sentence as a whole—  
see Quine (1981b), pp. 68-70.
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get correlated in virtue of having the same stimulus meaning—i.e., in virtue of 
being stimulus synonymous.
The set of occasion sentences of a language, nonetheless, does not constitute a 
monolithic block. Their membership is rather a matter of degree. Some will be 
easier to identify, some others more difficult. In this way, Quine distinguishes a 
priviledged subset of occasion sentences for the project of Radical Translation. 
Namely, those sentences whose stimulus meaning varies least under the influence 
of collateral information (cf. Quine, 1960, p. 42). Quine dubs them observation 
sentences. Their comparative constancy of stimulus meaning renders them suitable 
to form the basis on which the linguist will build up her translation manual. The 
linguist will be able to correlate an observation sentence, n, of Native with another 
one, h, of her Home language by noticing that the native assents to/dissents from n 
in every occasion in which the linguist would have assented to/dissented from h. 
Observation teaches the linguist to discriminate between occasion, and in particular, 
observation sentences on the one hand, and standing sentences on the other. From a 
range of situations the linguist can then try observation sentences upon the natives 
in different environmental situations, and inductively construct a tentative manual 
of translation. I shall not enlarge on the first steps of the linguist’s translation 
manual (see Quine, 1960, pp. 26-30). Let us move on to see how the linguist’s 
behaviouristic setting, aided by the notion of stimulus meaning, bears onto 
reference.
Quine considers an utterance of the native one-word observation sentence 
‘Gavagai’. By observing that on all the occasions in which the native had assented 
to/dissented from ‘Gavagai?’, the linguist would have given the same response to
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‘There is a rabbit?’, the linguist inductively arrives to the conclusion that ‘Gavagai’ 
is stimulus synonymous with the English sentence ‘There is a rabbit’. Concerned 
with stimulus meaning, the key point is that the linguist understands that the native 
sentence is a rabbit-related one. So far, no reason to worry about terms; the 
linguist’s entry to Native is via sentences, and in particular those highly linked to 
present observable events. So, for the sake of the argument, let’s assume without 
further ado that via the linguist’s aforementioned inductive process ‘Gavagai’ is 
correctly translatable as ‘There is a rabbit’.14
Bigger worries arise when we shift our attention from sentences to terms. As 
we’ve seen, observation sentences, and usually one-word ones, are fairly easy to pin 
down. But, unluckily, not all sentences are like this. Standing sentences cannot be 
directly correlated with some current stimulation. They will be assented to/dissented 
from irrespectively of the amount of perceptual similarity that both the native’s and 
the linguist’s sensory receptors might share at the time of the query. The linguist, 
therefore, is unable to translate whole Native standing sentences into Home 
sentences. The only way for the linguist to accomplish her task, Quine points out, is 
by making use of analytical hypotheses:
[The linguist] segments heard utterances into conveniently short recurrent 
parts, and thus compiles a list of native ‘words’. Various of these he 
hypothetically equates to English words and phrases. (Quine, 1960, p. 68)
14 The reader should notice that the whole process depends on assuming that the linguist can 
distinguish native’s assent from dissent (see Quine, 1960, pp.29-30). I shall ignore the possibility 
that the linguist is mistaken about what she takes to be native linguistic signs for assent and dissent. 
However, for some skeptical comments on this issue see Levy (1970), pp. 598-9.
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In devising analytical hypotheses, the linguist shifts her attention from sentences 
(initially taken as the minimum semantic unit) to terms. The way the linguist 
dissects standing sentences is guided by the observation sentences already written 
down in her notebook. If a segment of a standing sentence appears in as an 
observation one, the linguist will start by matching other examples of this segment 
in other observation sentences of Native. The matching should reflect the previous 
pairing between the observation sentences. In this way, the linguist will be tempted 
to conclude that, for instance, the native term ‘gavagai’ can be equated with our 
Home term ‘rabbit’.
However, according to Quine, we need not assume that the native term 
‘gavagai’ refers to the set of rabbits on the basis that the Native and English related 
sentential counterparts are stimulus synonymous. The reason is simply that we 
could still retain the identity of stimulus meaning of ‘Gavagai’, and ‘There is a 
rabbit’, while arguing that ‘gavagai’ as a term divides its reference over things other 
than rabbits. Well-known putative examples are undetached parts of rabbits, their 
temporal stages, or any other perverse referent that ‘gavagai’ might divide its 
reference over which does not violate Quine’s behavioural adequacy conditions (see 
chapter 3 below). Furthermore, the native term could be equated with some Home 
expressions that do not divide their reference at all. These are cases such as the 
abstract singular term ‘rabbithood’, standing for the universal; or ‘rabbitfusion’, that 
denotes the scattered region of space-time composed of all rabbits. Likewise, 
‘gavagai’ could also be translated as the feature-placer ‘rabbiting’, which would 
stand in analogy with, for instance, ‘raining’ or ‘snowing’. Bearing in mind Quine’s 
behavioural setting, we can see why stimulus synonymy at the sentential level is not
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affected by such semantically perverse proposals:
Point to a rabbit and you have pointed to a stage of a rabbit, to an integral part 
of a rabbit, to the rabbit fusion, and to where rabbithood is manifested. Point 
to an integral part of a rabbit and you have pointed again to the remaining four 
sorts of things; and so on around. (Quine, 1960, pp. 52-3)
Thus, all the available evidence being the linguistic, and non-linguistic dispositions 
of the native speakers under observable circumstances, it cannot be confirmed that 
‘gavagai’ refers to the set of rabbits as opposed to any of the aforementioned 
perverse alternatives. In short, we could be in possession of more than one correct 
manual of translation. All of which would agree which Native and Home sentences 
should be ascribed identical stimulus meaning. However such manuals are mutually 
incompatible since the terms of Home correlated with a given word of Native by 
each manual pick out different sets of objects in the world. In this way, we may 
have a standard manual that equates the native term ‘gavagai’ with ‘rabbit’, whereas 
a perverse manual might equate the same native term with, let’s say, ‘undetached 
rabbit part’. In conclusion, there is no objective fact of the matter as to which 
manual is the correct one, and what the extension of the Native term ‘gavagai’ is.
1.4 The Juggling Strategy
Quine’s original argument in favour of the plurality of schemes of reference is not 
completed yet. What has been shown so far is the lack of relevant criteria in order to 
fix the reference of ‘gavagai’ as a term. But someone might think that the ‘gavagai’ 
example, as it stands, is not significant. The reason for this has nothing to do with
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the way the argument has been developed, but rather with the example that has been 
chosen to exemplify the thesis. One-word observation sentences, such as ‘gavagai’, 
are a extreme case. The whole sentence takes the form of a single noun; it is not 
accompanied by any other grammatical devices such as singular or plural endings, 
definite or indefinite articles, counting expressions, etc. Someone might, thus, 
object that the plurality of choice will disappear as soon as we pay attention to more 
complex constructions in which ‘Gavagai’ is no longer a one-word sentence, but 
has rather been inserted into a bigger one. These worries drive us to the last part of 
Quine’s project of Radical Translation.
The kind of sentential constructions we should pay attention to are the ones 
involving, for example, Identity as in ‘... the same as ...’, Quantity as in ‘there are x 
...’, Plurality, etc. 15 The anti-Quinean argues that by paying attention to the 
apparatus of individuation, perverse alternatives a la Quine will be behaviourally 
discredited. Hence, by asking the native, let’s say, whether there are two or three 
so-and-so present, we may be able to tell whether the so-and-so is a term of divided 
reference or a mass term, for instance.16 If the native is able to answer the question, 
that could count as evidence in support of the thesis that the so-and-so divides its 
reference. On the other hand, abstention of judgment may count as evidence in 
support of the thesis that ‘gavagai’ refers to objects not subject to such division.
15 For the reader not familiar, these are the sort o f  constructions Quine refers to as the apparatus o f  
reference— see Quine (1973), esp. Part III. In this chapter, and chapter 3 below, I shall refer to this 
sort o f  constructions as the apparatus o f  individuation.
16 Notice that this strategy already involves a crucial assumption that I shall grant for argument’s 
sake. Namely, that the linguists are able to ask questions in Native where the apparatus o f  
individuation is present.
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Imagine then, for the sake of the argument, that we could ask the native 
whether certain gavagai is or is not the same as the one she saw the day before, or 
about the number of gavagai present at a the time of the query. In this way 
(borrowing, and recasting an example from Hookway, 1988, pp. 148-9) if the 
linguist asked the native: ‘Cuantos gavagai hay alii?’, she may translate the native’s 
answer (let us say, ‘Dos gavagai’) as ‘There are two rabbits’, and she would feel 
confident enough about her translation manual because of what she observes about 
the native’s environment and her linguistic behaviour. However , as Quine points 
out, it may have been rash of the linguist to reject the other putative alternative 
translations of ‘gavagai’:
We could equate a native expression with any of the disparate English terms 
‘rabbit’, ‘rabbit stage’, ‘undetached rabbit part’, etc., and still, by 
compensatorily juggling the translation of numerical identity and associated 
particles, preserve conformity to stimulus meanings of occasion sentences. 
(Quine, 1960, p. 54)
Let us illustrate how this juggling would work: When the linguist translates 
standardly ‘Dos gavagai’ as ‘There are two rabbits’, she is pressumably employing 
the following principle of translation:
(a) ‘dos’ => ‘there are two’ and
(b) ‘ gavagai ’ => ‘ rabbits ’.17
17 The reader should notice that ‘=>’ here is not a logical device. So far we are only deploying 
translation rules in a loose sense. I use ‘= > ’ simply to reflect the fact that the terms appearing at both 
sides o f  the equation enjoy a similar role in their respective languages, such that stimulus synonymy 
at the sentential level is preserved. A more rigourous framework will be required when we move 
from manuals o f  translation to theories o f  semantics (sections 1.6, and 1.7 below).
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The Quinean, however, does not need to do a very difficult adjustment in order to 
translate perversely ‘gavagai’ as ‘undetached rabbit part’. By changing (a) for
(a)* ‘dos’ => ‘there are two animals which are composed o f , 
then she will be able to replace (b) by
(b>* • gavagai’ => ‘undetached rabbit parts’.
And now, by putting (a)* and (b)* together, the perverse linguist can make use of 
an alternative translation manual that renders the native utterance ‘Dos gavagai’ as 
‘There are two animals which are composed of undetached rabbit parts’.18 Hence, 
by means of compensatory adjustments, Quine claims, the perverse manual is as 
compatible with the behavioural facts as the standard manual is assumed to be.
In like vein, we can compensatorily adjust all the rest of the Native 
expressions, and argue, for example, that the translation of the Native sentence 
‘Cuantos gavagai hay alii?’, is not our standard ‘How many rabbits are there over 
there?’, but rather the perverse ‘Of how many animals are there undetached rabbit 
parts over there?’ (cf. Wright, 1997). Nonetheless, it is worth remarking that Quine 
acknowledges that we should employ the standard manual, instead of the perverse 
alternatives. The very point that the Quinean would like to stress is that that choice
18 As the careful reader will have noticed, the perverse manual is obliged to specify that the 
undetached rabbit parts belong to two different animals. Otherwise, if  we said, for instance, ‘There 
are two undetached rabbit parts’, we might be referring to two different parts o f the same animal (see 
chapter 3, section 3.4 below).
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is based completely upon pragmatic interests: No particular manual is actually true, 
against the others (see 1.3 above).
The reader familiar with the ‘gavagai’ literature will surely recall one problem 
with the above proposal that has been highlighted by Hookway. As Hookway 
(1988, pp. 149-51) notes, thanks to the juggling strategy, the perverse manual seems 
to cope satisfactorily with gavagai-related sentences. But what would happen if we 
were confronted with a sentence of Native, let’s say, ‘Dos rosas’, that the standard 
manual translates correctly as ‘There are two roses’? How could the perverse 
manual preserve stimulus synonymy? If the perverse linguist claims that ‘rosas’ 
must be translated as ‘undetached rose parts’, then she is obliged to do some 
adjustments elsewhere. Unfortunately, according to her manual ‘dos’ has been 
translated as in (a)* above. So, the perverse linguist would come out with 
something like ‘There are two animals which are composed of undetached rose 
parts’ as the translation of the Native utterance ‘Dos rosas’. For obvious reasons, a 
perverse manual that deploys that translation would not be faithful to the evidence.
It seems then that Quine’s juggling strategy fails when we start dealing with things 
other than rabbits.
However, on behalf of Quine, Hookway offers a solution to the problem. The 
perverse linguist could produce a somewhat more cumbersome manual by changing
(a)* above for the following disjunctive rule of translation:
(a)** ‘dos’ => ‘two animals which are composed o f ,  when dealing with rabbit- 
related utterances,
or
‘dos’ => ‘two plants which are composed o f ,  when dealing with rose- 
related ones.
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So, with the help of a disjunctive rule of translation the perverse manual can cope 
both with rabbits and roses. Although it is not difficult to guess the next move of 
the anti-Quinean. How would the perverse manual translate a new Native sentence 
that the standard manual has matched correctly with, for instance, our ‘There are 
two stones’? The solution would be to insert another disjunct in (a)** in order to 
account for mineral-related utterances. And, now the anti-Quinean can do the same 
move once again, and so on, and so forth. The result is that the perverse linguist 
would come out with a translation manual which conforms to the evidence but 
which is extremely cumbersome. Whether such ad hoc manual can still be taken to 
be as correct as the standard one is something that I shall leave unanswered until 
chapter 2.19
This completes my introductory review of Quine’s parable of Radical 
Translation.20 In the remainder of this chapter I shall address two important counter-
19 The reader familiar with the literature will have noticed that (a)** is actually different from 
Hookway’s original version. His is hybrid in the sense that he employs a perverse disjunct for 
counting rabbits and a standard one when dealing with any other sort o f  objects. I find it more 
realistic to go for a fully-perverse manual all the way down. However, whatever choice we make 
(fully perverse, or standard-cum-perverse a la Hookway) will not influence my overall purposes (see 
chapters 2, and 3 below).
20 We have now the appropriate background to shed some light upon my opening remarks in section 
1.1. As I said earlier, Quine’s parable o f Radical Translation supports the thesis o f referential 
inscrutability, rather than the thesis o f  indeterminacy o f  translation. The following passage from 
Quine reveals the reason for this: “The gavaga i example was at best an example only o f  the 
inscrutability o f terms, not o f  the indeterminacy o f  translation o f  sentences. As sentence, G avagai 
had a translation that was unique to within stimulus synonymy; for the occasion sentences ‘Rabbit’, 
‘Rabbit stage’, and ‘Undetached rabbit part’ are stimulus-synonymous and holophrastically
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examples to the Inscrutability Thesis that Evans (1975) has produced. On behalf of 
the Quinean, I shall offer a rejoinder to Evans by expanding on Hookway’s above 
disjunctive strategy. But before that, let me just make some closing remarks that 
will help clarify the importance of the Inscrutability Thesis. The lack of any sort of 
ideological or cultural resemblance among the users of Native and English certainly 
helps to make Quine’s point more vivid. It is noteworthy, however, that even if the 
Inscrutability of Reference were true with respect to speakers of Native, its real 
significance would be missed unless we transfer the parable of Radical Translation 
to home. Someone might object to Quine’s parable that bilingualism may help to 
solve the indeterminacy. The linguist could go to the native tribe, live with them 
and learn their language in the same way a native child would do. In short, if the 
linguist became bilingual, someone may argue, she would be able to discover which 
is the correct manual. This, nevertheles, should not cause any concern. As Quine 
points out,
[it] makes no real difference that the linguist will turn bilingual and come to 
think as the natives do—whatever that means. For the arbitrariness of reading 
our objectifications into the heathen speech reflects not so much the 
inscrutability of the heathen mind, as that there is nothing to scrute. (Quine, 
1969a, p. 5)
interchangeable. The gavagai example had only this indirect bearing on indeterminacy o f  translation 
o f  sentences: one could imagine with some plausibility that some lengthy nonobservational sentences 
containing gavagai could be found which would go into English in materially different ways 
according as gavagai was equated with one or another o f  the terms ‘rabbit’, ‘rabbit stage’, etc. This 
whole effort was aimed not at proof but at helping the reader to reconcile the indeterminacy o f  
translation imaginatively with the concrete reality o f  radical translation.” (Quine, 1970d, p. 182).
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So, the problem is not that the linguist could force her own conceptual repertoire of 
Home into Native when learning the native tongue. We are assuming that the 
linguist does not take anything for granted. The point is that there is no singular 
individuation machinery to be assumed or not at home. There is not one conceptual 
repertoire belonging to Home. When two fellow speakers match their utterances by 
the homophonic rule (that is, by translating each other expressions phoneme by 
phoneme), their situation is not different from the one in Quine’s parable. There 
decision not to employ a heterophonic manual is due exclusively to reasons of 
simplicity. For purposes of communication, smoothness is important; but in terms 
of fidelity of speech to evidence, heterophonic and homophonic transcriptions are 
on a par. In short, the ontological commitments of the assertions of two speakers of 
the same language—even of the same speaker at different times—are inscrutable. 
They can be interpreted as picking rival referential relations in the world. Let us 
now turn our attention to Evans’ criticism of the Inscrutability Thesis.
1.5 Locating Schemes o f Predication
Evans (1975) produced a line of argument which suggests that semantically 
perverse translation manuals a la Quine are behaviourally incorrect. In my opinion, 
the interest of Evans’ argument relies in the fact that, unlike some foes of Quine 
that insist in the need of honouring a mentalistic level of explanation (see 1.2. 
above), Evans’ attack is launched from within a Quinean framework. Evans tries to 
show that the perverse referential schemes will not be able to cope with all the data 
that the standard scheme does. And Evans confines himself to a pool of data which
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Quine would acknowledge as genuine evidential basis: Namely, native assent and 
dissent to the linguist’s queries under concurrent observable circumstances. If 
Evans’ attack is sound, it may prove fatal since Quine will not be able to reply by 
claiming that Evans’ criticism relies on non-factual considerations. Evans’ anti- 
Quinean line of argument is a powerful one, and I shall spend some time in this, and 
the following section to review it.21 A full appraisal will be crucial since a major 
thread of my defence of the Inscrutability Thesis arises as a reaction to Evans’ 
attack (see chapter 3 below).
Evans starts by pointing out the divergencies between the task of a translator 
and the task of a semanticist. The aim of the former is simply to facilitate 
communication between two linguistic communities. In order to do so, she must 
devise a manual of translation. Evans does not manifest any concern with the claim 
that translation suffers from indeterminacy. The reason is simply that a translator is 
not devoted to revealing any semantic truth. The translator’s aim is simply to find 
smooth vehicles of communication, and insofar as this target is achieved, the way 
the translator dissects native utterances (i.e., what analytical hypotheses she projects 
into Native—see section 1.3) is completely irrelevant to her task. By contrast, the 
semanticist is involved in the project of constructing a theory of meaning. She is not 
concerned merely with correlating expressions of Native with lumps of Home 
language, but rather with stating what the native expressions actually mean?1 The
21 Many philosophers take Evans’ counter-examples to have definitely defeated the thesis o f  
referential inscrutability— see, for instance, Kirk (1986), p. 47.
22 In fact, Evans’ approach differs from the original project o f  Radical Translation in more 
substantial respects. Being concerned with semantics, we need the concepts o f  truth, denotation, etc. 
And Evans’ approach to such notions must be understood in a full-blooded sense: “[The] semanticist
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sentences of Native are potentially infinite in number. The semanticist, similarly to 
the translator (see 1.3), will be obliged to dissect native sentences. The target now, 
however, is to account for the meaning of those previously unencountered native 
utterances in a recursive way. But in opposition to the case of Radical Translation, 
Evans claims, not any given set of analytical hypotheses will do. Quine’s treatment 
of certain compound expressions, as we shall see next, is the root of Evans’ distrust.
Quine claims that mastering compound observation sentences (‘White rabbit’, 
‘Yellow paper’, etc.) is on a par with mastering simple observation sentences 
(‘Rabbit’, ‘Paper’, etc.). Speakers ostensively learn the use of bigger observational 
constructions in the familiar inductive way in which the use of one-word 
observation sentences is learned (Quine 1974, pp. 59-60). This similarity at the 
sentential level carries over to the theory of reference when we move down to the 
level of terms. Learning an observational term is learning when to assent to/dissent 
from it as an observational sentence. Since the learning of both simple and 
compound expressions follow the same pattern, the result is that the same 
referential indeterminacy that afflicts terms in simple observation sentences (see 1.3 
above) afflicts also terms in compound sentences. The compound ‘white rabbit’ (as 
a term) is subject to the Inscrutability Thesis in the same way as the term ‘rabbit’ is 
meant to be. Even though ‘white rabbit’ relates to a portion of space-time, in the 
vicinity of the speaker, which is both rabbit-related and white-related, it would be 
rash to impute our ontology to the speaker. Quine maintains that the extension of 
the second component, ‘rabbit’, could be taken to be the set of undetached rabbit
aims to uncover a structure in the language that mirrors the competence speakers o f  the language 
have actually acquired.” (Evans, 1975, pp. 343-4). In chapter 2, we shall see how Evans tries to 
exploit this issue to his advantage. See also fit. 25 below.
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parts.23 The conclusion is that it is indeterminate what the compound ‘white rabbit’ 
refers to: The semanticist may assign to the compound as its extension either a 
subclass of the set of rabbits or a subclass of the set of undetached rabbit parts. Our 
only hope, in Quine’s view, of solving the indeterminacy is by looking at the 
interaction of such expressions with the apparatus o f  individuation (plurals, 
identity, etc.). Unfortunately, as we saw in section 1.4, this hope is thwarted, since 
the apparatus of individuation is itself inscrutable too.
Evans disagrees with Quine’s contention, and notes that for Quine’s argument 
to work,
it must rest upon the belief that the sole reason a semanticist can have for 
treating an expression as a predicate with a particular divided reference is to 
account for that expression’s interaction with the (putative) apparatus of 
individuation. (Evans, 1975, pp. 345-6).
However, according to Evans, the apparatus of individuation is not the only way to 
identify an expression as a predicate that refers to such-and-such objects. As a 
matter of fact, the location of the scheme of predication takes place at a subtler 
level. And such a prior anchoring determines the apparatus of individuation. The 
apparatus of individuation can, thus, only be secondary. Evans advances what this 
subtler level consists of:
The primary function of construing an expression, G, as a term dividing its 
reference over rabbits—or trees—is to explain how the truth conditions of
23 In like vein, the Quinean may produce a perverse rendering o f  the first component, ‘white’ (Quine 
1974, pp. 81-3). However, we can ignore this additional perversity, since Evans is exclusively 
concerned with the semantic treatment o f ‘gavagai’ (Evans 1975, p. 363).
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certain elementary, but compound, sentences into which it enters are 
determined by their parts. The apparatus of individuation may be entirely 
absent from such sentences. To see the notion “what G is a predicate o f ’ in 
this way is to see it as constrained by a theory of sentence composition into 
which it fits and which alone gives it sense. {Ibid., p. 346).
There is in particular one phase in the route to linguistic competence where 
Evans starts to dig in to launch his attack. This is the process by which two 
observational expressions are attributively combined as occurs for example in 
‘White rabbit’ or ‘Yellow paper’. Attributive composition can be better appraised 
by contrasting it with a more primitive form of combining one-word observation 
sentences. That is conjunction—see Quine (1990), p. 4 and (1970b), pp. 9-10. This 
mode of combination differs from the attributive one in the fact that it does not 
require any sort of overlapping of the features referred to by the two conjuncts. In 
this way, ‘White here and rabbit here?’ will be assented to whenever there is both a 
rabbit and something white in the speaker’s vicinity. By contrast, the attributive 
compound ‘White rabbit?’ will only be assented to when a decent-sized portion of 
the rabbit is itself white. The overlapping of both features is the crucial point that 
distinguishes what Quine calls mereological functions (as in the case of attributive 
compounds) from truth functions (as, for example, conjunction). But, as Evans 
remarks, mereological functions are not enough for predication. What we do when 
we take an expression as a mode of predication is “to associate with it a certain 
condition, upon whose satisfaction by objects depends the truth or falsity of the 
sentences in which the expression occurs”. (Evans, 1975, pp. 348-9).
Mereological functions are assented to when there is a significant overlapping 
of the features compounding the function. But, clearly, it is not sufficient for the
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speaker to be confronted with a decent-sized portion of rabbit which is white. 
Think for example of several non-white rabbits with white tails which are 
distributed in such a way that there tails form a continuous white picture—cf. 
Evans, 1975, p. 351. In that case, speakers would still dissent from ‘White rabbit?’ 
This illustrates the fact that mereological functions cannot be taken as predicative 
constructions. In short, ‘White rabbit’ (taken as a mereological function) does not 
amount to ‘There is a white rabbit here’. What we require to obtain the correct 
assent conditions, and this is the key point, is that the white feature gets distributed 
in a characteristic way in relation to the boundaries of a single rabbit, such that its 
presence prompts assent to the query ‘White rabbit?’ (cf. Evans, 1975, p. 351).
Hence we may say that ‘White rabbit’ is true if, and only if, there is a rabbit in 
the vicinity of the speaker which satisfies the condition of being white. In this way, 
a first step in individuation has been achieved. By identifying the construction 
‘White rabbit’ with ‘There is a white rabbit here’, the truth conditions of such 
compound sentences can be easily explained. The contribution of the parts (‘white’ 
and ‘rabbit’) can be explained by taking ‘rabbit’ to be associated with a particular 
divided referent (i.e., a whole enduring rabbit), and ‘white’ as being distributed 
within the boundaries of such a particular object in a certain homogeneous way. So, 
summing up, the position Evans has arrived at is the following:
To say that an expression has a particular divided reference makes sense only 
in the context of the explanation of compound sentences. To decide that a 
term divides its reference over rabbits is to decide that the sentences into 
which it occurs involve predication of rabbits. And to decide that a set of 
sentences involve predication of rabbits is to identify the way those sentences’ 
assent conditions are generated from their parts as depending upon the
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identity conditions of rabbits, and so systematic mastery of those sentences 
requires mastery of the identity conditions of rabbits. (Evans, 1975, p. 355).
The Quinean, however, need to disagree with Evans in order to preserve her 
perverse alternatives. Explaining the aforementioned compounds as involving 
predication of rabbits may help the semanticist to build her theory up. Nevertheless, 
no reason has been given to support the view that the same role cannot be played by 
appealing to different ways in which the compound terms might divide their 
reference. For instance, over temporal stages of whole enduring objects, or over 
their undetached parts. Evans is aware of this point, and his aim in the last part of 
his seminal paper ‘Identity and Predication’ is to provide evidence to show why 
alternative perverse referents cannot possibly deliver the goods to the Quinean. 
Evans develops several different counter-examples in order to disprove one by one 
the various Quinean ad hoc alternatives (see 1.3). In what follows, I shall focus 
exclusively on Evans’ treatment of ‘undetached rabbit part’.24
24 It must be stressed that even if the forthcoming arguments that I shall be offering against Evans’ 
first counterexample— see section 1.6, and chapters 2, and 3 below— were on the right track, that 
would not have a straightforward bearing upon Evans’ (1975) other counterexamples (for a thorough 
appraisal o f  these other counters, the reader may care to consult Wright, 1997). However, it must be 
noted that for the Inscrutability Thesis to work, the sympathiser o f  Quine may simply stick to one
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1.6 Evans ’ First Counter-Example, and Hookway’s 'Divide-and-Rule ’ Strategy
To introduce Evans’ first counter-example, consider two semantic theories of 
Native, one standard and the other perverse.25 One of the native expressions is 
‘Blanco gavagai’. Natives utter ‘Blanco gavagai’ only when a white rabbit shows up 
in their visual field. On the one hand the Standard Theory, ST, deals with ‘Blanco 
gavagai’ in the following way:
ST
Axioms:
(a) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is a rabbit)
(a^ (x)(x satisfies ‘blanco’A/  iff (x is white & x satisfies f j)
Theorem:
perverse alternative to standard semantic theorizing. In the remainder o f  this work, I shall thus 
restrict my interest to Evans’ treatment o f ‘undetached rabbit part’.
25 Although noted in section 1.5 that Evans’ approach differs from Quine’s insofar as the 
semanticist, unlike the translator, is concerned with semantic notions, the Quinean need not disagree. 
A sympathiser o f Quine can concede that referential inscrutability actually concerns indeterminacy in 
the semantic field. By transferring Quine’s original formulation into semantics, we fear no loss: Any 
theory o f  semantics will have ot match Native with Home sentences. And in doing so the semanticist 
relies upon the same body o f  evidence as the translator does. Namely, native assent to/dissent from 
queries under concurrent observable circumstances. From now on then I shall follow Evans, and 
illustrate Quine’s perversity by means o f  theories o f  reference, rather than translation manuals.
The Inscrutability o f Reference 31
(a2) (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is white & x is a rabbit))26
On the other hand the alternative offered by the perverse semanticist is:
PTj
Axioms:
(b) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is an undetached rabbit part)
(b,) (x)(x satisfies ‘blanco’A/  iff (x is white & x satisfies f j)
Theorem:
(b2) (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is white & x is an undetached
rabbit part))
Let us suppose that ST is behaviourally adequate. We can, thus, identify the 
sentence ‘Blanco gavagai’ with ‘There is a white rabbit’. However, Evans argues, if 
ST is behaviourally adequate, then PT, is not behaviourally adequate. There are 
certain circumstances in which PT, fails to reflect correctly the native’s linguistic 
behaviour (Evans 1975, p. 358)—assuming ST does correctly reflect the native’s 
linguistic behaviour. The sort of situation Evans is thinking of is for example when 
native speakers are stimulated by a brown rabbit with a white leg. In this case, PTj 
is not faithful to the evidence since, assuming PTb natives should assent to ‘Blanco 
gavagai?’ when stimulated by a white-legged brown rabbit.27 But, we have assumed
26 (a2) is obviously a consequence o f  (a) and (a^. The reader might be expecting that ‘theorems’ of 
the standard theory would assign truth to sentences. However, it is simpler to stay with satisfaction 
for nothing in my ensuing argument hangs on the difference.
27 Notice that a brown rabbit’s white leg is a white undetached rabbit part.
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that ST is behaviourally correct, and hence that natives would assent to the 
combined construction ‘Blanco gavagai?’ only in presence of a white rabbit.
There is a further alternative that Evans himself advances. In order to avoid 
the inconvenient consequences of white-legged brown rabbits, the obvious move is 
to link the satisfaction conditions of ‘bianco’ to things which are parts of white 
rabbits. The perverse theory would then require an axiom of the form:
(b,)* (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’ iff x is an undetached part of a white rabbit)
But this move only brings further difficulties: What will the native say about white 
sheets of paper, snowed landscapes, and so on? It seems that we are obliged to 
extend the scope of (bj)* in order to talk about white things other than rabbits. 
Hence, the broader axiom required should run as follows:
Oh)** (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’ iff x is an undetached part of a white thing)
But unfortunately, as Evans notices, the Quinean still faces a similar worry to the 
one motivated by white-legged brown rabbits. According to Oh)**, ‘Blanco 
gavagai?’ should be assented to when a claw of a white-legged brown rabbit is 
present. For the claw itself is a part of a white thing: namely, a white leg. At this 
point, Evans doesn’t pursue these matters further. It seems there is nothing the 
Quinean can do.
Hookway, however, proposes a rejoinder to the difficulties which Evans has 
raised for the Quinean thus far. He contends that the problem arising with Oh)* 
does not force us to go for Oh)**- If we want to refer to white sheets of paper or 
snowed landscapes, then the way to do so is by displaying the satisfaction
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conditions of ‘bianco’ in a context-sensitive way.28 In order to do so Hookway 
(1988, p. 155) offers the following disjunctive axiom:
(x)(x satisfies W if, and only if, either
(a) W occurs ‘together with’ H and x is a part of a white animal
or
(b) W occurs in some other context and x is white).
Recasting Hookway’s axiom (bj)*** in our terminology we get:
PT2
Axioms:
(c) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is an undetached rabbit part)
(c^ (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’ iff either
(a) ‘bianco’ occurs together with ‘gavagai’ and x is an undetached 
part of a white animal
or
(b) ‘bianco’ occurs in some other context and x is white)
Theorem:
(c2) (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is an undetached part of a
white animal))
Hence, if the native utters ‘Blanco gavagai’ we employ the first disjunct of (c^. 
Otherwise, we use the second.
28 Hookway’s move is similar to the way in which he adjusts the apparatus o f  individuation to favour 
a particular perverse scheme via disjunctive rules o f  translation (see 1.4).
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The careful reader may have spotted a difficulty with Hookway’s proposal 
that prevents PT2 from preserving its empirical adequacy. To wit: According to the 
theorem generated by PT2, (c2), native speakers should assent to ‘Blanco gavagai?’ 
in the vicinity of a white cat or a white cow. The reason is obvious. Notice that any 
undetached part of a white cat or a white cow is an undetached part of a white 
animal. I ignore what moved Hookway to formulate his proposal in terms of 
animals. However, it should not cause great inconvenience, for the modification 
required is minimal. By substituting ‘rabbit’ for ‘animal’ in the first disjunct of (Cj), 
we shall obtain the correct satisfaction theorem. Hence the perverse semantic theory 
Hookway requires is:
PT3
Axioms:
(d) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is an undetached rabbit part)
(dj) (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’ iff either
(a) ‘bianco’ occurs together with ‘gavagai’ and x is an undetached 
part of a white rabbit
or
(b) ‘bianco’ occurs in some other context and x is white)
Theorem:
(d2) (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is an undetached part of a
white rabbit))
Now, PT3 is behaviourally correct if the standard theory, ST, is—as required. 
Natives will only assent to ‘Blanco gavagai?’ in presence of a white rabbit. When 
dealing with white cats or white cows the second disjunct, (b), of (d]) will come to
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the rescue.29 Hookway’s disjunctive strategy, as reformulated in PT3, seems to 
succeed in eluding Evans’ counter-example. Unfortunately for the Quinean, as we’ll 
see next, Evans is not ready to surrender yet.
1.7 Evans’ Second Counter-Example: Widening the Scope o f Hookway’s 
Disjunctive Route
Evans (1975) is not specially worried about potential rejoinders to his first counter­
example (1.6 above). The reason is that even if a positive solution to the ‘white­
legged brown rabbit’ counter could be given, as Hookway’s strategy suggests, there 
are further problems that Evans thinks the Quinean will not be able to face. Evans 
switches to another line of attack which he believes is lethal for the Quinean. As 
Evans suggests, if the native language under study contains
some unstructured expressions whose satisfaction conditions were given on 
[ST] by use of ‘is partly red’ and ‘is partly green’, then, when we permute, it 
might be thought that these expressions could be given conditions satisfied by 
some but not all parts of the same rabbit. Thus the sentence whose truth 
conditions used to be given by [‘There is a rabbit here and it is partly red’] is 
now rendered by the use of [‘There is a rabbit part here and it is red’] —which 
has incontestably the same stimulus meaning [...] This theory, however, will 
not work if [ST] did. For the sentence [‘There is a rabbit here and it is partly 
red and it is partly green’] would occasionally elicit assent, inexplicable upon
29 The reader might expect the second disjunct in axiom (dj ), (b), to behave perversely too, as (a) 
does, keeping thus with the Quinean spirit. I address this issue in an introductory caveat in chapter 2, 
section 2.1, below. For the purposes o f  this chapter it suffices to appraise how Hookway’s ‘divide- 
and-rule’ strategy manages to elude Evans’ objection by means o f  a context-sensitive axiomatic base.
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the new theory, under which the sentence emerges as true iff there is a rabbit
part present which is both red and green. (Evans, 1975, pp. 359-60).
Evans contends that the putative empirical adequacy that Quinean perverse 
semantics enjoys will be lost as soon as we pay attention to more complex Native 
sentences. Any perverse counterpart of the standard English sentence ‘There is a 
rabbit here and it is partly red and it is partly green’ would fail to preserve stimulus 
synonymy, misrepresenting thus Native usage. I don’t think that Evans’ second 
counter-example can sink Quine’s project. In the remainder of this section I shall 
offer an extension of Hookway’s proposal which avoids loosing its empirical 
adequacy (assuming Evans’ hypothesized data). According to Evans, an extension 
of our standard theory, ST, would cope with, say, the unstructured Native 
expressions ‘parcial-rojo’ and ‘parcial-verde’ in the following way:
ST+
Axioms:
(a) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is a rabbit)
(a3) (x)(x satisfies ‘parcial-rojo’A/  iff (x is partly red & x satisfies /))
(a4) (x)(x satisfies ‘ parcial-verde’A/  iff (x is partly green & x satisfies f j)
Theorems:
(a5) (x)(x satisfies ‘parcial-rojo’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is partly red & x is a
rabbit))
(a6) (x)(x satisfies ‘parcial-verde’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is partly green & x is a
rabbit))
(a7) (x)(x satisfies ‘parcial-rojo’A‘parcial-verde’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is partly
red & x is partly green & x is a rabbit))
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Assuming that ST+ is behaviourally adequate, natives would assent for example to 
the combined construction ‘Parcial-rojo, parcial-verde gavagai?’ only in presence of 
a rabbit which is partly red and partly green. Now the challenge for the Quinean is 
to produce an alternative semantic theory to ST. A sympathiser of Hookway may 
contend that his disjunctive strategy can be deployed once more in order to cope 
with the hypothesized pool of data. Hence, our perverse semantic theory PT3 (see 
1.6 above) might be thought to deliver the goods via the following extension:
PT3+
Axioms:
(d) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is an undetached rabbit part)
(d3) (x)(x satisfies ‘parcial-rojo,A0 iff either
(a) Q = ‘gavagai’ and x is an undetached part of a partly red rabbit,
or
(b) 0 = / x‘gavagai’ and (x is an undetached part of a red rabbit and x 
satisfies gavagai ’),
or
(c) ‘parcial-rojo’ occurs in some other context and x is partly red)
(d4) (x)(x satisfies ‘parcial-verde,A0 iff either
(a) D = ‘gavagai’ and x is an undetached part of a partly green rabbit,
or
(b) D =yA‘gavagai’ and (x is an undetached part of a green rabbit and 
x sa tisfie sg av ag a i’),
or
(c) ‘parcial-verde’ occurs in some other context and x is partly 
green)
Theorems:
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(d5) (x)(x satisfies ‘parcial-rojo’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is an undetached part of
a partly red rabbit))
(d6) (x)(x satisfies ‘parcial-verde’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is an undetached part
of a partly green rabbit))
(d7) (x)(x satisfies ‘parcial-rojo’A‘parcial-verde’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is an
undetached part of a partly red, partly green rabbit))
The reader can see that by linking the satisfaction conditions of ‘parcial- 
rojo’/‘parcial-verde’ (when concatenated with ‘gavagai’) to things which are parts 
of partly red/partly green rabbits, we can avoid the results Evans predicted for the 
Quinean. The reason is simply that the partly-/ feature applies to whole rabbits (as 
is the case under ST), rather than to their parts. Hence, according to PT3+, native 
speakers will assent to the query ‘Parcial-rojo, parcial-verde gavagai?’ in exactly 
the contexts hypothesized by Evans: Namely, when a partly red, partly green rabbit 
appears in their visual field. Stimulus synonymy, contra Evans, is thus preserved.
Someone, however, may maintain that the proposal does not go far enough. 
Put bluntly, the problem for PT3+ stems from the fact that the native expressions 
‘parcial-rojo’ and ‘parcial-verde’ are not actually unstructured. Plausibly, by 
observing the linguistic behaviour of native speakers we’ll soon realise that they can 
talk of a wide variety of objects in their environment as being partly /  (where ‘/ ’ 
need not stand for a colour feature, but rather for any other property natives might 
ascribe to the object in question). So, they will be able to say, for instance, that a 
bottle is partly empty.30 But in that case, any semantic theory aiming to explain the
30 There is no point in arguing that, unlike English speakers, natives might lack the apparatus to 
construct this sort o f  combined expressions. As I mentioned earlier, Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis is 
meant to apply at Home (see 1.4 above), where we do employ ‘partly’ in many different contexts.
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linguistic competency of native speakers must tell us what the semantic value of 
‘partial’ is. By taking into account the systematicity manifested in the natives’ 
behaviour, we shall be able to determine the semantic value of ‘parcial / ’ out of the 
satisfaction conditions of the semantically primitive expressions ‘parcial’ and ‘/ ’. In 
this way, we’ll be able to grasp the semantic contribution that the simple term 
‘parcial’ makes in ‘parcial rojo’ as well as in for example ‘parcial vacfo’ (the 
expression that ST has correctly equated with our ‘partly empty’).
Nevertheless, acknowledging that ‘parcial rojo’ and ‘parcial verde’ are 
structured expressions should not occasion any distress to those sympathetic to 
Hookway’s route—at least insofar as we manage to produce a semantic theory 
containing separate axioms for ‘parcial’, ‘rojo’ and ‘verde’. The perverse semantic 
theory thus required, PT3++, would include the following disjunctive axioms:31
PT3++
Axioms:
(e) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is an undetached rabbit part)
(e^ (x)(x satisfies ‘rojo’ iff x is red)
(e2) (x)(x satisfies ‘verde’ iff x is green)
(e3) (x)(x satisfies / ' ‘gavagai’ iff (3y)(x is an undetached part of y & y is
a rabbit & y satisfies f)
(e4) (x)(x satisfies ‘ partial’-/*□ iff either
311 leave as an exercise for the reader to modify the standard theory, ST, (see section 1.6) so that it 
can account for the satisfaction conditions o f  ‘parcial’, ‘rojo’ and ‘verde’ in a structured  way.
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(a) 0 = ‘gavagai’ and (3y)(x is an undetached part of y & y is a rabbit 
& (3z)(z is an undetached part of y & z satisfies f ) ,32
or
(b) □ = ^ ‘gavagai’ and (3y)(x is an undetached part of y & y is a 
rabbit & y satisfies g  & (3z)(z is an undetached part of y & z 
satisfies f)
or
(c) □ = ‘parcial’-g*‘gavagai’ and (3y)(x is an undetached part of y & 
y is a rabbit & (3z)(z is an undetached part of y & z satisfies f)  & 
(3w)(w is an undetached part of y & w satisfies g)
or
(d) ‘parcial-rojo’ occurs in some other context and x is partly red)
The above axiomatic structure seems to deliver the goods to the Quinean. It delivers 
satisfaction theorems similar to those generated by PT3+—(d5), (ds) and (d7), so that 
the property of ‘being partly / ’ applies to whole rabbits, rather than to their parts. 
Otherwise, Evans’ counter would incontestably kick in. Thanks to P T ^ ,  we have 
no problem to account for the different possible uses of ‘parcial’. When natives talk 
about rabbits as being partly red, or partly green, we employ the first disjunct, (a) of 
(e4), together with the appropriate supplementary axiom for the particular value of/  
in question. Hence we get, for example, the theorem
(e5) (x)(x satisfies ‘parcial’A‘rojo’A‘gavagai’ iff (3y)(x is an undetached
part of y & y is a rabbit) & (3z)(z is an undetached part of y & z is 
red))
32 It could either be the case that x=z or x^z. Notice that all (a) in (e4) is saying is that x is an 
undetached part o f  a rabbit which has a part that is /:  It does not need to be the case that x is the part 
that the /  feature applies to.
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and also, for example
(e6) (x)(x satisfies ‘parcial’A‘rojo’A‘parcial’A‘verde’A‘gavagai’ iff (3y)(x
is an undetached part of y & y is a rabbit) & (3z)(z is an undetached 
part of y & z is red) & (3w)(w is an undetached part of y & w is 
green))
So, it seems that P T ^  can deal perfectly with, say, ‘parcial rojo, parcial verde 
gavagai’ when ‘parcial rojo’ and ‘parcial verde’ are taken to be structured. The 
satisfaction theorem for ‘Parcial rojo parcial verde gavagai’ is derivable from the 
semantic properties of its constituents. That is, from the semantic values of 
‘partial’, ‘rojo’, ‘verde’, and ‘gavagai’, specified respectively in axioms (e4), (e,), 
(e2) and (e). So, the way (e6) has been generated is the following. Since ‘parcial 
rojo’ occurs together with ‘parcial verde gavagai’, we employed the third disjunct,
(c), of (e4). Then in order to cash out the semantic vocabulary remaining in right 
hand side of (c) —i.e., z satisfies ‘rojo’ and w satisfies ‘verde’—we employed 
axioms (e^ and (e2). As we can see, a native guided by PT3++ will assent to/dissent 
from the query ‘Partial rojo, parcial verde gavagai?’ in exactly the same kind of 
contexts in which a native guided by ST would: Namely, when a rabbit which is 
partly red and partly green passess by. In conclusion, P T ^  is behaviourally 
adequate, and once again, stimulus synonymy, contra Evans, is preserved.
1.8 Conclusion
The discussion in sections 1.6, and 1.7 indicates that the Quinean need not be
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embarked on a lost cause (at least, with respect to Evans’ hypothesized data). We 
saw how Hookway modified Quine’s perverse manual to make it behaviourally 
correct. Initially, Hookway’s proposal failed to deliver the right satisfaction 
conditions. But, as I argued, Hooway’s ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy could be 
expanded to bypass Evans’ two counter-examples. Unfortunately, the problems for 
the Quinean are far from over. Hookway’s route succeeded in its task at the expense 
of deploying a somewhat barroque axiomatic structure. In the next chapter I shall 
review a couple of criticisms due to Evans, and Wright that exploit the structural 
complexity of Hookway’s route in order to discredit perverse semantic theorizing. 
The only way out for the Quinean seems to be to prove that structural simplicity 
cannot become alethic for semantic theories. That will be the topic for discussion of 
chapter 2.
2IS SIMPLICITY ALETHIC FOR SEMANTIC THEORIES?
2.1 Introduction
In chapter 1 we saw how an expanded version of Hookway’s disjunctive strategy 
bypasses two counter-examples Evans (1975) offered against Quine’s Inscrutability 
Thesis. Nevertheless, some philosophers have urged, Quine’s thesis is not saved by 
Hookway’s disjunctive reading. Evans (1981) and, more recently, Wright (1997) 
have argued on different grounds that, under certain conditions, structural 
simplicity may become alethic—i.e., truth-conducive—for semantic theories. Being 
structurally more complex than the standard semantic theory, Hookway’s 
disjunctive route (see section 1.6, above) is an easy prey for Evans’ and Wright’s 
considerations. The bulk of this chapter will be devoted to addressing Evans’ and 
Wright’s criticisms. I shall argue that both Evans’ and Wright’s criticisms are 
unmotivated, and do not jeopardize Hookway’s overall enterprise. But before that, 
let me just highlight a potential problem for Hookway that the careful reader may
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have spotted in chapter 1.
Hookway is careful not to offer his perverse disjunctive proposal as 
conclusive against Evans, but rather as ‘no more than a first approximation to a 
satisfactory response’ (Hookway, 1988, p. 155). Hookway acknowledges the 
possibility that ‘the attempt to develop [his] proposal consistently would run into 
technical difficulties’ {ibid., p. 155). Hookway makes these remarks with an eye to 
Evans’ potential attack based on structural simplicity (see 2.2 below). However, 
there is a more basic technical hurdle for Hookway’s proposal. Consider again how 
the Standard and Hookway’s disjunctive semantic theories of Native dealt with the 
Native expression ‘Blanco gavagai’ (see chapter 1). Recall that natives utter 
‘Blanco gavagai’ only when a white rabbit shows up in their visual field. On the one 
hand the Standard Theory, ST, deals with ‘Blanco gavagai’ in the following way:
ST
Axioms:
(a) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is a rabbit)
(a,) (x)(x satisfies ‘blanco’A/  iff (x is white & x satisfies /))
Theorem:
(a2) (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is white & x is a rabbit))
On the other hand, a version of Hookway’s alternative to the standard route ST, as 
modified in chaper 1, runs as follows:
PT3
Axioms:
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(d) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is an undetached rabbit part)
(dj) (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’ iff either
(a) ‘bianco’ occurs together with ‘gavagai’ and x is an undetached 
part of a white rabbit
or
(b) ‘bianco’ occurs in some other context and x is white)
Theorem:
(d2) (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is an undetached part of a
white rabbit))
Although PT3 is behaviourally adequate whenever ST is behaviourally adequate 
(see 1.6), the semantic perversity of PT3 is rather narrow in scope. PT3’s results 
coincide with the standard ones, as achieved via ST, except for rabbity expressions: 
The satisfaction conditions of ‘bianco’ are linked to undetached parts of white-... 
only when ‘bianco’ is coupled with ‘gavagai’. In all other cases, PT3 behaves 
standardly, taking ‘bianco’-related utterances to be associated with whole enduring 
white cats or white sheets of paper, for example. This hybrid character of PT3 (i.e., 
standard-cum-perverse) seems to be alien to Quine’s original pursuit. Quine’s aim 
was to produce a fully perverse alternative to ST in the sense that for every standard 
referent that ST picks out, a perverse counterpart is offered.1
Now, it seems that when we try to broaden the scope of Hookway’s perverse 
route we are in trouble. If PT3 is to account for Evans’ first counter (see section 1.6) 
while being fully-perverse, (dQ will have indefinitely many disjuncts. We will 
require an indefinite number of disjuncts in order to link the satisfaction conditions 
of ‘bianco’ to the appropriate wholes of undetached parts of rabbits, cats, cows,
1 See Quine, 1973, esp. chapter 3.
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paper, etc., etc. And the same will happen with respect to all those axioms required
for dealing with any other Native colour-word, and indeed, with any other Native
expression for which a version of Evans’ counter can be put forward. Therefore, it
may be the case that the perverse semanticist will not be able to state a fully-
perverse disjunctive semantic theory.
However, in fairness to Hookway, we ought to notice that this difficulty is
rooted on rather speculative grounds. First, it is unclear why the Quinean should not
favour an array of merely hybrid semantic theories, rather than a single fully-
perverse one. And second, even if the Quinean wishes to be fully-perverse, it is not
obvious that the aforementioned difficulty could not be overcome by some baroque
plot which the Quinean has up his sleeve (see chapter 3 below). Nevertheless, for
the purposes of this chapter we need not expand on these considerations. Were we
to concede the Quinean a position to fall back on for argument’s sake, there are still
two other criticisms due to Evans and Wright which, to many, seem to be crucial
against Hookway. Let’s take them in turn.
2.2 Evans ’ Mirror Constraint
In the closing passages of ‘Identity and Predication’ Evans remarks:
I do not pretend to have shown that a viable semantic theory based upon one 
of Quine’s suggestions cannot be constructed. Perhaps an ingenious person 
will show that the difficulties are less severe than they look, and thereby make 
something of Quine’s example of the indeterminacy of semantics. (Evans, 
1975, p. 363)
Despite this rethorical concession, Evans would not have been moved by
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Hookway’s strategy. According to Evans, a semantic theory, by contrast to a theory 
of translation, aims to provide a psychological explanation of the speakers’ verbal 
behaviour by singling out certain behavioural dispositions (see 1.5). Speakers’ 
behavioural dispositions, however, are to be understood in a full-blooded sense, 
thus marking a watershed with respect to the radical translator’s account of 
disposition, where previously all that mattered was the preservation of stimulus 
meaning (see 1.3). In Evans’ view, the semanticist must consider not only the 
linguistic regularities that natives may exhibit, but the underlying states that explain 
such regularities. In this way, we may talk not only of the behavioural dispositions 
themselves, but also of the causal explanatory states underlying those dispositions:
I suggest that we construe the claim that someone tacitly knows a theory of 
meaning as ascribing to that person a set of dispositions—one corresponding 
to each of the expressions for which the theory provides a distinct axiom. [... 
It] is essential that the notion of a disposition used in these formulations be 
understood in a full-blooded sense. [... The ascription of tacit knowledge] 
involves the claim that there is a single state of the subject which figures in a 
causal explanation of why he reacts in this regular way to all the sentences 
containing the expression. (Evans, 1981, pp. 124-5)2
Once we conceive semantic theories as psychologically real—i.e., as tacitly 
endorsed by the speakers of a language—a structural constraint, alien to the radical 
translator’s enterprise, comes into play. We should expect, Evans contends, that the 
derivational structure of the semantic theory tacily endorsed by the speakers of a 
language is somehow mirrored in the causal structures found in the speakers. That 
is the essence of what has become known as the mirror constraint. We may state it
2 The reader may care to consult Davies, 1986, for a development o f  Evans’ insights.
as follows:
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Mirror Constraint The derivational structure of a semantic theory—i.e.,
the canonical route leading from the theory’s axioms 
to the theorems produced—should mirror a causal 
structure found among the competencies of the 
speakers.
In a nutshell, the mirror constraint tells us that there must be an underlying causal 
explanation of the way competent speakers comprehend their language. And such a 
causal explanation will provide us with a picture of the actual route leading from 
the speaker’s dispositions associated with the atomic elements of their language (its 
names and predicates, etc.) to the overall states associated with the whole sentences 
they might produce.
The mirror constraint proves to be a useful tool, for instance, when confronted 
with extensionally equivalent semantic theories. Given two theories that deliver the 
same set of well-formed theorems, we may decide, on empirical grounds, which is 
the correct one by looking at the dispositions of the speakers. To illustrate it, Evans 
(1981) introduces an example of an artificial language, L, consisting of 10 names 
(‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, ..., ‘j ’) and 10 predicates (‘F’,’G’,’H’, ..., ‘O’). A competent speaker of 
L should be able to produce, and understand when uttered by a different speaker, 
100 different sentences—by coupling each name with all the predicates, one at a 
time. Nevertheless, we can be in possession of at least two semantic theories—call 
them Tj and T2—which are extensionally equivalent, agreeing thus in their 
specifications of the truth-conditions regarding the sentences of L. So, both Tx and 
T2 will specify, for example, that
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‘Fa’ is true (in L) iff Pete is sad,
and so on for the rest of the sentences of L. But whereas T! is composed of 100 
axioms—one for each well-formed sentence of L—, T2 has only 21 axioms— 10 for 
the names, 10 for the predicates and 1 for the coupling of a given name with any 
predicate. So the problem resides in choosing between T, (listiform theory) and T2 
{articulated theory).3
So far, the point we are interested in is how to use the mirror constraint in 
order to discover which is the correct theory. That is, can the causal structure 
underlying the speaker’s dispositions justify us in choosing one theory, as opposed 
to the other? At this point, Evans appeals to different empirical evidence we may 
have in order to explain speaker’s linguistic abilities, such as patterns of acquisiton 
or loss of understanding of sentences of L. We can observe what happens to the 
competencies of speakers when loosing competence of a particular sentence. Thus, 
imagine that as a result of a stroke a speaker looses competence with ‘Fa’. If by 
loosing competence with ‘Fa’ we observe that the speaker’s competence with the 
other 99 sentences remains intact, then we should infer that Tt is the correct theory.4 
Whereas if, on the other hand, we observe that when a speaker looses competence 
with ‘Fa’ she looses as well competence of all those other sentences in which either 
‘F’ or ‘a’ play a role, and she keeps intact her competence with all other sentences, 
and furthermore, something similar happens when the original sentence she lost her
3 See Miller (1997) for a comprehensive review o f  the mirror constraint.
4 Obviously, this follows from assuming that the choice is restricted to T] and T2— i.e., to a fu lly  
listiform semantic theory, and a fu lly  articulated one. Hybrid options would oblige the semanticist to 
withold his judgement until a wider range o f  evidence is considered.
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competence with is not ‘Fa’ but any other sentence, then we shall say that we are
justified, on empirical grounds, in choosing T2. So, it seems that the mirror
constraint provides us with a way to determine empirically which semantic theory is
the correct one.5
Although Evans’ target has been discrediting rival semantic theories which 
yield the same theorems as the standard one, it’s not difficult to see how Evans’s 
argument applies to cases where the theories under consideration are not thus 
equivalent, such as our standard theory, ST, of Native, and Hookway’s disjunctive 
alternative, PT3—see 2.1.
2.3 Full-blooded Semantics and Disjunctive Semantic Theories
One obvious advantage of Evans’ mirror constraint with respect to Quines 
scepticism towards the Theory of Reference is that hopefully a unique choice of 
referential scheme will be empirically grounded. This is because the tacit 
knowledge ascribed to the native speakers comes in terms of the causal-explanatory 
states attributed to natives—or better said, to their internal information-processing 
systems. And the structure of these states will clearly not be discovered from the 
armchair. Once we know what this structure is like, what the mirror constraint tells 
us is that it will mirror the derivational structure of the theory that is implicitly 
known. In this way, the anti-Quinean may deploy this further structural constraint; 
a constraint which is alien to the radical translator’s original enterprise, and which 
will thwart, Evans believes, any Quinean hope of transferring translational
5 For present purposes we need not go into the detail o f  Evans’ argument. The reader may care to 
consult Evans (1981), and Wright (1981) for a rejoinder to Evans.
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indeterminacy to the semantic field.
Evans (1975) contends that those semantic theories that divide the reference 
of ‘gavagai’ over undetached parts of rabbits may have a chance of working. 
Nevertheless, that’s only at the expense of attributing to the speakers of the 
language unwarranted dispositions—see Evans (1975), p. 363. Confronted with ST 
and PT3, we may find that native speakers do follow, though tacitly, ST, and not 
PT3, by observing for instance that mastering the term ‘bianco’ in contexts which do 
not include ‘gavagai’, permits natives to understand such expression in all contexts. 
If this were to be the case, then this behavioural evidence would favour ST over 
PT3, since native speakers would have just one single disposition for judging 
sentences containing ‘bianco’ as having such-and-such truth-conditions—as 
opposed to having two different dispositions, as occurs under PT3: one to account 
for the first disjunct, (a), of (d,), the other for the second disjunct, (b). On the other 
hand, were we to observe that loosing competence with ‘bianco’ in any non-rabbit 
context left unaltered the native’s understanding of ‘bianco’ when coupled with 
‘gavagai’, that would count as partial evidence for PT3.
Hookway (1988, pp. 155-62) considers Evans’ view that one semantic theory 
may give a better psychological explanation of a speaker’s verbal behaviour than 
another, but he believes that it poses no serious threat to PT3. His reason is that the
Quinean would simply reject as non-factual any psychologically-based criterion 
which goes beyond the description of the observable behaviour of speakers. 
Hookway’s Quinean notes that
unless psychological explanations simply allude to physical mechanisms, they 
do not enhance our knowledge of (physical) reality, (ibid, p. 159)
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However, Hookway is overlooking a crucial point: Namely, that Evans’ 
argument can be transposed into a form which a physicalist will have to admit as 
legitimate. The key point is that a physicalist should expect there to be some 
relation between speaker’s linguistic manifestations and the information content of 
physical states in their brains, such that the canonical route in a theory of meaning 
leading from its axioms to the theorems produced reflects a neurophysiological 
causal structure found underlying the competencies of the speakers.6 This means 
that there should be a neurophysiological explanation of the way competent 
speakers comprehend their language. And this causal explanation will provide us 
with a picture of the actual route leading from the speaker’s dispositions associated 
with the atomic elements of Native to the overall physical states associated with the 
whole sentences they produce. Hopefully, just one semantic theory will thus be 
empirically grounded since the tacit knowledge of the semantic theory ascribed to a 
certain speaker of Native comes in terms of the causal explanatory states attributed 
to her internal information-processing system.
Once we know how this internal system operates, it is theoretically plausible 
that we can determine whether a speaker tacitly follows ST or PT3. If future 
neuroscience reveals that there is one single neurophysiological state causally 
activated when a native utters ‘bianco’ in all different contexts, then that would
6 This is indeed Evans’ original approach: “The decisive way to decide which model is correct is by 
providing a causal, presumably neurophysiologically based, explanation o f  comprehension” (Evans 
1981, p. 127). In Quine’s view this is the correct level o f  analysis: “To cite a behavioural disposition 
is to posit an unexplained neural mechanism, and such posits should be made in the hope o f  their 
submitting some day to a physical explanation” (Quine 1975, p. 95)— see chapter 1.
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count as evidence against PT3, since assuming PT3 we would require two different 
neurophysiological states: Namely, one state exclusively responsible for ‘bianco’ 
when coupled with ‘gavagai’ and a different one causally responsible for all other 
‘bianco’-related utterances.7
Being an open empirical question whether there is actually a body of evidence 
favouring ST over PT3 let me close this section with two speculative remarks: 
Evans believes that considerations concerning the productivity and systematicity of 
language and thought, would tip the balance in favour of ST. Evans’ well-known 
generality constraint claims that:
if a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the 
conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every 
property of being G of which he has a conception. (Evans, 1982, p. 104)
By assuming the generality constraint we are committed to a demand for a causal 
systematicity in relation to our concept-mastering abilities.8 If we are to explain a 
set of inferences by appealing to a common piece of concept mastery, then there 
must be some internal factor which is common to all the inferential transitions. In 
short, by acknowledging the generality constraint we are demanding a single inner 
state which gets activated whenever a cognitive episode involving a given concept
7 Someone might object that speakers who follow PT3 are after all being tacitly guided by a simple, 
though compound, dispositional state. Namely, the disposition to assent to ‘bianco gavagai’ when 
there is an undetached part o f  a white rabbit in the vicinity o f  the native, and  to assent to ‘bianco f  
when there is a white f  The onus however would be on neuroscientists to explain what such a 
neurophysiological state would look like. This is nevertheless an open empirical question.
8 We may read Evans’ generality constraint as dealing with linguistic utterances, rather than 
concepts, for nothing hangs on the difference.
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occurs.
Unfortunately, we still lack the neuroscientific apparatus to judge whether the 
generality constraint is correct or not. In chapter 4 I shall argue that i f  certain 
connectionist models of human cognition are on the right track, then Evans’ mirror 
constraint and generality constraint have little chance of working.9
On the other hand, a second caveat concerns whether the mirror constraint 
does indeed favour ST over any perverse semantic theory the Quinean might 
produce. Someone may argue that the mirror constraint needs to be supplemented 
by some sort of uniqueness constraint, such that a system of dispositions will be 
empirically found to back ST, and that no more than one semantic theory will be 
correct under these empirical findings. Again, I must postpone development of this 
point until chapter 3, where I shall offer a perverse route which survives both the 
mirror constraint and the putative uniqueness constraint just canvassed.
Nevertheless, the anti-Quinean, without being committed to either the mirror 
constraint or the generality constraint, can still adduce further considerations aiming 
to discredit perverse semantic theories. Before I develop my main arguments in 
chapters 3 and 4 in defence of Quine’s inscrutability thesis, we must look at a 
different argument based again on structural simplicity considerations which Wright 
has recently offered to show that Hookway’s disjunctive strategy cannot be a viable 
alternative to ST.10
9 The reason— to advance one o f  the main points o f  my research (see chapter 4, below)— is that we 
need not posit tacit rules in order to explain the productivity and systematicity o f  language and 
thought (see Elman, 1998).
10 For an overview o f  Wright’s appraisal o f  Quine’s argument for the Thesis o f  the Inscrutability o f  
Reference and the reasons he produces against it, see Wright (1997).
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2.4 Wright's “MetodologicalSimplicity” Criterion
Crispin Wright (1992) has reshaped debates about Realism by offering a new 
landscape of what’s at stake in the discussions between realists and their opponents. 
Instead of arguing whether a given discourse can be truth apt, discussion should 
focus, Wright contends, on what kind of truth predicate a discourse can enjoy. 
Namely, whether truth for a discourse can be ‘robust’ or merely ‘minimal’. 
Wright’s approach has important implications for Quine’s Thesis of the 
Inscrutability of Reference. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to 
showing that an argument involving minimalism about truth which Wright (1997) 
offers against the Inscrutability Thesis fails by reductio. By the end of the chapter, 
we’ll see how Wright’s proposed frame for discussion of Realism bears on the 
metaphysical status of Semantic Theories.
A difficulty is raised by Wright (1997) which, if accepted, would favour ST 
over PT3—see 2.1. Wright introduces a criterion of ‘methodological simplicity’.11 
Wright admits that in general simplicity is not alethic:
[Simplicity] cannot be assumed, without further ado, to be an alethic—truth- 
conducive—virtue in empirical theory generally. There is prima facie sense in 
the idea that of two empirically adequate theories, it might be the more 
complex that is actually faithful to the reality which each seeks to
11 By ‘methodological simplicity’ Wright refers to the sort o f  structural simplicity considerations 
which seem to weaken Hookway’s disjunctive route. Note, however, that Wright would not agree 
with Evans’ structural simplicity argument as reviewed in the last section for Wright wouldn’t buy 
the mirror constraint— see Wright, 1981, and Miller, 1997.
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circumscribe. (Ibid., p. 411)
Although not alethic in general, simplicity is alethic, Wright thinks, in certain 
circumstances. There must be some ‘further ado’ that will transform what is not 
initially alethic into something alethic.
[The] thought that, when it comes to radical interpretation, there is an ulterior 
psychologico-semantical reality which an empirically adequate translation 
scheme might somehow misrepresent is, of course, exactly what Quine 
rejects—exactly what he famously stigmatizes as the myth of the semantic 
museum [see chapter 1]. And with that rejection in place, methodological 
virtues which are not, in realistically conceived theorizing, straightforwardly 
alethic can now become so. In such cases, the methodologically best theory 
ought to be reckoned true just on that account. It is therefore not enough for a 
defender of Quine to seek to save the alternative schemes by postulations 
which, though still principled and general, are comparatively expensive in 
terms of ambiguity and other forms of complication. If a simpler scheme is 
available, that fact is enough to determine that these alternatives are untrue, 
by the lights of the only notion of truth that, in Quine’s own view, can engage 
the translational enterprise. (Ibid., p. 411)
We can expand on the thinking behind Wright’s remark if we look at his discussion 
in Truth and Objectivity. Wright interprets Quine as an anti-realist about meaning. 
Applied to the case of discourse about meaning, the discussion in Truth and 
Objectivity allows that discourse about meaning will be apt for minimal truth and 
falsity, and some semantic theory may well be true. It is sufficient to be fitted for 
minimal truth, Wright contends, that a discourse meets the constraint of disciplined 
syntacticism: (a) The discourse must have sufficient discipline to support a practice 
of warranted assertion (i.e., the use of sentences must be standardly regulated such
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that uttering ‘p’ will or will not be considered appropriate depending of the 
situation in question). And, (b) the discourse must exhibit a number of syntactic 
possibilities that permits speakers to say things like ‘if p&q then p’, ‘not-p’, ‘I 
believe that p ’, etc. Disciplined syntacticism will ensure, Wright holds, that the 
discourse in question does deal with bona fide assertoric contents apt for truth and 
falsity. However, discourse about meaning will fail certain other tests by which a 
discourse qualifies as realist, and hence does not qualify for a ‘substantial’ notion of 
correspondence between true sentences of the discourse and the facts that make 
them true. Thus, Wright thinks that where a substantial notion of correspondence 
with the facts is in play, simplicity is not alethic. The more complex of two equally 
epistemically justified theories may be the one which corresponds to the facts. But 
where a minimal notion of truth is in play, the simpler theory is the true theory.
The key test by which Wright distinguishes a realist discourse from a 
discourse apt for mere minimal truth is ‘cognitive command’. A discourse exerts 
cognitive command if, and only if:
It is a priori that differences of opinion formulated within the discourse, 
unless excusable as a result of vagueness in a disputed statement, or in the 
standards of acceptability, or variation in personal evidence thresholds, so to 
speak, will involve something which may properly be regarded as a cognitive 
shortcoming. (Wright, 1992, p. 144)12
12 Notice the importance o f  stating ‘cognitive command’ as an a priori constraint. We may find areas 
o f  discourse where it happens to be the case that no disagreement ever emerges. However, we should 
not conclude from that that the discourse in question achieves or lacks cognitive command. Whether 
a discourse exerts cognitive command or not must depend on the content o f  those expressions 
belonging to the discourse. For an elaboration o f  this idea see Wright, 1992, pp. 94, 168-70.
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By ‘cognitive shortcoming’ Wright is thinking of any kind of shortcoming
belonging to one of the following three broad categories:
“divergent input”, that is, the disputants’ working on the basis of different 
information (and hence guilty of ignorance or error, depending on the status 
of that information), or “unsuitable conditions” (resulting in inattention or 
distraction and so in inferential error, or oversight of data and so on), or 
“malfunction” (for example, prejudicial assessment of data, upwards or 
downwards, or dogma, or failings in other categories already listed). {Ibid., p. 
93)
Wright’s idea then is that cognitive command will help us to discern whether the 
true assertions of a discourse represent states of the world in a genuinely realistic 
fashion. If a discourse passes the test of cognitive command, then its true assertions 
may represent the states of the world in a heavyweight manner. So to speak, 
cognitive command may help to beef up the notion of representation. In contrast, 
when a discourse does not pass the test of cognitive command, the notion of 
representation to be applied to that discourse will be lightweight, though, we must 
remember, not weightless since minimal notions of truth and falsity apply.
2.5 Beefing up Semantic Discourse: A Reductio contra Wright
This brief review of Wright’s approach to the realist/anti-realist debate will suffice 
to illuminate the bearing of Wright’s argument upon the acceptability of Hookway’s 
semantic theory PT3. Take two contesting theorists who each support respectively 
one of the rival referential schemes ST and PT3. They frame their respective 
theories in English. The question arises whether such theories, so framed, are apt
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for truth and, if so, whether such truth is minimal or robust—all according to 
Wright’s criterion. Wright is claiming that such theories are apt for minimal truth 
only, and that judged by the standards of minimal truth, only the standard theory is 
true. We may express Wright’s argument as follows:
Wright’s version of Quine’s assumptions
(i) Truth for semantic discourse is minimal.
(Wright’s reading of Quine’s rejection of the Museum Myth).
(H) Semantic discourse exerts assertoric discipline in that both the
Standard Theory—ST—and its Quinean alternative—PT3—are fully 
supported by the Native behavioural evidence.
(Assuming Quine’s idealization about the facts of Native behaviour).
Wright’s premises
(iii) If the truth for a discourse is minimal (and consequently the relation 
of correspondence and the facts which the discourse is about are 
minimal), then simplicity is alethic.
(iv) ST is simpler than its Quinean alternative—PT3.
Wright’s conclusion from (i)-(iv)
(v) ST is true and its Quinean alternative—PT3—is false.
However, we may now continue the argument as follows:—
Assumption
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(vi) ST and PT3 are the only semantic theories which are fully supported 
by Native behavioural evidence.13
If we take premises (i)-(iv) and (vi) and add to them a further premise, then we may 
derive a contradiction from the whole set of premises:
Additional premise
(vii) If semantic discourse exerts cognitive command, then truth for
semantic discourse is not minimal (and consequently the relation of
correspondence and the facts to which the truths correspond are not 
minimal).
We proceed,
(viii) Semantic discourse exerts cognitive command.
(From (v) and (vi), since only the Standard Theory—ST—is 
assertable).
Therefore {contra (i)),
(ix) Truth for semantic discourse is not minimal.
(From (vii) and (viii)).
13 Quine claims that there is an indefinite set o f fully behaviourally adequate theories. For simplicity 
I have limited the alternatives to ST and PT3, since this does not affect the substance o f  the 
argument. As is Wright, we are assuming ST is the simplest o f  all behaviourally adequate theories, 
and PT3 is acting as a representative o f  all the rivals to ST.
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We cannot accept the whole set of premises {(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (vi) and (vii)} since 
they are inconsistent, yielding a contradiction between (i) and (ix). However, we 
shall not reject (i) or (ii) because we wish to stick, with Wright, to Quine’s 
proposed frame of discussion. Nor will we question the simplifying assumption
(vi). So, the premise to be abandoned must be either (iii), (iv) or (vii). In agreement 
with Wright, I shall not question (iv).14 So, we are left with (iii) and (vii). I shall go 
for (iii)—arguing that simplicity cannot become alethic for semantic theories (even 
though we accept that the truth predicate to be applied to semantic discourse 
remains minimal). Wright’s best shot then is to go for (vii)—the additional premise 
I assumed in order to obtain the reductio. So, let’s see whether such an option is 
available to Wright.
Wright argues that passing the test of cognitive command is a necessary 
condition for a beefed up notion of representation—i.e., the kind of heavyweight 
representational status to be associated with a robust (not minimal) account of truth. 
However, Wright’s position allows that cognitive command is not a sufficient 
condition for robust truth. He sums up his general position as follows:
Suppose a class of predications such that it can never be a priori excluded that 
disagreement about one of them originates in some variation in a particular 
non-cognitive disposition of the disputants. Then there will be no obstacle to 
defining a range of concepts, cognate to those distinctive of the predications 
in question, such that nothing counts as a disagreement about the application 
of one of these concepts unless the disputants share the relevant non- 
cognitive disposition. By describing a disagreement as focused upon the
14 At least for the purposes o f  this chapter. In chapter 3 I shall offer a perverse semantic theory in the 
line o f  PT3 which is actually as simple, methodologically speaking, as the Standard Theory, ST.
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application of one of these latter concepts, we can thus preempt the possibility 
that it has one particular kind of non-cognitive source. Nevertheless, the 
operation o f  the non-cognitive disposition is no less involved in the 
application o f the new concepts than in that o f  the old. It is not that we now 
stand on firmer ground, or engage more “robust” matters. (Ibid., p. 224), 
(Last emphasis added).
An example of Wright’s will illustrate the point. Suppose comic discourse—i.e., 
discourse about what is and is not funny—is sufficiently disciplined and has the 
right kind of syntax to support a truth predicate. Thus, practitioners of comic 
discourse will agree, for example, that it is not funny that I have two hands (in a 
‘normal’ context). They will also agree that one who denied that Charlie Chaplin or 
Buster Keaton were funny would be deemed to be wrong and to lack a sense of 
humour. However, plausibly, comic discourse does not pass the test of cognitive 
command. Practitioners may disagree as to whether Buster Keaton is funnier than 
Charlie Chaplin, but agree that neither of them is in cognitive error. They may just 
have somewhat different senses of humour, such that their disagreement is not 
reducible to other areas of discourse concerning non-comic facts. The difference 
between their senses of humour is within the limits of what is normal for their 
community. Hence, following Wright, we are supposing that comic discourse does 
not exert cognitive command and is therefore apt only for minimal truth. Now, 
imagine a ‘subcommunity of comic empathisers’ (Ibid., pp. 223-4) such that their 
senses of humour coincide perfectly. Whenever they are in disagreement about a 
comic situation, their disagreement is always explicable in terms of a dispute about 
non-comic aspects of the discourse. We could then imagine this subcommunity 
setting up a new discourse, comic*, which does exert cognitive command. 
Practitioners of comic* discourse introduce a new set of concepts such that it is a
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priori that if two people disagree as to whether something is funny *, then one of 
them must be in cognitive error. Hence, when comic empathisers disagree as to 
whether Buster Keaton is funnier* than Charlie Chaplin, they will maintain, in 
contrast to what we do in the case of comic discourse, that one or other is in 
cognitive error. This error involves a cognitive defect, a false appraisal about some 
non-comic* fact about the situation. However, Wright plausibly claims:—
the mix of the cognitive and the affective in the basis for opinions about
comedy* is exactly the same as it is for opinions about comedy. (Ibid., p. 224)
Therefore, the fact that comic* discourse passes the test of cognitive command 
whereas comic discourse doesn’t, does not imply that the first enjoys a beefed up 
notion of representation. It seems then that all they achieve by replacing concepts of 
the comic by concepts of the comic* is, as Wright puts it, “objectivity for cheap” 
(Ibid. p. 224). The moral of the comic* example is that cognitive command is not 
sufficient for realism. Thus, premise (vii) in the above derivation cannot be assumed 
without further ado.
However, the key issue, I shall contend, is that the results achieved in the area 
of comedy cannot be applied to the case of semantics. In general, I offer the 
following conjecture:
(C) If a discourse exerts cognitive command, then realism is the default 
presumption. The discourse is apt for robust truth unless reason can 
be found to downgrade the notion of truth involved in the discourse.
In the comic scenario reason was offered by Wright to show why comic* discourse 
is apt only for minimal truth, even though it passes the test of cognitive command.
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As we’ve just seen, Wright argues that the same non-cognitive disposition is
involved in both judgements—i.e., those judgements concerning the comic and
those concerning the comic*. However, there is no parallel between comic and
semantic discourses. By assuming that simplicity is alethic, semantic discourse
exerts cognitive command. But there is no case for claiming that some non-
cognitive disposition is involved in our semantic judgements. The dispute between
an advocate of ST and an advocate of PT3 doesn’t depend on assuming vagueness in
the Native statements under dispute or in the standards of acceptability, or on
variations in personal evidence thresholds. Any disagreement, then, must involve a
cognitive error on the part of the perverse semanticist since she is overlooking a
crucial alethic datum: Namely, that the assertoric discipline of semantic discourse is
subject to a principle of simplicity. And, simplicity being alethic, the perverse
semanticist is guilty of ‘malfunction’—a kind of cognitive shortcoming noted by
Wright (Ibid., p. 93). The perverse semanticist is prejudicially assessing the data, in
the light of the availability of ST.
The position we have reached is this: Wright’s best shot was to reject (vii),
(vii) If semantic discourse exerts cognitive command, then truth for 
semantic discourse is not minimal (and consequently the relation of 
correspondence and the facts to which the truths correspond are not 
minimal).
Wright has shown that in general cognitive command is not sufficient for robust 
truth, by the example of the comic empathisers. However, I have claimed that were 
we to take semantic discourse to pass cognitive command because simplicity is 
alethic, then there would be no reason to deny that semantic truth is robust. Hence,
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denying (vii) does not give Wright a satisfactory way of avoiding the contradiction.
There is however a possible rejoinder. Wright might reject (C) by claiming 
that cognitive command and an additional condition are jointly sufficient for 
realism. This additional condition is that the discourse has an ‘intuitional 
epistemology’. Wright connects the idea of robustness to the notion of an intuitional 
epistemology when discussing a hypothetical ‘trivialising theorist’ (Ibid., pp. 148- 
57). The trivialiser complains that the test of cognitive command is vacuous. Given 
disagreement within a discourse, it is not clear whether the discourse satisfies the 
constraint since we don’t know what to count as a cognitive shortcoming. If we take 
any disagreement within a discourse which intuitively fails the test of cognitive 
command, the trivialiser would claim that the disagreement actually involves a 
cognitive shortcoming since “ignorance or error will at least be involved concerning 
the truth value o f the disputed statement” (Ibid., p. 149). In order to avoid this risk 
of trivialisation, Wright brings into play the notion of an intuitional epistemology. 
That is, an epistemology such that our judgements concerning the subject-matter of 
the discourse are justified in a non-inferential manner. Wright contends that 
assertions that beefily represent the facts need to be backed by an intuitional 
epistemology.
Hence, Wright might reject conjecture (C) above. He may claim that truth for 
semantic discourse is minimal—even though it exerts cognitive command— 
because semantic discourse is not backed by an intuitional epistemology. We 
observe the verbal behaviour of the natives in their jungle setting. We do not 
observe semantic facts—see chapter 1. Our semantic discourse postulates semantic 
facts to explain the observed behaviour. Hence, it seems, Wright has found a reason 
why truth for semantic discourse is minimal even though it exerts cognitive
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command.
I don’t think that this line of argument will work. The reason is that it will not 
fit Wright’s overall position. Wright would accept that, for instance, discourse 
about microphysical facts does exert cognitive command and is furthermore to be 
interpreted in a robust sense. Nonetheless, we lack an intuitional epistemology for 
microphysical facts, since we have intuitional access only to the observable facts of 
physics. Microphysics postulates unobservable—theoretical—facts beyond the 
reach of our observational capacities. And yet Wright would agree that these so 
called theoretical facts (i.e., the facts of microphysics) are robust. Parallel to this, it 
seems we have intuitional access to the behaviour of natives in their jungle context, 
and we postulate unobservable (theoretical) semantic facts to explain the verbal 
aspects of their behaviour. So, we can see that the lack of an intuitional 
epistemology does not provide us with a reason why semantic discourse exerts 
cognitive command and yet truth for that discourse remains minimal.
We saw that premises (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (vi) and (vii) imply a contradiction. 
We are not questioning (i) and (ii) because they form the Quinean background to 
the discussion. We also granted (iv) and the simplifying premise (vi) for the 
purposes of this chapter. That left (iii) and (vii) as candidates for a reductio. We 
have now seen that (vii) stands. Hence, I conclude that it is (iii) which must go. 
Simplicity for semantic discourse cannot become alethic.
2.6 The Metaphysical Status o f Semantics
Where does the preceding discussion leave us regarding the metaphysical status of 
semantics? We’ve seen that simplicity is not alethic. But this leaves us in an
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uncomfortable position. It might seem now that semantic discourse has too little 
discipline to support even minimal truth. Wright makes some remarks about the 
amount of discipline required for minimal truth aptness in connection to comic 
discourse. For comic statements to be minimally true, we require a minimum of 
discipline such that practitioners of the discourse will agree that, for example, in a 
normal context it is not funny that I have two hands. The discourse may then 
become slack in other cases.
However, in the case of semantic discourse, taking simplicity not to be 
alethic, we find that there is no discipline at all. This may not seem obvious at first 
sight. The standard semantic theory, ST, and its perverse counterpart, PT3, as spelt 
out in section 2.1, differ only on the satisfaction theorems that both theories 
generate respectively in order to deal with the Native sentence ‘Blanco gavagai’:
ST: (a2) (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is white & x is a rabbit))
PT3: (d2) (x)(x satisfies ‘blanco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is an undetached part of a
white rabbit))
But by looking exclusively to (a2) and (d2), someone might argue, we cannot 
justifiably claim that semantic discourse is not disciplined at all. We simply don’t 
possess enough evidence to argue so. Nonetheless, by recalling Quine’s approach to 
Radical Translation this worry disipates. According to Quine’s setting of Radical 
Translation—see chapter 1—, the only agreement between standard and perverse 
translators is on logical constants, on signs of assent and dissent and on highly
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observation sentences.15 Quine’s original pursuit was to produce a fully perverse
alternative to ST in the sense that for every standard referent that ST picks out, a
perverse counterpart is offered. Plausibly then, we may extend PT3 such that for
each theorem (a j of ST of the form:
(an) (x) (x satisfies‘N’ if f ...),
the Quinean will produce a rival account that yields a theorem (d j of the form:
(dn) (x) (x satisfies ‘N’ iff ...)
where what fills out the dots in (dn) differs in extension from what fills out the dots 
in ST’s theorem (aj. The idea is to achieve semantic perversity by producing a 
scheme of reference that conforms to all possible evidence, and yet assigns different 
extensions to most of the Native terms from those assigned by ST. This would 
ensure the aforementioned lack of discipline— insofar as ST and its perverse 
counterpart are behaviourally adequate and equally correct.
At this point the careful reader may have spotted a difficulty. As I pointed out 
in section 2.1, although being behaviourally adequate, the semantic perversity of 
Hookway’s strategy is rather narrow in scope. The hybrid character of PT3— 
standard-cum-perverse (see 2.1)—, someone may contend, might bring enough 
discipline for semantic discourse to support a truth predicate (at least, minimally).
15 Though maybe not even this much could be given for granted. The disagreement might even be 
wider than initially expected. See Levy (1970) for scepticism about agreement on assent/dissent 
signs, and see Quine (1973), pp. 81-3, for a perverse rendering o f  highly observation sentences such 
as ‘Red’.
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In fairness to Wright, this may well be the case. Nevertheless, we need not dwell on 
this issue since in the next chapter I shall offer a perverse route which is fully 
perverse, undermining thus this potential problem for Hookway’s hybrid 
alternative. Therefore, granting that the Quinean can produce a fully perverse 
semantic route—see chapter 3, below—I conclude that semantic discourse is not 
disciplined enough in order to enjoy the benefits of a truth predicate, not even the 
benefits of minimal truth.
This position is congenial to Quine—see chapter 1, and chapter 7, below. 
Quine is an eliminative materialist who claims there are no semantic facts. In 
contrast, if we make simplicity alethic in order to enforce sufficient discipline to 
support a truth predicate for semantic discourse, we get cognitive command and 
hence, as we saw, robust truth as well. We are thus jumping from no truth at all to 
robust truth. Wright has failed to show that there is metaphysical room for semantic 
facts which are not robust facts.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I considered two arguments put forward by Evans (1981) and Wright 
(1997) respectively, which threatened Hookway’s perverse semantic proposal. 
Exploiting the fact that Hookway’s perverse semantic theory is structurally more 
complex than the standard theory, ST, Evans and Wright argued, on different 
grounds, that Hookway’s route looses its empirical adequacy since, under certain 
conditions, structural simplicity may become alethic for semantic theories. The bulk 
of chapter 2 has been devoted to arguing that both Evans’ and Wright’s criticisms 
are unmotivated, and cannot jeopardize Hookway’s overall enterprise.
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Nevertheless, even if the arguments I’ve developed in this chapter were
shown to be wrong, the Inscrutability Thesis would still not be endangered by
Evans’ and Wright’s considerations. In the next chapter I shall pursue a perverse
semantic route which differs substantially from the one advanced by Hookway. My
proposal is as simple—structurally speaking—as its standard counterpart. Thanks to
this feature, my strategy, I shall contend, is not subject to putative rejoinders along
Evans’ and Wright’s ‘structural-simplicity’ lines. Furthermore, it is not subject
either to certain other criticisms that I shall review in the next chapter; criticisms
that tell against Hookway’s proposal.
3SEMANTIC PER VERSITY
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I shall propose a perverse theory of reference which differs 
substantially from the one advanced by Hookway in his attempt to bypass Evans’ 
counter-examples (see chapter 1). In view of the results achieved in chapter 2, 
where I contended that Evans’ and Wright’s ‘structural simplicity’ considerations 
leave Hookway’s proposal unaffected, let me outline the motivations for pursuing a 
different proposal. The perverse semantic translation manual I shall be offering is as 
simple, structurally speaking, as the standard translation manual, ST. Thanks to this 
feature, my strategy is not subject to certain criticisms which may put Hookway’s 
proposal in jeopardy, thereby becoming an overall better candidate for the Quinean 
to fulfill her goal.
First, as I argued in chapter 2, Evans’ ‘structural simplicity’ argument can be 
transposed into a physicalist format, threatening Hookway’s disjunctive proposal.
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Evans hoped to cut down the number of empirically adequate semantic theories to 
just one—namely, the standard theory, ST—by considering the neurophysiological 
states that speakers are being attributed as causally (explanatory) active, both in 
linguistic production and comprehension—see 2.3. I acknowledged that it is an 
open empirical question whether there is actually a body of neurophysiological 
evidence that favours those semantic theories that are structurally simpler. Whether 
or not Evans’ mirror constraint—see 2.2—can deliver him the goods is a matter for 
future research in the neurosciences, and will ultimately depend on what kind of 
architecture embeds our higher cognitive abilities—see section 2.3, and chapter 4 
below. But insofar as Evans’ constraint is drawn from a physicalist framework, its 
bearing is a theoretical possibility that the Quinean cannot ignore. Fortunately for 
the Quinean, the proposal I shall advance, being as simple—structurally speaking— 
as ST, undermines Evans’ considerations.
Moreover, my proposal has another advantage over Hookway’s. In section
3.5 ,1 shall consider an extension of Quine’s succinct behavioural criteria of Radical 
Translation (see 1.2, and 1.3 above) suggested by Jaakko Hintikka’s Game- 
Theoretical Semantics (1973; 1976). I shall argue that Hintikka’s semantics suggest 
behavioural criteria which we can use to constrain perverse semantic theories. In 
particular, I shall try to show that whilst Hintikka’s behavioural data tells against 
Hookway’s disjunctive proposal, it reveals, nonetheless, further reasons (beyond 
structural simplicity) as to why my perverse semantic proposal enjoys the same 
privileged status that the standard theory, ST, is supposed to enjoy. So, without 
further ado, let’s flesh out these considerations.
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3.2 A Perverse Way o f Dividing Reference over Parts o f Things
Evans’ (1975) attack on Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis has been so widely well 
received by the philosophical community because of an implicit, though misleading, 
assumption made by foes and sympathizers of Quine alike. Namely, that reference 
is to be divided over objects in a monolithic fashion. Evans (1975, p. 362) talks in 
terms of semantic theories that cut the reference of ‘gavagai’ finer than the standard 
theory does—e.g., over undetached rabbit parts.1 It is however tacitly assumed that 
finer cuts, such as the division of the reference of ‘gavagai’ over undetached rabbit 
parts, constitute a monolithic block. That is, the axioms that deal with the 
satisfaction conditions of ‘gavagai’ and ‘ gavagai’'Y are spelt out such that any 
undetached rabbit part smaller than a whole enduring rabbit satisfies the argument.
However, I contend, we need not cluster all undetached rabbit parts under the 
same semantic theory. Rabbit claws, feet, legs and heads are undetached parts of 
rabbits. But we can differentiate among them, and articulate semantic theories 
whose axioms deal with those anatomical parts separately. In this way, ‘gavagai’, 
under one particular scheme, might be taken to divide its reference over undetached 
legs of rabbits, for instance; under another scheme, over undetached tails of rabbits; 
and so forth. Unfortunately, were the semanticist to specify which particular 
anatomical part of a rabbit her scheme makes use of, it would be fairly easy for the 
anti-Quinean to rebut the proposal. Simply by pointing; for even though every time 
you point to a rabbit, you are pointing to an undetached rabbit part, you need not
1 For present purposes I shall ignore Quine’s coarser cuts. The reader may care to consult Evans 
(1975). Wright (1997) offers a critical appraisal o f  all the different Quinean proposals (both finer 
and coarser) and o f  Evans’ counters to all o f them.
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point to, say, its leg in every occasion. Therefore, the semanticist will be able to 
discard, on inductive grounds (see chapter 1) a particular undetached rabbit part as 
the target of the native’s ostensive behaviour.2 Nevertheless, there is a better option 
available to the Quinean.
I shall propose a particular way to discriminate among schemes of reference 
denoting diverse undetached rabbit parts that is not subject to the aforementioned 
difficulties. We may talk in terms of the percentage of the whole rabbit, including 
the percentage of its surface, that each scheme assigns as the extension of ‘gavagai’. 
In this way, one putative scheme may claim that ‘gavagai’ divides its reference over 
5% of the whole rabbit, including 5% of its surface (henceforth abbreviated 5%-urp: 
—i.e., 5% undetached rabbit part). Another scheme over 20%-urp; another over 
80%-urp, and so on. Notice that neither pointing nor questioning (see chapter 1) can 
help to solve the referential indeterminacy. Every time you point to a rabbit, you are 
pointing to a 5%-urp, to a 20%-urp, to an 80%-urp, etc. Moreover, any further 
questioning beyond querying ‘Gavagai?’ that involves the apparatus of 
individuation (identity, plurals, etc.), will be dependent on imputing to the natives 
our ontology when interpreting such questions. By employing Quine’s juggling 
strategy (1.5), we may take natives’ assent to/dissent ffom any given query as 
evidence in favour of a ‘x%-urp’ scheme, as opposed to the standard one—see 
below.
2 In fairness to Quine it must be noted that the case is not quite settled. It is unclear that the Quinean 
could not reestablish the empirical adequacy o f her perverse scheme by means o f  some cumbersome 
plot which she has up her sleeve. However, the burden o f  proof is on the Quinean to make her case, 
and I fail to see how she could preserve structural simplicity, but I shall not press on this point.
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Let’s see how some semantic theories that cut the reference of ‘gavagai’ over 
x%-urp can cope with Evans’ white-legged brown rabbit. Take, for instance, a 
perverse semantic theory that divides the reference of ‘gavagai’ over 5%-urp. Such 
a theory would include the following axioms:
(p*) (x) (x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is a 5%-urp), and
(p**) (x) (x satisfies ‘ bianco’A/  iff (x is white & x satisfies /))
Hence, taking the satisfaction conditions for ‘bianco’ in the standard way3, our 
putative semantic theory will generate theorem (p):
(p) (x) (x satisfies ‘bianco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is white and x is a 5%-urp))
However, such a perverse semantic theory would not resist Evans’ attack. A version 
of Evans’ first counter-example (see 1.3) would kick in. Think of a brown rabbit 
which, instead of having a white leg, has 5% of its surface white-coloured. In this 
case, natives guided by (p) would assent to ‘Blanco gavagai?’ when stimulated by a 
5%-white-coloured brown rabbit. Whiteness distributed all over a 5%-urp would 
not work since it elicits the wrong answer under certain circumstances. Semanticists 
agreed that natives would not assent to ‘Blanco gavagai?’ unless they are in 
presence of a white rabbit—see 1.5. And clearly an object which only has 5% of its 
surface 0-coloured does not count as a 0-coloured object.
The careful reader may have guessed by now what the next move for the 
Quinean should be. Evans’ initial contention (see 1.5) about compound expressions
3 Note that (p**) coincides with (a!)— i.e., the axiom employed by the standard theory, ST— see 1.6.
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such as ‘bianco gavagai’ was that ‘bianco’ had to be distributed in a particular way 
with respect to the boundaries of the object prompting native’s assent to the query 
‘Gavagai?’ The key word is distribution. In natural languages, when we say that a 
rabbit is white, we are assuming that the white feature is distributed more or less 
uniformly over all the surface of the rabbit. Let’s say that when the percentage of 
white-coloured surface is equal or bigger than 13, then we take the rabbit as white.4 
Now, my contention is that a perverse scheme that divides the reference of 
‘gavagai’ over 13%-urp will cope with Evans’ white-legged brown rabbit. Take 13 for 
instance as 99%. The perverse theory would then run as follows:
PT4
Axioms:
(e) (x) (x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is a 99%-urp)
(et) (x) (x satisfies ‘bianco’A/  iff (x is white & x satisfies f))
Theorem:
(e2) (x) (x satisfies ‘bianco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is white & x is a 99%-urp))
Now, let’s see how this perverse referential scheme behaves under Evans’ pool of
data. The question is: Would the native guided by PT4 assent to ‘Blanco gavagai?’ 
when a brown rabbit with a white leg is in his presence? Certainly not, for the 
native will only assent to the query when the 99% of the surface of the rabbit is
4 I can set up the example in terms o f percentage-of-surface (rather than volume) since we are 
restricting our attention to highly observational features such as ‘colour’ which applies to the 
external surface o f  objects. Notice, however, that since the ‘x%-urp’ scheme was defined in terms o f  
x% o f  whole objects, including x% o f their surfaces, we could bypass putative versions o f Evans’ 
counter that exploited volume features— like mass.
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white. Hence, Evans’ first counter-example is not a counter to PT4. Those 
sympathetic to Evans would have to develop a different version of his counter in 
which the white portion of the brown rabbit is bigger. But not any bigger portion 
will do. We require the brown rabbit to have a white part occupying the 99% of its 
surface. But in this case, we would be confronted with a white rabbit, rather than 
with a brown one. Therefore, Evans’ example is unable to show that PT4 
misrepresents native usage. A translator guided by this perverse scheme will predict 
native assent to/dissent from ‘Blanco gavagai?’ in exactly the same sort of 
situations in which a ‘non-perverse’ translator would. The reason is that rabbits and 
99%-urp are observationally indistinguishable.
The reader can see that the ‘99%-urp’ scheme differs from ST in a non-trivial 
way. What we need to achieve semantic perversity is a scheme of reference that 
conforms to all possible evidence, and yet assigns different extensions to the native 
terms from those assigned by ST. The following is a priori'.
(x)(y) (x = y ->  (z) (z is a part of x <-> z is a part of y)
This condition establishes the semantic perversity of PT4. Since 99 is smaller than 
100, there will always be an undetached part of a whole rabbit which does not 
belong to the given 99%-urp: —namely, a 1%-urp. Hence, the perversity of PT4 is 
real in the sense that the set of objects satisfying the property of being white does 
not coincide with the set of objects contemplated under ST.
Bearing in mind these results, we can now go back to one of the caveats left 
unanswered in chapter 2. In section 2.3, I called into question whether Evans’ 
mirror constraint does indeed favour ST over any perverse semantic theory the 
Quinean might produce—granting for argument’s sake that future neuroscientific
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research might tip the balance in Evans’ favour. As I hinted, someone may argue 
that the mirror constraint needs to be supplemented by some sort of uniqueness 
constraint.5 The motivation behind this putative constraint was to secure that no 
more than one semantic theory will be correct under the potential empirical findings 
that the mirror constraint hopes to exploit. By comparing the semantic structure of 
PT4 with that of ST, we’ll soon realize that the Quinean has no reason to worry. 
Recall ST and PT4:
ST
Axioms:
(a) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is a rabbit)
(a^ (x)(x satisfies ‘blanco’A/  iff (x is white & x satisfies /))
Theorem:
(a2) (x)(x satisfies ‘blanco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is white & x is a rabbit))
PT4
Axioms:
(e) (x) (x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is a 99%-urp)
(ej) (x) (x satisfies ‘bianco’A/  iff (x is white & x satisfies /))
5 For current purposes we need not worry about how to flesh out this additional constraint. The 
reason for this will become apparent in a moment. Nevertheless, note that the issue hinges on what 
source o f  evidence the uniqueness constraint can exploit. And at this point, the debate has been 
framed so that only behavioural and neurophysiological data is relevant (see section 1.2, above). 
Appealing to normative considerations to state a uniqueness constraint would beg the question.
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Theorem:
(e2) (x) (x satisfies ‘ bianco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is white & x is a 99%-urp))
Notice that derivations in PT4 have exactly the same syntactic structure as 
derivations in the standard theory, ST. Therefore, if the data Evans hypothesized 
(see 2.3) showed that any semantic theory aiming to explain Native linguistic 
behaviour ought to do so by means of non-disjunctive axioms, PT4 would conform 
to such a constraint. Evans suggested that by observing for instance that mastering 
the term ‘bianco’ in contexts which do not include ‘gavagai’ permits natives to 
grasp such expression in all contexts, that would count as evidence in favour of ST, 
as opposed to baroque alternatives such as Hookway’s. However, PT4 being as 
simple structurally speaking as ST, the chances for Evans to articulate such a 
constraint become slimmer. Natives who follow PT4 will not be attributed 
unwarranted dispositions of the kind Evans suggests since natives would have just 
one single disposition for judging sentences containing ‘bianco’ as having such- 
and-such truth conditions. The indeterminacy, thus, remains unsolved. We haven’t 
got a clue as to whether ‘gavagai’ divides its reference over rabbits or 99%-urp.
3.3 The ‘99%-urp ’ Scheme and Evans ’ Second Counter-Example
As I mentioned in chapter 1, Evans is not moved by potential rejoinders to his 
white-legged brown rabbit counter-example. Even if the ‘99%-urp’ scheme 
manages to bypass Evans’ first counter-example, Evans raises a further problem for 
the Quinean. Evans— see 1.7—considered the native sentence ‘Parcial rojo gavagai’ 
which according to the standard manual gets translated into English as ‘There is a 
rabbit here and it is partly red’. We imaiy nonetheless translate ‘Parcial rojo gavagai’
Semantic Perversity 80
a la Quine, Evans acknowledges, as ‘There is a rabbit part here and it is wholly red’. 
Notice that ‘There is a rabbit here and it is partly red’ and ‘There is a rabbit part 
here and it is wholly red’ are stimulus synonymous. So far, so good. However, 
Evans goes on to argue that the Quinean proposal will loose its empirical adequacy 
as soon as we pay attention to more complex Native sentences. Consider the native 
sentence ‘Parcial rojo, parcial verde gavagai’, which we can standardly translate as 
‘There is a rabbit here and it is partly red and it is partly green’. The perverse 
rendering required, in order to preserve stimulus synonymy, Evans contends, would 
be something like ‘There is a rabbit part here and it is wholly red and it is wholly 
green’. But such a translation clearly misrepresents Native usage, since it represents 
natives as assenting to ‘Parcial rojo, parcial verde gavagai?’ in presence of a rabbit 
part which is both wholly red and wholly green.
We saw in section 1.7 how a version of Hookway’s disjunctive strategy could 
be successfully applied to cope with Evans’ recalcitrant data. However, Hookway’s 
strategy could only be applied at the expense of a greater complexity in the 
formulation of the axioms required to generate the appropriate satisfaction 
theorems. Fortunately for the Quinean we can once more make use of the ‘99%-urp’ 
referential scheme to avoid Evans’ second counter-example in a way which doesn’t 
bring the structural complexity that Hookway’s alternative implied. Consider the 
following extension of PT4:
P T /
Axioms:
(e) (x) (x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is a 99%-urp)
(e3) (x) (x satisfies ‘parcial’A/ A0  iff (3y) (y is an undetached part of x &
y satisfies f )  & x satisfies 0 )
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(e4) (x) (x satisfies Tojo’A0  iff (x is red & x satisfies 0))
(e5) (x) (x satisfies ‘ verde’A0  iff (x is green & x satisfies 0))
(e6) (x) (x satisfies ‘parcial’/yA‘parciaTAgA0  iff (3y)(3z) (y is an
undetached part of x & z in an undetached part of x & x satisfies 0  
& y satisfies/&  z satisfies g))
Theorems:
(e7) (x) (x satisfies ‘parcial’A‘rojo’A‘gavagai’ iff (3y) (y is an undetached
part of x & y is red & x is a 99%-urp))
(e8) (x) (x satisfies ‘partial’A‘verde’A‘gavagai’ iff (By) (y is an
undetached part of x & y is green & x is a 99%-urp))
(e9) (x) (x satisfies ‘parciarA‘rojo’A‘parcial’A‘verde’A‘gavagai’ iff
(3y)(3z) (y is an undetached part of x & z is an undetached part of x 
& y is red & z is green & x is a 99%-urp))
Under PT4+ we translate the native sentence ‘Parcial rojo gavagai’ as in effect 
‘A 99%-urp here is partly red’. The reader can see that this perverse alternative 
preserves stimulus synonymy with respect to its standard counterpart ‘A rabbit here 
is partly red’. Furthermore, when we move to more complex Native constructions 
such as ‘Parcial rojo, parcial verde gavagai’, we can see that PT4+ is not subject to 
the problems that Evans envisages. Following theorem (e9), the appropriate perverse 
rendering of the native sentence is in effect ‘A 99%-urp here is partly red and partly 
green’. Again, we can see that the perverse interpretation preserves stimulus 
synonymy with respect to its standard counterpart ‘A rabbit here is partly red and 
partly green’. We would assent to/dissent from the perverse rendering in all those 
situations in which we would have assented to/dissented from the standard one. If it 
is legitimate of an object to be partly-/and partly not-/ the same goes for another
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object composed of the 99% volume of the first. In short, we can perfectly be in 
presence of the partly red and partly green 99% undetached part of an object.6
We’ve seen how the perverse semantic theory PT4 can cope with the counter­
examples put forward by Evans. In the remainder of this chapter I shall elaborate on 
a different issue that will shed more light on the reasons why I believe that the 
‘99%-urp’ scheme is a good tool for the Quinean.
3.4 Back to the Apparatus o f Individuation
Consider again the Native sentences ‘Dos gavagai’ and ‘Dos rosas’ which were 
translated standardly as ‘There are (exactly) two rabbits’ and ‘There are (exactly) 
two roses’ respectively—see chapter 1. By digging in the apparatus of individuation 
(plurals, identity, etc.)— see 1.4— the anti-Quinean hoped to discover some data 
recalcitrant to perverse interpretations of these sentences. Hookway managed to 
overcome potential difficulties by translating ‘dos’ in a context-dependent way. 
Following Hookway—see 1.4, ft. 18—we may equate ‘dos’ with ‘two animals 
which are composed o f , when dealing with rabbit-related utterances, and with ‘two 
plants which are composed o f , when dealing with rose-related ones. Once more, 
Hookway’s strategy could be successfully applied, but at the cost of loosing 
structural simplicity when compared to ST.
6 The reader should notice that the anti-Quinean cannot adduce in her favour a situation in which an 
object is 99% red and 1% green. The reason is that (e) has been defined in terms o f  a 99%-urp. 
Hence, if  it were the case that a particular 99%-urp cannot be partly green because greeness applies 
to the 1% left o f  the whole rabbit, we are not in trouble: W e’ve got plenty o f  other cases where the 
1% o f  greeness applies to the surface o f a 99%-urp.
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Thanks to the ‘99%-urp’ scheme, we do not need to make use of disjunctive 
rules of translation to deal with complex structures where the apparatus of 
individuation is present. Consider Quine’s original rendering of ‘gavagai’ as 
contemplated under the perverse semantic theory PT, (see 1.6):
(b) (x) (x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is an undetached rabbit part)
If we try to avoid Hookway’s rendering of ‘dos’ (as related in each particular 
disjunct to animals or plants or minerals, etc.) and talk, instead, of satisfaction 
conditions over things in general by means of one non-disjunctive axiom, we are in 
trouble. The reason is that according to PT, we will obtain the following truth 
theorem for the native utterance ‘Dos gavagai’:
(t) ‘dos’A’gavagai’ is true iff (3x)(3y) (x is an undetached rabbit part & y is an
undetached rabbit part & x fy  & (z) (z is an undetached rabbit part —» (z=x 
or z=y)))
Theorem (t) tells us that there are two, and no more than two, things which are 
undetached rabbit parts. But according to (t), native speakers would not assent to 
‘Dos gavagai?’ even when faced with exactly two rabbits. For obviously, even a 
single rabbit has many more than two undetached parts.
However, we may substitute axiom (b) for (e)— i.e., the perverse axiom for 
‘gavagai’ contemplated under PT4—see 3.2:
(e) (x) (x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is a 99%-urp)
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By taking ‘gavagai’ as dividing its reference over 99%-urp, we obtain the following 
theorem:
(tj) ‘dos’A’gavagai’ is true iff (3x)(3y) (x is a 99%-urp & y is a 99%-urp & x fy  
& (z) (z is a 99%-urp -» (z=x or z=y)))
This is better, but still won’t do. Theorem (t,) tells us that there are two, and no 
more than two, things which are 99%-urps. But, according to (t,), ‘Dos gavagai?’ 
would still not be assented to in presence of a pair of rabbits: For each individual 
rabbit consists of indefinitely many 99%-urps, obtained by selecting a different 1% 
of the rabbit as the remainder.7
One final adjustment will permit us generate the truth theorem required. In 
order to preserve stimulus synonymy with respect to the standard semantic theory, 
we simply need the two 99% undetached rabbit parts not to overlap. Take the 
symbol ‘-s-’ to represent the fact that two objects are different in the sense that they 
share no particle at all. By changing ‘y-*-z’ for ‘y^z’, we shall obtain the following 
theorem:
(t2) ‘dos’A’gavagai’ is true iff (3x)(3y) (x is a 99%-urp & y is a 99%-urp & x*y & 
(z) (z is a 99%-urp -» (-’z-^ -x or —’z-5-y)))
7 Notice that ‘y^z’ in (t,) just means that y is different from z. The disanalogy, however, could be 
simply a matter o f  not having one particle in common; y and z could, thus, be sharing the rest o f  their 
components.
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Now, according to (t2), we require exactly two rabbits, for we could not possibly be 
referring to two different 99% parts of one single rabbit which did not overlap.8 
Notice that thanks to the ‘99%-urp’ semantic theory, we avoid deploying context- 
sensitive translations of ‘dos’. The native term ‘dos’ can be translated as ‘there are 
two non-overlapping ...’. Hence, we can couple the expression in question, ‘dos’, 
with the 99% undetached part of any object at all, irrespectively of its nature, 
avoiding, thus, having to discern among plants, animals, etc. In this way, according 
to the ‘99%-urp’ scheme, we can translate the native sentence ‘Dos rosas’ (see 1.4) 
as ‘There are exactly two non-overlapping 99% undetached rose parts’.
The reader might worry that PT4+ cannot assign ‘Dos gavagai’ the condition 
true if and only if there are exactly two rabbits. For, the reader might think, a single 
rabbit has indefinitely many (partially overlapping) 99%-urps. Hence the first rabbit 
provides an indefinitely large stock of 99%-urps none of which overlap with any of 
the indefinitey large number of 99%-urps provided by the second rabbit. However, 
PT4+ does get the truth conditions of ‘Dos gavagai’ right. Any choice of value for x 
and of a value for y rendering the sentence true selects a pair of non-overlapping 
99%-urps, which perforce have to come one from each rabbit, and then there is no 
third non-overlapping 99%-urp. Thus ‘Dos gavagai’ comes out true if and only if 
there are two rabbits.
In conclusion, when we move from Evans’ compounds of predicates to the 
apparatus of individuation, we can see that the ‘99%-urp’ scheme still works. And 
furthermore, it avoids having to employ disjunctive rules of translation.
8 Notice that it would have been useless to employ ‘-5-’ in (t) since y and z could share no particle at 
all, and still be two different things belonging to the same rabbit. We avoid this difficulty when the 
two things are as big as the 99% o f a rabbit.
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3.5 Game-Theoretical Semantics
We gain a further argument for the indiscemibility of PT4+ and ST, and for the 
superiority of PT4+ over Hookway’s proposal, if we consider game-theoretical 
semantics as an epistemic model. ST, PT4+ and Hookway respectively provide the 
following translations of ‘Dos gavagai’:—9
(ST) (3x)(3y) (x is a rabbit & y is a rabbit & -.x=y & (z) (-iz is a rabbit v (z=x 
v z=y)))
(PT4+) (3x)(3y) (x is a 99%-urp & y is a 99%-urp & x-^ -y & (z) (-iz is a 99%-urp 
v (-'z-^x v - ,z-^y)))
(H) (3x)(3y) {Animal x & Animal y & x fy  & (w) (~w is a component of x v w
is an undetached rabbit part) & (w) (~w is a component of y v w is an 
undetached rabbit part) & (z) [""(Animal z & (w) (-"w is a component of z v 
w is an undetached rabbit part)) v (z=x v z=y)]}
We usually think of a native assenting to ‘Dos gavagai’ in the obvious presence of a 
pair of rabbits, and hence the only relevant behaviour of the native might be 
immediate assent. But epistemic circumstances might be more difficult—the native 
might be set the task of finding out whether there are exactly two rabbits living in 
the large overgrown orchard, which might involve crawling around finding rabbits 
and distinguishing them from the other inhabitants of the orchard. We might then
9 I have replaced expressions o f  the form ‘p —> q’ by ‘- p  v  q’, since, as we shall shortly see, 
Hintikka does not give game-rules for
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expect more complex behaviour leading up to an assent to ‘Dos gavagai?’, 
behaviour which displays a canonical verification procedure following the logical 
form of (ST), or (PT4+), or (H). Hintikka’s game-theoretical semantics gives us a 
model for canonical verification of ‘Dos gavagai’ under our three proposed 
translations. In this way we might look for behavioural evidence in favour of one or 
other translation.
In Logic, Language-games and Information, Hintikka offers game-theoretical 
semantics which we can apply to (ST), (PT4+), and (H)10—see Hintikka, 1973, pp. 
86-8. Simplified, the game of ‘searching and finding’ goes as follows:
The game is played on a given quantified sentence, S. The game is played by 
two persons—the truth proponent of S (hereafer the proponent) who is committed 
to showing that S is true, and her opponent, the falsity proponent of S (hereafter the 
opponent), who is committed to showing that S is not true. Proponent and opponent 
are invited to play out semantic games on S, according to the rules set out below. At 
each round of a game the play focuses on the main constant and results in a simpler 
sentence, which is then the subject of play in the next round of the game, until an 
atomic formula is reached when the game stops. If the atomic formula is true, 
whoever is proponent at that stage of the game has won, and if it is false whoever is 
opponent at that stage of the game has won. For S to be true is for the proponent of 
S to have a winning strategy. That is, a repertoire of plays such that she wins 
whatever her opponent may play. The interesting idea from our point of view is that 
a winning strategy will reflect the logical form of S, since plays of the game will
10 The reader may care to consult Hintikka (1976) for an employment o f  game-theoretical semantics 
in a context wider than radical translation as a way to grasp the connection between quantifiers o f 
Formal Logic and quantifiers in Natural Languages. See also Tennant (1987).
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trace the nested structure of logical constants in S. Hence, we will expect, the 
behaviour of one who is seeking to discover whether she has a winning strategy on 
S will, in general, reflect the nested logical structure of S, since the players have to 
discover whether or not they have winning strategies on various simpler sentences 
generated in the play on S when the logical constants are succesively stripped away. 
Thus we may hope to predict behavioural differences in between one who is a 
proponent of (ST) as against one who is a proponent of (PT4+), as against one who 
is a proponent of (H). At least we may hope to do so when the determination of 
‘Dos gavagai’ is particularly difficult and forced to follow an ideal canonical 
epistemic route mapped out by its logical form.n >12
To play the game we need to learn some basic rules. At each stage of the 
game, at which a quantifier is the main constant, a player chooses a member of the 
universe of discourse. Similarity, at each stage at which a propositional operator is 
the main constant, a player chooses a disjunct or a conjunct, depending on the form
11 The relevancy o f  Hintikka’s strategy for our purposes is that the games are played in strict 
behavioural terms, without appeal to normative or rational considerations— see 1.2. Although 
Hintikka’s concern is not the translation o f terms and ontologies, but rather the translation of 
quantifiers— see Hintikka (1973), pp. 87-ff.— I believe, nonetheless, that we can employ his insights 
to throw some light upon our current semantic and ontological worries.
12 By ‘ideal’ I mean the following: In any particular game, the number o f  rounds necessary to arrive 
at an atomic sentence and verify it depends on the ability o f  both contestants. The fact that a given 
sentence is true doesn’t imply that it will be verified by the proponent, but only that it can be 
verified. Whether the proponent manages to verify it or not depends on how smart she is in her 
choice o f  individuals. In the same way, if  her opponent is dumber, it will be easier for the proponent 
to win; but if  the opponent plays a good game, the proponent will have to perform at her best to win 
the game. Hence, what I mean by an ‘ideal game’ is that game where the two contenders play at the 
possibly maximum level to achieve their purposes.
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of the sentence being considered. But we need to know who is the one to choose. 
This will depend on the kind of sentence in question. Hintikka gives the following 
five rules:
Rx If S is (3x) F(x), the proponent chooses a member of D—i.e., the 
universe of discourse—, and gives it a proper name, say ‘b’. The 
game is then continued with respect to F(b).
R2 If S is (x) F(x), the same happens except that the opponent chooses
b.
R3 If S is (F v G), the proponent chooses F or G, and the game is
continued with respect to it.
R4 If S is (F a  G), the same happens except that the opponent makes the
choice.
Rs If S is —'F, the roles of the two players (as defined by rules R,, R2, R3
and R )^ are reversed and the game is continued with respect to F. 
(Adapted from Hintikka (1976), p. 217)
By following these rules, the proponent and her opponent will keep on 
choosing individuals, disjuncts and conjuncts alternatively (depending on the form 
of the sentence S) until they obtain an atomic sentence which contains no quantifier 
phrase at all. If that atomic sentence is true then whoever has the role of proponent 
at that stage wins, and otherwise whoever has the role of opponent at that stage 
wins. Now we can see why Hintikka calls it a game of ‘seeking and finding’. Each 
player seeks for the individuals that will verify or falsify any quantified statement in 
dispute, or seeks which disjunct or conjunct to select. The underlying thought in 
Hintikka’s strategy is then that, for decidable statements, if S is true, then the 
proponent of S will have a winning strategy to verify it.
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Let’s now see the bearing of Game-Theoretical Semantics for our present 
purposes. Recall that our three rival translation manuals offer the following as the 
logical form of ‘Dos gavagai’:—
(ST) (3x)(3y) (x is a rabbit & y is a rabbit & -ix=y & (z) (-iz is a rabbit v  (z=x 
V  z=y)))
(PT4+) (3x)(3y) (x is a 99%-urp & y is a 99%-urp & x+y & (z) (-iz is a 99%-urp
v  (^z+x v  ^z^-y)))
(H) (3x)(3y) {Animal x & Animal y & x fy  & (w) (--w is a component of x v  w
is an undetached rabbit part) & (w) (^w is a component of y v  w is an 
undetached rabbit part) & (z) [^(Animal z & (w) (~w is a component of z v  
w is an undetached rabbit part)) v  (z=x v  z=y)]}
As a preliminary and to fix ideas, I illustrate by describing a game on (ST), with 
obvious abbreviations.
(s) (3x)(3y) ((Rx & Ry) & x^y & (z) (-iRz v  (z=x v  z=y)))
Round l :13 Sp chooses r,,
Play continues on:—
(3y) ((Rr, & Ry) & r,^y & (z) (-.Rz v  (z=r, v  z=y)))
13 ‘Sp’ stands for the proponent o f  (s), and ‘So’ for her opponent. For economy I take the set o f  
individuals on which the predicates are interpreted to contain only three objects: two rabbits and an 
unspecified object other than a rabbit— abbreviated respectively rb r2, and o.
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Round 2: Sp chooses r2,
Play continues on:—
(Rr, & Rr2) & & (z) (-iRz v (z=r, v z=r2))
Round 3: So chooses 3rd. conjunct,
Play continues on:—
(z) (-.Rz v (z=r, v z=r2))
Round 4: So chooses o,
Play continues on:—
~"Ro v (o=r, v o=r2)
Round 5: Sp chooses 1st. disjunct,
Play continues on:—
-Ro
Round 6: So is committed to the truth and Sp to the falsity of:—
Ro
Game Over
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Sp wins if ‘Ro’ is false, otherwise So has won this particular game.
If (ST) gives the logical form of ‘Dos gavagai’ then one who asserts ‘Dos 
gavagai’ claims, in effect, to have a winning strategy on (ST). So we may expect the 
behaviour leading up to an assertion of ‘Dos gavagai’ to be, in an ideal case, the 
behaviour of one seeking to discover whether they have a winning strategy on (ST). 
And similarity, of course, for (PT4+) and (H). We may now note a striking parallel 
between (ST) and (PT4+).
For every game on (ST) leading to an atomic sentence in the left hand 
column, there is an exactly parallel game on (PT4+) leading to the ‘atomic’ 
sentences in the right hand column:—
A is a rabbit A* is a 99%-urp
B is a rabbit B* is a 99%-urp
where A=A*, unless A is a rabbit in which case A* is a 99% undetached part of that 
rabbit, and B and B*, and C and C*, similarly.
Now, if the game on (ST) produces a win for the proponent, so does the 
corresponding game on (PT4+), and vice versa. So it seems that the behaviour of a 
proponent trying to see whether they have a winning strategy on (ST) will be 
indistinguishable from the behaviour of a proponent trying to see whether they have 
a winning strategy on (PT4+).
A=B A-B
C* is a 99%-urp
-C*-A
-C*+B
C is a rabbit
O A
O B
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However, it might seem that nonehteless there are two differences, which I 
will consider in turn:—
(1) In the last two cases, games on (PT4+) have a further round in which roles 
are swapped and a final round is played on ‘C**A’ or on ‘C*-*-B\ Perhaps we can 
hope to test this difference of length in their respective games behaviouristically. 
But this is not a difference which registers in behaviour. The proponent is the 
asserter of ‘Dos gavagai’, but the opponent is only a notional character. All that 
happens is that when a proponent reaches ‘C=A’ she has to determine whether C 
and A are identical. Likewise, all that happens when a proponent reaches ‘- ,C*-*-A’ 
is that they have to determine whether C* and A partially overlap. No behaviour 
will reveal which of these tasks a proponent is engaged in. Similarly for ‘C=B’ and 
‘-C * -B ’.
(2) ‘A is a rabbit’ is an atomic sentence, and it is assumed that when a game is 
played in which this is the terminus, and proponent and opponent know who has 
won, this is because ‘A is a rabbit’ is verified or falsified by direct observation. But 
‘A* is a 99%-urp’ is not, in absolute terms, an atomic sentence. It has significant 
semantically relevant structure. Thus, it is to be distinguished from, for example, 
‘A* is a 5%-urp’. So it might seemt that we should analyse ‘A is a 99%-urp’ along 
the lines of
(3x)(3y)(3n) (x is a rabbit & y=A* & n=99 & y is n% of x),
and then the game should continue on this. However, this is to misunderstand the 
nature of Quine’s proposed indeterminacy of radical translation, and the proposal
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(PT4+) in particular. Although ‘A* is an undetached rabbit part’ is indeed 
semantically complex, Quine assumes that it is epistemically equivalent to ‘A is a 
rabbit’. On all occasions in which one is able to verify or falsify ‘A is a rabbit’ by 
direct observation, one can also verify or falsify ‘A* is an undetached rabbit part’ 
by direct observation, and vice versa, Quine assumes. The same holds for ‘A is a 
rabbit’ and ‘A* is a 99%-urp’, we are assuming. So from the point of view of 
epistemic behaviour, we can regard games which reach ‘A* is a 99%-urp’ as 
terminating there, as we do regard games which reach ‘A is a rabbit’, the winner 
being decided by direct observation.
Thus, in sum, any behaviour which is interpretable as seeking and finding in 
the service of discovering a winning strategy on (ST) is equally interpretable as 
seeking and finding in the service of discovering a winning strategy on (PT4+), and 
vice versa.
Unfortunately for Hookway’s route, the same cannot be said for (ST) and (H). 
Recall the logical form o f ‘Dos gavagai’ offered by Hookway’s translation manual:
(H) (3x)(3y) {Animal x & Animal y & -,x=y & (w) (^w is a component of x v
w is an undetached rabbit part) & (w) (^w is a component of y v w is an 
undetached rabbit part) & (z) [""(Animal z & (w) (""w is a component of z v 
w is an undetached rabbit part)) v (z=x v z=y)]}
As we saw above, games on (ST) lead to one or other of:—
A is a rabbit 
B is a rabbit 
A=B
Semantic Perversity 95
C is a rabbit
O A
C=B
On the other hand, games on (H) lead to one or other of:—
A is an animal 
B is an animal 
A=B
C is a component of A
C is an undetached rabbit part
D is a component of B
D is an undetached rabbit part
E is an animal
F is a component of E
F is an undetached rabbit part
F=A
F=B
A sympathizer of Hookway who asserts ‘Dos gavagai’ would claim, in effect, 
to have a winning strategy on (H)—assuming that (H) gives the logical form of 
‘Dos gavagai’. As in the cases of (ST) and (PT4+) above, we may expect the 
behaviour leading up to an assertion of ‘Dos gavagai’ to be, in an ideal case, the 
behaviour of one seeking to discover whether they have a winning strategy on (H). 
However, the reader can see that unlike games on (PT4+), games on (H) lead to one 
or other of the above sentences by routes which are not images of those on (ST). 
This disanalogy permits us to predict behavioural differences in between one who is 
a proponent of (ST), as against one who is a proponent of (H). We shall be able to 
distinguish the behaviour of a proponent trying to see whether they have a winning
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strategy on (ST) from the behaviour of a proponent trying to see whether they have 
a winning strategy on (H). Therefore, any behaviour which is interpretable as 
seeking and finding in the service of discovering a winning strategy on (ST)—or for 
that matter, on (PT4+)— cannot be interpreted as seeking and finding in the service 
of discovering a winning strategy on Hookway’s route, (H).
Although we have only considered one example, ‘Dos gavagai’, the points 
made generalize. There is an obvious isomorphism between the translation manuals 
(ST) and (PT4+) with ‘is a rabbit’ in (ST) as the image of ‘is a 99%-urp’ in (PT4+). 
Likewise, there is an obvious lack of isomorphism between the translation manuals 
(ST) and (PT4+), on the one hand, and (H), on the other. Provided we can take ‘is a 
rabbit’ as observationally equivalent to ‘is a 99%-urp’—see 3.2, above—, then the 
native’s behaviour when seeking to verify a native sentence S will be equally 
interpretable as seeking to verify that she has a winning strategy on sentence S 
delivered by (ST), and as seeking to verify that she has a winning strategy on the 
corresponding sentence delivered by (PT4+), and vice versa.
In sum, by looking at the native’s complex patterns of behaviour leading up to 
an assent to ‘Dos gavagai?’, I contended, we’ve gained a further argument for the 
indiscemibility of the semantic theories PT4+ and ST, and for the superiority of PT4+ 
over Hookway’s proposal. And plausibly, the points made concerning ‘Dos 
gavagai’ generalize to all sentences of Native—see chapters 4 and 5, below.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we’ve seen how the Quinean can be semantically perverse with no 
need to make baroque adjustments in terms of the derivational structure of her
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perverse theory. This renders the ‘99%-urp’ scheme of reference a promising 
candidate to exemplify the Inscrutability Thesis; especially taking into account that 
research in the neurosciences might end up backing Evans’ argument against 
structurally complex semantic theories—although see chapter 4, below.
Unfortunately for the Quinean, structural simplicity is not the only front that 
endangers perverse semantic theorizing. Crispin Wright (1997) has recently argued 
that apart from structural simplicity, the Quinean faces bigger worries. Wright is 
thinking of simplicity, not in the derivational structure of the perverse theories, but 
in the psychological theory that accompanies them. Psychological simplicity, as we 
shall see next, can become a powerful weapon for the anti-Quinean to exploit.
4A CONNECTIONIST DEFENCE OF THE 
INSCRUTABILITY THESIS
4.1 Introduction
In chapters 1 and 3 we saw how two different perverse semantic theories—PT2 and 
PT4—could be developed in order to preserve their empirical adequacy against our 
‘privileged’ standard semantic theory, ST. All the hurdles, though, for these 
perverse alternatives consisted of behavioural and hypothetical neurophysiological 
data, and considerations regarding structural simplicity may tip the balance against 
perverse interpretations of Native. In this chapter I take up a new challenge for the 
defender of the Inscrutability Thesis. The threat comes this time, not from 
considerations regarding complexity in the derivational structure of the Quinean 
perverse candidates, but from the complexity in the psychological theory that
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accompanies semantic theorizing in general. The challenge is, in my opinion, far
more serious than those tackled in previous chapters. In order to address it I shall
elaborate on current issues in Connectionist Theory, producing then, I hope, a
Connectionist Defence o f the Inscrutability Thesis.
Before getting started, let me briefly outline the programme of this chapter. In 
section 4.2, I shall introduce and develop a criterion recently produced by Wright 
(1997) in terms of ‘psychological simplicity’ which threatens the perverse semantic 
proposal I offered in chapter 3. In section 4.3, I shall argue that a Language-of- 
Thought—LOT—model of human cognition could motivate Wright’s criterion, 
favouring thus a standard interpretation of Native along the lines reviewed in 
chapter 1. In sections 4.4-4.6 I shall introduce the reader to some basic aspects of 
connectionist theory, and elaborate on a particularly promising neurocomputational 
approach to language processing put forward by Jeff Elman (1992; 1998). I shall 
argue that if instead of endorsing a LOT hypothesis, we model human cognition by 
a recurrent neural network a la Elman, then Wright’s criterion is unmotivated. In 
particular, I shall argue that considerations regarding ‘psychological simplicity’ are 
neutral, favouring neither a standard interpretation of Native, nor a perverse one. In 
section 4 .7 ,1 shall consider two lines of response to my connectionist defence of the 
Inscrutability Thesis. I shall rejoin to one of them, deferring full treatment of the 
other line of response until chapter 7, where I’ll look in more detail to some recent 
neurocomputational research in order to answer it. In section 4.8 I shall argue that 
connectionism can account for the systematicity and compositionality of thought 
while avoiding a symbolic—LOT—implementation. This is an important result that
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will permit us address one of the two caveats left unanswered in chapter 2 (section
2.3). Finally, I shall close the discussion in 4.9 by addressing a minor worry raised
by a sympathizer of connectionism. In addition, I shall give some hints as to how
connectionism may fit with the thesis of Semantic Holism—another pivotal thesis
of Quine.
4.2 Wright’s ‘Psychological-Simplicity ’ Argument
Crispin Wright (1997) has recently proposed a line of argument against the 
Inscrutability Thesis which focuses upon the conceptual repertoire of native 
speakers. Wright’s overall argument does not rely on the considerations regarding 
‘structural simplicity’ that I addressed in chapter 2. Instead, Wright contrasts the 
simplicity of the conceptual repertoire imputed to the native by the standard manual 
with the contrasting complexity of the conceptual repertoire imputed to the native 
by a perverse manual. His aim is to make use of some sort of ‘psychological- 
simplicity’ criterion in order to discredit any perverse semantic theorizing. Wright 
targets Hookway’s perverse semantic proposal, which employs disjunctive 
axioms—see 1.6— , but his argument, if valid, applies equally to PT4—the perverse 
semantic proposal I advanced in chapter 3 (see 3.2). The reason is that even though 
a perverse semantic theory which for example divides the reference of ‘gavagai’ 
over 99%-urp, rather than over rabbits, is as simple, structurally speaking, as the 
standard one is—see 3.2—, it is nonetheless true, or so Wright believes, that such a 
theory imputes a great deal of psychological complexity to the native (Wright, 1997,
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p. 412). And now, Wright contends, if rival semantic theories impute different
conceptual repertoires to natives, but one imputes a simpler repertoire than the
others, then that one is objectively speaking the correct semantic theory. Hence, the
standard theory ST—see 1.6—is the only correct semantic theory.1
Let us elaborate on Wright’s argument to see if it poses a serious threat to the
Quinean. Wright claims that
(A) the basic clauses of our semantic theory are to assign reference and 
satisfaction-conditions in ways which are presumed to correspond to the 
conceptual repertoire o f speakers o f the language in question.2 {Ibid., p. 412, 
Wright’s emphasis)
It may seem that Wright begs the question against Quine. Obviously, a hard-line
1 Someone may argue that the ‘psychological complexity’ imputed to the native by a perverse 
semantic theory will eventually show up in complex patterns o f  behavioural dispositions. In this way, 
loss or acquisition of, say, linguistic dispositions under certain circumstances are observable higher- 
order dispositions which may act as a constraint, tipping the balance against perverse interpretations 
o f Native. (This line o f  argument was prompted by an anonymous referee o f  M ind and Language in 
response to Calvo Garzon, 2000a). This, however, should not cause any concern for, as the 
discussion in chapters 2 and 3 revealed, the ‘99%-urp’ referential scheme would conform to such a 
constraint. Wright’s attack, thus, must come from a different comer, as w e’ll see next.
2 The reader should notice that by agreeing on this point w e’re not being committed to accepting 
Evans’ M irror Constraint (see 2.2). Wright’s contention has nothing to do with mirroring the 
derivational structure o f  our semantic theories— see 2.4, fn. 11. Rather, according to Wright’s 
psychological approach, speakers’ conceptual repertoires must mirror our semantic theories’ basic 
clauses, not the routes, departing from them, which generate the various semantic theorems.
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Quinean would not accept Wright’s premise, since it trades in concepts. However,
we can interpret the premise in a way acceptable to a Quinean. The idea is to
naturalize concepts in such a way that Wright’s ‘conceptual repertoire’ can be
transposed into a form which the Quinean should admit as legitimate—see 3.3.
Whatever naturalizing strategy we adopt—see 5.3-5.6 below—the key point,
scientifically speaking, is that we will require some relation between the concepts
belonging to a speaker’s conceptual repertoire, expressed by words, and the
information content of real internal states in the brain. So, assuming there is such a
relation, Wright’s premise should be accepted by a Quinean. Wright’s argument can
then proceed as follows. Firstly, Wright notices, with respect to putative perverse
alternatives to the standard scheme, that
(B) the range of concepts necessary in order to formulate their various 
[basic] clauses in each case includes, but is not included in, the simple range 
of concepts of observable spatio-temporal continuants and their observable 
properties which the favoured scheme deploys. {Ibid. p. 412)
Taking for example the Quinean perverse schemes that divide the reference of 
‘gavagai’ over undetached parts of rabbits or over their temporal stages 
respectively, Wright argues:
(C) To have the concept of an undetached rabbit part, you need a concept 
of the integrated individual of which such parts are parts; to have the concept 
of a temporal stage of a rabbit, you need to grasp the idea of the spatio- 
temporal continuant of which such a stage is a stage. {Ibid. p. 412)
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If we add as a manifestation requirement that the basic clauses should not assign to
a speaker the possession of a larger repertoire of concepts than is needed to explain
the subject’s behaviour, we can see that Wright’s argument poses a threat to the
perverse semantic theory I offered in chapter 3.3
However, we need to guard against a misreading of the above argument 
whose clarification will prove crucial for my purposes in due course (see chapter 5 
below). We are considering the conceptual repertoires assigned by the basic clauses 
of the standard and the perverse semantic theories respectively. The total conceptual 
repertoire of the native speakers will of course include all the complex concepts
3 To keep the record straight, it must be noted that Wright reinforces his argument not with the 
aforementioned ‘manifestation requirement’, but rather with the following methodological caveat: 
“that the conceptual repertoire which radical interpretation may permissibly ascribe to speakers 
should exceed what is actually expressible in their language, as so interpreted, only if  its ascription to 
them is necessary in other ways in order to account for their linguistic competence” (Wright, 1997, p. 
412). Wright (personal communication) acknowledges that it is unclear how the methodological 
constraint he offers, as it stands, would deliver him the goods. Notice that unless some further 
psychological or neurophysiological explanation is forthcoming as to why speakers cannot be 
ascribed a conceptual repertoire which is not strictly necessary to explain their linguistic 
competencies, Wright’s methodological constraint collapses into the methodological considerations 
we reviewed in chapter 2, and is thus doomed for the reasons I offered there. I am happy to accept 
that a developed version o f  Wright’s constraint, or o f  the manifestation requirement sketched above, 
may well play the role Wright desires— indeed, Wright’s (1992) ‘Wide Cosmological Role’ 
constraint may well be a good candidate. However, I would need to see a proposal along those lines 
in some detail before submitting it to critical scrutiny. Nevertheless, we need not worry about this
A Connectionist Defence o f  the Inscrutability Thesis 104
which they can build from the simple lexicon of Native by the usual combinatorial
means. In general, total sets of concepts will be the same under the perverse and the
standard theories. We can see this by transferring Quine’s case of Radical
Translation to Home.4 Suppose we are devising translation manuals for fellow
speakers. I may translate your English sentence ‘There is a rabbit’ homophonically
as my ‘There is a rabbit’. Or I could translate it heterophonically as my ‘There is a
99%-urp’. Since my sentence ‘There is a 99%-urp’ is a well-formed sentence of
English, it is one you could produce and, hence, must be subject to translation into
my English. Again, my homophonic manual would equate it with my ‘There is a
99%-urp’, whereas my heterophonic manual would translate it as ‘There is a 99%
undetached part of a 99%-urp’. Once again, this sentence is also a well-formed
sentence in your English. So, once again, I need to translate it and can do so either
via my standard manual or via my perverse manual. Obviously the process iterates
indefinitely. The point of all this is that the total conceptual repertoire assigned via
either manual is the same. Hence, Wright’s argument should be taken to concern
only the conceptual repertoire imputed by the basic clauses of the rival translation
issue for our present interests, since my counter-arguments in this chapter hinge somewhere else, 
calling into question the core o f  Wright’s argument— i.e., quotes (B) and (C) above.
4 Setting the parable o f  Radical Translation in a home environment— i.e., English-to-English 
translation—  should not alter matters significantly, and Wright would agree. The success o f  the 
Inscrutability Thesis cannot be dependent on the object-language being inferior— grammatically 
and/or semantically speaking— with respect to the home language. Otherwise, the Inscrutability o f  
Reference would amount to no more than a trivial— as far as Semantics is concerned— clash o f  
cultures (see chapter 1).
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manuals.
Wright reads the basic clauses realistically—as we saw in the quote labeled 
(A) above. Hence, he takes the conceptual repertoire of the basic clauses to be 
subject to a manifestation requirement—although see fn. 3 above. A Quinean may 
seek to naturalize the facts recorded by the basic clauses in either of two ways: As a 
LOT hypothesis or in a Connectionist architecture. We may then ask for 
manifestable evidence in favour of one or the other semantic theory. The question 
of which semantic theory is correct becomes subsumed, I claim, under the question 
of which account of the brain’s architecture is correct. I shall argue below that a 
LOT hypothesis favours ST over PT4, whereas a connectionist setting is neutral 
between ST and PT4. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to developing 
this argument.
4.3 Psychological Simplicity and The Syntactic Image
What structure do the representations in the brain have?5 In other words, how is
5 For strategical reasons— see chapter 7, below— I assume throughout the remainder o f  my 
dissertation a representationalist approach to cognition both in the classical and the connectionist 
theoretical frameworks. Although this may sound somewhat platitudinous from within the classical 
approach, in the second case it is less than obvious. Those keen on eliminating content altogether 
may care to consult, for example, Beer (1995), Freeman and Skarda (1990), Keijzer (1998), Ramsey 
(1993), and van Gelder (1995) for illustrations o f  how connectionist networks can perform particular 
tasks with no need for viewing the internal apparatus as representational. For some key cases that
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information encoded in a cognitive system? In Fodor’s view, the study of higher
cognitive abilities—thought, language mastery, etc.—and, in particular, explaining
the systematicity, productivity and inferential coherence of thought processes,
requires a symbolic treatment.6 And the best metaphor at hand for the way
information is encoded is human language. What we then have is a linguiform
structured cognitive system. The underlying idea is that thinking can be seen as
logic-like inferential processing—i.e., some sort of sentence-crunching. In Fodor
and Pylyshyn’s (1988) view, systematicity, productivity and inferential coherence
can only be explained from a LOT perspective—see below. Let us elaborate.
According to a LOT hypothesis we, as thinkers, have the capacity to entertain
thoughts with particular contents which are carried by the mental representations of
LOT. For example, to entertain the thought THERE IS A WHITE 99%-URP OVER
THERE,7 is for us to be related to a mental representation carrying that particular
content. In Fodor’s view, concepts are word-types of LOT, and our employment of
pose a problem to the anti-representationalist— Andy Clark dubs these cases ‘representation-hungry 
problems’— see Clark, 1997, chapter 8, and Clark and Toribio (1994).
6 Put bluntly, we say that thought processes are systematic to the extent that our capacity to entertain 
or grasp the thought AB is directly connected with our capacity to entertain or grasp the thought BA. 
Thoughts, furthermore, are productive in the sense that we have the ability to entertain or grasp an 
indefinite number o f  increasingly complex thoughts: A, AB, ABC, ...— although neurophysiological 
constraints on human hardware capacities will unavoidably kick in. And lastly, human thought is 
inferentially coherent since our entertaining, or at least our grasping, the thought A&B  triggers our 
grasping the thought A and the thought B.
7 From now on I shall use capital letters to express concepts.
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concepts is the occurrence of word-tokens of LOT.8 In this picture, context-
independence is a key feature. Fodor (1987, p. 137) notes that the constituent ‘P’ in
the formula ‘P’ is a token of the same representational type as the ‘P’ in the formula
‘P&Q’, if ‘P’ is to be a consequence of ‘P&Q’. Mental representations are formed
out of context-independent constituents in such a way that constituents appear in
different thoughts as syntactically identical tokens with the same conceptual
content. I shall refer to this kind of context-independence, as Classical
Constituency. In short, LOT and its classical form of constituency amount to
claiming that:
(1) (some) mental formulas have mental formulas as parts; and
(2) the parts are ‘transportable’: the same parts can appear in lots of mental
formulas. (Ibid., p. 137)
Classical constituency, I contend, motivates Wright’s ‘psychological 
simplicity’ argument. The working hypothesis of LOT is that there must be some 
causal relation between the speakers’ strings of LOT and the strings of English 
which reflects a syntactic similitude between LOT and English strings. Fodor and
8 See Fodor (1975; 1987). There are different versions o f the LOT hypothesis— the reader may care 
to consult for example Field (1978), and Harman (1973). For the earliest explicit treatment o f  the 
LOT hypothesis, see Sellars (1968). Some people maintain that LOT is actually the thinkers’ spoken 
language, but internalized. Others take LOT to be the analog o f  a hidden machine code. We do not 
need to decide which is the most plausible. We just need to pay attention to a key feature o f  LOT 
models: Classical Constituency (see below). For a quick appraisal o f  some problems that the 
LOTTER faces see Clark (1994).
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Pylyshyn understand quite literally the linguiform metaphor of thought-processes:
[The] symbol structures in a Classical model are assumed to correspond to 
real physical structures in the brain and the combinatorial structure of a 
representation is supposed to have a counterpart in structural relations among 
physical properties of the brain. (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988, p. 13)
And, Fodor and Pylyshyn continue,
the relation ‘part o f , which holds between a relatively simple symbol and a 
more complex one, is assumed to correspond to some physical relation among 
brain states. (Ibid., p. 13)
In this way, if the perverse scheme assigns to ‘gavagai’ the phrasal concept 99%- 
URP—expressed by a lexically complex phrase of English (‘99%-urp’)— , and we 
apply the linguiform analogy quite literally, we can see why this phrasal concept 
contains, among others, the atomic concept RABBIT. Because in the corresponding 
strings of LOT, the token RABBIT of LOT occurs in any token of 99%-URP of 
LOT. Therefore, we can see why Wright’s argument holds. Employing the phrasal 
concept 99%URP involves employing some word-tokens o f LOT o f the same word- 
type—i.e., RABBIT. In short, we shall not be able to entertain for example a 99%- 
URP-related thought without exercising the concept of a rabbit, among others. The 
lexical concept RABBIT is, thus, psychologically simpler than the phrasal concept 
99%-URP.
By approaching the issue of the naturalization of concepts from a LOT 
perspective, we’ve seen how Wright may hold to his principle of psychological
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simplicity, and hope to put the Quinean up against the ropes. The story, however, as
we are about to see, looks rather different once we approach the issue from a non-
classical, connectionist, perspective where constituency is non-classical in a sense
yet to be explained.9
4.4 Basic Aspects o f  Connectionism: Components and Dynamics
In this section I shall review the basic components and dynamics of connectionist 
networks. Connectionism offers a new ‘biologically- and developmentally-inspired 
approach’ to cognition—see Elman et al., 1996, chapter 2—which differs critically 
from the Syntactic Image championed by classical cognitive scientists—see 4.3 
above, and the references given there. Computations, in the connectionist guise, are 
based primarily on the interconnection of many simple units whose dynamics seek 
to explain complex patterns of behaviour, whilst avoiding recurring to the explicit 
symbols and algorithms that classical computationalism relies on. The basic 
components of a connectionist network are simple processing units and connections 
between those units. Units—the reader may think of them as ‘foy-neurons’—have 
either a binary level of activation (0 or 1), or a range of values varying between 0
9 The arguments I shall elaborate on in the remainder o f  this chapter, and in chapters 5 and 7, rely 
pretty heavily upon some key features o f  connectionist theory. I shall thus spend some time in 
sections 4.4 and 4.5 to introduce the reader to some basic aspects o f  connectionism. For 
philosophically-oriented introductions to connectionist theory, the reader may care to consult Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen (1991), Clark (1989; 1993), or Tienson (1988). Those familiar with the basic tenets 
o f  connectionism may wish to skip sections 4.4 and 4.5, and jump ahead to section 4.6.
A Connectionist Defence o f  the Inscrutability Thesis 110 
and 1. Units receive input signals from other units—or from the environment, in the
case of input units—via connections of various weights and polarities. The weights
take the form of real-valued numbers, and indicate the strengths of the connections
among the units. To obtain the input value to a unit / from a sending unit j ,  we
multiply the activation value of unit j  by the weight of the connection between unit j
and unit /. Then the activation values from all units inputting to unit / are summed
determining thus the netinput to unit i. In this way, units can be either excited or
inhibited as a function of the existing connections and their values, and as a result,
they acquire new levels of activation which may result in the emission of an output
signal of a certain strength. The output signal emitted by a unit need not coincide in
value with the netinput to that unit. Rather, output activation values are the result of
an arithmetical function performed on the netinput.10 The networks I shall make use
I n p u t
10 Units whose output activations do coincide with their netinput are called linear units. However, 
for our purposes (see 4.8 below) w e’re interested in non-linear activation functions.
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[Fig. 4.1]: The sigmoid activation function often used for units in neural networks. Outputs 
(along the ordinate) are shown for a range o f  possible inputs (abscissa). Units with this sort o f  
activation function exhibit an all or nothing response given very positive or very negative 
inputs; but they are very sensitive to small differences within a narrow range around 0. With 
an absence o f  input, the nodes output 0.5, which is in the middle o f  their response range.11 
(from Elman et a l ,  1996, p. 53)
of deploy the following logistic (sigmoid) activation function:12
ai = l/l+e-neti
where a, stands for the output value of unit i; net, for the net input to unit i; and e is 
the exponential. The graph above shows the output value of unit i for any given 
netinput.
We can now see how units connect to each other to form the skeleton of the 
network. In a simple feedforward network13—see fig. 4.2—units are organized into
11 This sort o f  non-linear response will be crucial for our purposes since, to advance a key point, it 
allows networks, which are not governed by explicit rules, to behave in a rule-like manner— see 4.8 
below.
12 The logistic activation function is an activation rule which takes into account parameters such as 
the netinput, the previous activation value, the decay rate, etc. We need not be bothered with the 
details here. The reader interested in the fine-grained mechanisms is urged to visit the locus classici 
(the ‘bible’ o f  connectionist theory): — Rumelhart, McClelland et al. (1986), and McClelland, 
Rumelhart et al. (1986). Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991), and Elman et al. (1996) offer as well 
exhaustive introductions to the mechanics o f  neural networks.
13 There are many different sorts o f connectionist architecture to be found in the recent literature, 
though we can ignore for our purposes all such diversity— see Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) for
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at least three separate layers. One input layer, one or more hidden ones, and one
output layer. The units of a given layer connect exclusively to units of the next
layer. In this way, activations feed forward from the input to the output layer
passing through the hidden layer/s. The activation pattern of any of the layers
corresponds to the sequence of activation values of the units that form the layer. We
can treat these patterns of activation as vectors in a n-dimensional space, where n
corresponds to the number of units that constitute the layer.
Layer#3 
Layer #2
Layer#!
[Fig. 4.2]: A simple feedforward network. Units in layer 1 are input units. Units in layer 3 are
an exposition o f  some o f  the most relevant types. See also Hanson and Burr (1990) for a sketched 
taxonomy. Depending on how units connect to each other, we can broadly distinguish between 
feedforw ard  and recurrent networks. Whereas in a standard feedforward— i.e., acyclic— network, 
activations flow only in one direction (from lower to upper layers), in recurrent networks activations 
can flow in any direction at all. For ease o f  exposition, I employ a simple feedforward network in 
this section.
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output units. Activations strictly feed forward. Each unit in layer n has output connections to
each unit in layer n+1.
The input activation values of the input layer are propagated to the units of the next 
layer. Each receiving hidden unit will suffer a change in its level of activation. The 
resulting hidden activation values can be seen as a new activation pattern to be 
treated as a hidden vector in a n-dimensional space. Once again, the hidden units 
will feed their activation forward to the units of the following layer (either another 
hidden layer or the output one). In a similar way, an n-dimensional vector will be 
formed as a result of the new levels of excitation or inhibition of the n hidden or 
output units. Connectionist theorists hope that the interconnectivity among the 
units, and the flow of activation from one layer to another are sufficient to mimic 
and account for both the non-cognitive as well as the cognitive abilities of living 
creatures (see 4.5. below). When we try to explain, for instance, sensorimotor 
control, networks as simple as the feedforward model introduced above can be 
satisfactorily employed. A classic example in the literature is a crab that wants to 
grab an object situated at a certain distance in its visual field. The problem would be 
how to transform the visual information the crab is receiving into motor 
information that tells the crab where the object is with respect to its claw.14 These 
networks operate by executing vector-to-vector transformations that allow the 
creature to go from a sensorial coordinate system to a motor one. Computations are 
thus better seen as vector-to-vector transformations from one coordinate system into
14 For a comprehensive exposition o f  how neural networks can perform sensorimotor coordination 
tasks, see P.M. Churchland (1986) or P.S. Churchland (1986).
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another. In short, we may appraise the dynamics of connectionist networks as the
transformation of an activation vector (an input pattern of activation) into another
vector (an output one) via one or several hidden vectors.
4.5 Learning and Conceptual Organization in Neural Networks: State Space 
Semantics
Connectionist networks as simple as the feedforward net shown above are very 
good at learning—see Rumelhart, McClelland et al. (1986), and Hanson and Burr 
(1990). Thanks to the employment of hidden units, multi-layered networks can 
develop internal representations that reflect the externally given inputs.15 One 
learning technique extensively employed in connectionist modeling is the
15 Very basic networks, such as Rosenblatt’s (1959) Perceptron  (a two-layered net with no hidden 
units) do employ learning rules— in particular the delta rule— that allows the network to alter its 
weights in order to reflect more appropriately environmental links between input and output patterns. 
The perceptron learns by readjusting the correlations between input and output units as a function o f  
the deviation between each output unit’s actual value and the expected value for that unit. 
Unfortunately, the lack o f  hidden layers, mediating between the encoded features at the input level 
and the output response, seriously undermined the learning capacities o f  the Perceptron, and soon, 
researches turned their attention to ‘explicit-rules’ learning machines— see 4.8 below. See Hanson 
and Burr (1990) for a comparison between Rosenblatt’s Perceptron and the properties o f  more 
advanced networks with hidden units.
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generalized delta rule (aka backpropagation).16 To apply backpropagation, the
network (initially activated with a set of random weight assignments) is fed with a
particular input. As a result of a number of transformations, the network eventually
produces an output vector. Since the network has been started with a random set of
weights, it is highly probable that the resulting output vector does not coincide with
the target pattern of output activation—i.e., the expected vector. Various of the
output layer’s units, then, must be in error. If we now take a single output unit and
compare it with the target activation for that unit, we can take the difference in
value as a measure o f error. Then, by employing algorithms to adjust the weights,
and by observing the effect that a minor positive or negative change in its weight
would have in reducing the overall error, we can determine what kind of change
(positive or negative) will make the output vector approximate more to the target
pattern of activation. This process is then repeated for the rest of the connections
from the upper to the lower levels in the network. What learning algorithms such as
backpropagation thus try to accomplish is a minimization of the network’s overall
error by searching for a ‘gradient-descent route’ in the space of potential weight
assignments (see below).17
Taking then a typical learning task such as categorization, a network trained
16 Backpropagation was initially articulated by Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams as a generalization 
o f the delta rule employed by Rosenblatt’s Perceptron (see ft. 15)— see Rumelhart, Hinton and 
Williams (1986) for the minutiae.
17 For a formal appraisal and illustrations o f  backpropagation see Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991), 
and Elman et al. (1996).
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by backpropagation can learn to classify fed stimuli into an established set of
categories. A classical example in the connectionist literature is an acoustic network
for sonar analysis. The network has a simple feedforward architecture—containing
34 input units, 14 hidden units and 2 output ones—and was trained by
backpropagation to distinguish between rocks and mines.18 In the training phase, the
network is fed with the digitized outputs of an analyzer whose frequencies
correspond to real sonar echoes bouncing back from both rocks and mines, lying at
the bottom of the sea. The idea is that through backpropagation learning, the
network can develop internal representations that reflect the externally given inputs.
In the training phase, after each input has been fed, the weights are calculated
upward. The result is that one of the two output nodes (one for the answer ‘mine’,
the other for ‘rock’) will have a higher value than the other, eliciting thus an output
response. If the network’s response is correct—i.e., if the ‘mine’ node has a higher
activation value when a mine-frequency has been given as input, for instance—,
then the patterns of activation are left intact. Otherwise— if the answer is
incorrect—the weights on the connections are recursively adjusted downward
according to the measure of error calculated as a result of the difference between the
actual response the network has given and what the correct answer should have
been. Once the training phase is completed, the network is tested by feeding it with
the frequency of several previously unencountered mines and rocks. The result
Gorman and Sejnowski (1988) reported is that the network can respond correctly—
18 See Gorman and Sejnowski (1988) for a detailed analysis o f  the training process, or Churchland 
(1989a) for a recapitulation o f  the key aspects o f  the network.
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more than 90% success rate—to the novel inputs: If fed with a mine frequency, the
network’s mine output-node will have a higher level of activation. And similarly
with respect to new rocks’ sonar echoes. In this way, we may say that the network
has learned to discriminate between mines and rocks.
Churchland makes use of Gorman and Sejnowski’s results in order to
articulate a connectionist-inspired theory of mental representation—aka State Space
Semantics. The basic idea is that
[the] brain represents various aspects of reality by a position in a suitable state 
space, and the brain performs computations on such representations by means 
of general coordinate transformations from one state space to another. 
(Churchland, 1986, p. 280)
Churchland proposes that we understand concepts as points in a partial state space 
of a dynamical system. These points correspond to the tips of the vectors 
determined by the levels of activation of the different units in hidden layers—see 
4.4 above. The semantic characteristics of a concept can then be seen as a function 
of the place that that concept—i.e., point—occupies in a geometrically 
characterized hyperspace. In this way, Churchland proposes, we may talk of 
semantic similarity between concepts in terms of the proximity of their respective 
absolute positions in state space, as identified in relation to a number of 
semantically relevant dimensions. In short, State Space Semantics tells us that the 
semantic connection of a concept A with properties x and y  can be analyzed in terms 
of the position of concept A in a semantic space which is delimited in part by the x-
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and ^ -dimensions.19
State Space Semantics sheds some light onto the ongoings of the mine/rock 
detector. By observing the behaviour of the hidden units during the training phase, 
and how the network performs subsequently under the presence of new exemplars, 
we find that the training process has partitioned the state space of possible patterns 
of activation across the hidden units. In particular, the internal space has been split 
into two sub-spaces: One corresponding to mine-representations, the other to rock- 
representations. One way to grasp this partitioning is via statistical techniques such 
as Cluster Analysis. It consists in pairing each pattern of activation with its closest 
neighbour. An average activation value is then calculated, and the process of pairing 
neighbours is repeated for the new patterns of activation. This technique is 
hierarchically applied, arriving in the end at a final clustering in space where points 
are located in several specific regions as a function of the similitudes shared with 
other points, culminating each sub-space in a hot spot, as Churchland calls it. The 
hot spot in the mine-like space is taken to represent the prototypical mine; the one 
in the rock-like space is taken to represent the prototypical rock (see figure 4.3 
below). All the vectors whose activation values correspond to mine-inputs are seen 
as points in a mine-region, and the same goes for the ‘rock’ vectors. We may then 
judge how representative of a category an exemplar is as a function of the
19 This is a simplification o f Churchland’s (1986) original proposal. Since then Churchland has 
developed State Space Semantics further, in order to meet a number o f  challenges. In particular, 
Churchland (1996; 1998) now defines semantic similarity, not in terms o f  absolute positions, but 
rather relative  positions in state space— see chapter 5 below.
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[Fig. 4.3]: The activation-vector space o f the middle layer o f  the acoustic network for sonar 
analysis. Note the partition into two exclusive categories: mine echoes and rock echoes. Note 
also the two prototypical hot spots where typical and uncompromised examples o f each 
category are routinely coded, (from Churchland, 1995, p. 83)
geometrical distance, in a pre-specified Euclidean space, that separates the vector in 
question from one particular hot spot. In this way, the task of the network can be 
better understood as a process of discrimination, not only between mine-like and 
rock-like representations, but also between more or less prototypical mines and 
rocks. Hence, under a novel input pattern, the network is discriminating the 
proximity of the new pattern of activation produced—represented as a point—to 
one or other of the hot spots. In short, the key point to bear in mind is that when a 
hot spot is activated, it represents the network’s concurrent understanding of a given
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environmental feature.20
As we saw above, connectionist learning consists in minimizing the 
network’s error in the space of potential weight assignments. This statement 
however requires some further qualification that will help us appraise a crucial 
disanalogy between classical computers and neural networks as far as information 
storage goes. Even though neural networks can be trained to navigate complex 
domains, the information the network gathers from the environment is not explicitly 
stored anywhere, as is the case in a symbolic model. Digital computers store 
information in memory, such that relevant data for specific tasks can be retrieved 
and deployed when required. Connectionist models, on the other hand, don’t retain 
information anywhere in the system. All the information present is the one being 
actively represented as an activation pattern at any given point in processing. When 
the network is not making use of a piece of information, that data is nowhere in the 
system. Nevertheless, if a network is to navigate a certain domain it must somehow
20 It is noteworthy that Churchland’s approach to concept organization finds empirical support in 
some psychological research on perception and categorization. Rosch (1975), for instance, 
challenged the rule-based perspective according to which falling into one category is determined by 
the satisfaction o f  an established— fixed— set o f  characteristics. In contrast, categorization is better 
understood in terms o f  prototypes. Think for example o f  robins and ducks as exemplars o f  the 
category ‘bird’. Experimental psychology has taught us that the first exemplars fall more neatly into 
the ‘bird’ category than the latter. The reader can see that State Space Semantics can perfectly 
account for Rosch’s dynamic understanding o f  categorization. On the other hand, Rosch’s prototype 
perspective o f  concepts has been recently called into question. However, those against the Roschian
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store information that can be necessary for future steps of processing. In
connectionist learning it is the weights—i.e., the strengths—among the connections
what gets stored. Ultimately, in the connectionist dynamical approach, we may say
that the knowledge the network has of a target domain resides in the connection
weights that have been generated during learning in accordance to a learning
algorithm. The weights between the units is what allows the network to recreate all
the patterns of activation corresponding to the features of the different stimulus in,
for example, a categorization task (see 4.9 below). In this way, learning consists of
certain weight adjustments such that the network comes to sort the given stimuli
into the correct categories—i.e., such that a single set o f weights allows the network
to constantly generate the right activation patterns in the face of the activation from
new input patterns. We now have an elementary picture of the basic components
and dynamics of connectionist networks, and how concepts get organized in this
framework. But before developing my connectionist defence of the Inscrutability
Thesis in the next section, let me introduce a caveat regarding the biological
plausibility of connectionist networks which is essential to avoid a source of
misunderstandings concerning the potential application of connectionist modeling
as an explanatory framework of human cognition.
Connectionist networks are neurally inspired. Research in neurobiology and 
cognitive science appears to favour connectionism as a fruitful model of cognition, 
over the computer metaphor advocated by classical artificial intelligence—see for
approach have produced models which are even more in accordance with Churchland’s flexible 
construal o f  concepts— see, for example, Barsalou (1989), and Schyns and Rodet (1997).
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example Churchland and Sejnowski (1992); and Elman et al. (1996). Among the
reasons often cited, connectionist supporters stress certain tasks that neural
networks appear to be better at than digital computers. Examples are pattern
recognition, plan making, speech understanding, and in general, any task which is
domain-specific.21 Moreover, the friend of connectionism often alludes to two
further features of connectionist networks which find clear neurobiological support.
These are real time constraints on processing, and graceful degradation. Humans
are able to perform highly complex tasks such as language processing in the order
of hundreds of milliseconds. This imposes a serious limitation on processing since
were we to perform complex tasks by following classical rules and programs, that
couldn’t be accomplished in more than 100 serial steps.22 Real time constraints,
connectionists argue, bring support to parallel processing. On the other hand, neural
networks, like brains, seem to ‘degrade gracefully’. Since information is distributed
in parallel, optimal performance in a certain domain deteriorates gradually. On the
other hand, classical processing is said to be ‘brittle’. Either a system works or it
doesn’t, given certain damage that affects to a particular domain. So, in short, it
seems that in some important aspects, connectionist networks exhibit properties of
biological cognitive systems not found in classical symbolic models.
Granted that, nonetheless, it must be noted that connectionist networks bring 
a great deal of simplification in contrast with ‘biological networks’, failing to
21 Digital computers, on the other hand, are far better at tasks requiring manipulation o f  large pools 
o f  data according to fixed explicit rules— e.g., number crunching.
22 This has come to be known in the literature as the '100 step' constraint.
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capture the fine-grained architectural and processing details of real brains. The
following are important disanalogies, to name but a few: Firstly, the level of
activation of connectionist nodes usually takes 2 values (in the case of all-or-
nothing units), or n values (if we discriminate between n different activation levels
between 0 and 1, where n is not usually a very high number). In contrast, the
spiking frequency of neurons ranges between 0 and 200 hertz. In this way, we might
be able to distinguish a number m of relevantly different levels of activation
corresponding to values within this interval, where m is considerably much higher
than n. Secondly, a simple feedforward network has just one or maybe a few hidden
layers, whereas natural networks can be formed by up to approximately 50 different
hidden layers. Thirdly, as we saw, connections in feedforward neural networks are
propagated from one layer to the immediate following one. In contrast, natural
networks have layers connected with each other in a non-sequential order.23
Moreover, we did not contemplate connections among the units of the same layer,
whereas in natural networks, the level of activation of a given unit can be partially
determined by its connections to other units of the same layer. And lastly, artificial
networks operate with layers composed of hundreds, maybe a few thousands, of
units. In contrast, biologically speaking, we can talk of layers with a number of
units reaching into the millions! So, it seems that the dimensionality of the systems
of coordinates to be determined by real brains is much higher than the
23 There are many recurrent networks— as opposed to feedforward or non-acyclic ones— which do 
enjoy a richer non-sequential connectivity (see 4.6 below). Nevertheless, even the most developed 
recurrent networks are still far away from mirroring the connectivity patterns o f  brain cells.
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dimensionality achieved by the hand of artificial neural networks. The number of
potential positions of a vector in its relevant coordinate system will consequently be
much bigger as well. This is important because how knowledge is stored may
influence the course of future processing—see 4.7, and 4.8 below.
Furthermore, learning algorithms for weight-readjustment, such as 
backpropagation, depend crucially upon some form of supervision. The crucial 
point is that connection weights can only be adjusted by deriving a measure of error 
from a target output. This feature is not known to have biological implementation. 
Real nervous systems lack access to the target outputs that backpropagation 
exploits. And, moreover, even if brains did have access, information does not flow 
backwards in order to adjust weights as to lead to a better future performance of the 
system.
These considerations bring a substantial worry that must be addressed before I 
try to exploit connectionist theory for my defence of Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis. 
Given that artificial neural networks are in a sense radically different from their 
biological counterparts, why should we pay any attention to connectionism in the 
first place if our subject matter are real cognitive agents? Putting it bluntly, a fair 
question is: What can connectionist theory possibly tell us about the brain? At this 
point, there is, I’m afraid, not one single answer that will satisfy everyone. Let me 
however sketch a couple of responses that will help to set to some extent the 
(modest) limits of the present work.
On the one hand, in fairness to the connectionist, it must be pointed out that 
modelers are progressively making use of more and more constraints under the light
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of neurobiological research, refining thus their models so as to push the neural
metaphor of connectionism as far as possible.24 On the other hand, and more
importantly, even though the richness of real brains cannot be easily implemented
artificially, we may read connectionist theorizing at a more abstract level of
understanding. Connectionist networks are to be interpreted as abstract models of
real nervous systems. Even with simple abstract toy-models of this sort, the
connectionist hope is that a lot about human cognition can be modelled.
Connectionism can then set as its target the more modest project of accounting for
the coarse-grained architectural and dynamical features responsible for human
cognition. In this way, for example, even though we know that brains do not learn
by backpropagation, the connectionist may still argue that i f  biological strategies to
minimize error are functionally similar to backpropagation, then connectionist
theory can still help us to understand the coarse mechanisms involved in human
learning—cf. Elman et al. (1996).
My working hypothesis will thus be that these ideas, but perhaps with more 
complication, will equally shed light on higher-level cognitive problems—thought, 
language-mastery, etc. Ultimately, the best shot for my forthcoming arguments will
24 New neural networks are being designed which can account, for example, for aspects o f  the 
mammalian visual cortex, human aphasia, etc. Some researchers are trying to fmd connectionist 
analogs o f  synaptogenesis, and synaptic pruning (see Elman et al., 1996, p. 5; p. 49, and the 
references given there). Also, a number o f  strategies for implementing backpropagation with lower- 
level mechanisms have been pursued— see, for example, Hecht-Nielsen, 1989, and Parker, 1985; 
1987. In addition, several other learning algorithms with increasing biological plausibility are being 
deployed.
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be to frame them conditionally: If real brains do process thoughts and language via
biological strategies functionally similar to the ones employed by recurrent neural
networks—in particular, by making use of a non-classical form of constituency (see
4.6 below)—then Wright’s ‘psychological simplicity’ argument will not go through. 
We now have the basic machinery to build up a connectionist defence of the 
Inscrutability Thesis.
4.6 Simple Recurrent Networks and Conceptual Inclusion
The processing of natural languages—where information is encoded serially—calls 
for the representation of complex hierarchical grammatical structures. A 
connectionist network that can master complex linguistic tasks must reflect the 
temporal dimension involved in language processing; an essential feature if we 
think for example of nested relative clauses, where grammatical context will 
determine the semantic properties of the words being processed. Connectionist 
networks proposed to date to account for this kind of complexity are, nonetheless, 
far from mimicking the complex patterns of human linguistic behaviour. Our 
interest, however, is to appraise how concepts may be represented in a connectionist 
architecture, even though these concepts will relate to a toy language—i.e., a small 
portion of a natural language. Recurrent networks are precisely designed to cope 
with the complex grammatical structures of the limited number of sentences of a toy 
language. The result is a non-classical approach to cognition where constituency 
and processing are non-classical in a sense yet to be explained.
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A simple recurrent network is a standard feedforward net supplemented with
one or more feedbackward pathways. The idea is to make use of this recurrent
architecture in order to bring into play some sort of short-term memory. The
information in state space at any given step of processing is fed back into the hidden
layer of the network along with the ‘normal’ input pattern being fed at the
subsequent step of processing. Thanks to this recurrence the network can process
contextualized sequential information. Based on this recurrent architecture, Elman
(1992)— see fig. 4 A— designed a network which does exhibit appropriate
sensitivity to the syntactical dependencies found in grammatical structures.25 Elman
trained a recurrent network on a set of 10,000 grammatical sentences which were
produced, in the classical rule-derived way, out of a lexicon of 8 nouns, 12 verbs,
the relative pronoun ‘who’ and an end-of-sentence period. Items of this lexicon
were randomly assigned a twenty-six bit vector. The input set consisted then of the
successive concatenation of all the sentences in the pool of data formed out of the
stream of these vectors. The network’s task was to make correct predictions of
subsequent words in the corpus of sentences. Being fed with a sequence of words
from the input stream, the network had to predict the subsequent word. Using
backpropagation—see 4 A— weights were adjusted to the desired output
performance. Once the training phase was finished, Elman’s network was tested on
a set of novel sentences. As we shall see shortly, the prediction task for the net
cannot be deterministic. Given a novel input, several correct outputs may follow.
25 The recurrent architecture employed by Elman is a variation o f  Jordan (1986) sequential 
network— see Elman (1988; 1989).
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Probabilities of occurrence for all possibly correct predictions were determined by
generating the likelihood vectors for every word in the novel corpus of sentences.
The results were that the network could successfully discriminate grammatical
strings of words.26 The root mean squared (rms) error of predictions was 0.177 (sd:
0.463) against the likelihood vectors—for the details, see Elman, 1992, p. 154.
26 Strictly speaking, the network’s task is not to discriminate grammatically acceptable from 
grammatically unacceptable structures, but simply to make correct predictions o f  subsequent 
words— this conflation between the two tasks appears to be common in the literature. We may say, 
however, that the ungrammaticality of, for example, "boy who boys"— as a complete sentence— is 
indicated by the fact that the network does not predict a as a possible next word. That is, it 
recognizes that the sentence is not complete. If the string were "boys see boys" then the network 
would predict two kinds o f  possible next items: Namely, a period (which indicates that the sentence 
could be complete at this point); and also the word "who" (indicating that a grammatical continuation 
would involve a relative clause on the second noun). There are two reasons why we may want to stay 
with mere prediction. On the one hand, we may derive grammaticality from prediction by seeing 
whether the network believes that a sentence is (potentially) complete, or whether it wants additional 
input. In cases o f degenerate input— e.g., "boys boys..."— the network predicts that nothing is 
possible as a successor. Thus, there are network behaviours which, although they do not explicitly 
indicate grammaticality p er  se, can be mapped onto grammaticality. Besides, we may model 
grammaticality explicitly by designing another network whose task is to examine Elman net’s 
predictions, and output a ‘grammaticality judgement’. On the other hand, prediction is a more 
ecologically plausible and naturalistic task than grammaticality. For present purposes, we need not 
expand on this issue, but just bear in mind that it is not a measure o f  grammaticality p er se what 
Elman’s network outputs. Many thanks to Jeff Elman for helping me clarify this issue.
A Connectionist Defence o f the Inscrutability Thesis 129
2 6 output
10
hidden
26
input
context
[Fig. 4.4]: Elman’s recurrent network used to discriminate grammatically correct sentences. 
(Elman, 1992, p. 153)
An illustration will help to appraise these results. Elman’s net was presented 
with the following novel sentences, being fed one word at a time:
(a) boy who boys chase chases boy.
(b) boys who boys chase chase boy.27
Number information (e.g., boy/s) needs to be taken into account over the relative 
clause—who boys chase—common to (a) and (b). The results were encouraging.
27 English grammar demands: “boy whom boys chase chases boy”, and “boy whom boys chase chase 
boy”. We may nonetheless take sentences (a), and (b) above, for it doesn’t make any difference to 
my forthcoming argument’s.
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Elman’s net respected the grammatical agreement between the main clause subject
and the main clause verb.28 The crucial point for our purposes is to understand how
Elman’s network succeeds in its task. After each word in sentences (a) and (b) had
been processed, the patterns of hidden unit activation were recorded. The hidden
patterns of activation are distributed over 70 units, yielding a 70-dimensional state
space. Making conceptual sense of the processing is thus not straightforward and
requires some simplifying statistical treatment. We need to observe the temporal
trajectories of these hidden patterns through state space. Principal Components
Analysis (henceforth abbreviated PCA) provides us with a relatively simple way of
looking into this high-dimensional sequential vector space. PCA is a
dimensionality-reduction technique which consists in passing each member—
sentence—of the input set through a trained network with its weights frozen, so that
current learning does not interfere. The corresponding hidden patterns are then
recorded and the number of statistically relevant correlations of the set of hidden
activations is calculated. As a result, we get different vectors ordered by their values
from greater to smaller amount of variance. These vectors recode each 70-
dimensional input vector in terms of those variations, obtaining a more accessible—
somewhat ‘localized’—description of the hidden units activation patterns in which
different vectors are used as first, second, ..., principal components in the analysis.
If we now make use of the principal components—i.e., those input-output
correlations that make the highest contribution to the net’s overall output
28 Similarly, Elman’s net could represent successive embedding relationships, as found in complex 
relative clauses. See Elman, 1992, pp. 165-7, for the details.
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behaviour—, we can see the temporal trajectories in the processing of sentences.
who
who
boys
chase
boys
chases
chase
boys
boy
O-x-5
boys].
boy],
[Fig. 4.5]: Trajectories through state space for‘[boy who boys chase chases boy’ and ‘boys 
who boys chase chase boy’]. After the indicated word has been input, each point marks the
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position along the second principal component o f  hidden unit space. Magnitude o f  the second 
principal component is measured along the ordinate; time (i.e., order o f  words in sentence) is 
measured along the abscissa. [...The] sentence-final word is marked with a ]s. (Adapted from 
Elman, 1992, pp. 162-3)
Each different principal component carries different information. By examining the 
trajectories through state space along several dimensions when processing sentences 
(a) and (b), it was discovered that the second principal component played a key role 
in retaining number information of the main clause subject over the relative clause. 
PC A—see fig. 4.5 above—shows how
grammatically similar sentences, such as (a) and (b), follow closely resembling 
trajectories in the simplified space obtained by plotting the second principal 
component along the ordinate.
Let us now turn to a crucial philosophical implication of Elman’s recurrent 
network.29 Broadly speaking, the activations undergone by a connectionist network 
can be interpreted either locally or in a distributed fashion. In a localist model, 
individual units are used to represent entire concepts—see, for example, Rumelhart 
and McClelland (1982) model for word recognition. These localist units are atomic, 
and cannot thus be further decomposed. The semantics to be assigned in a localist 
interpretation are a function of the patterns of connectivity among these atomic 
units. By contrast, in a distributed model individual units are semantically 
uninterpretable. Representations are processed simultaneously by many units. Since 
a single ensemble of units can represent many concepts, we need to look at the 
entire pattern of activation in order to know which concept is being represented at a
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particular time.30 The representations obtained in Elman’s net are fully distributed.
The smallest interpretable pattern of activation is the one produced by the whole set
of hidden units.31 We cannot equate discrete parts of the hidden units’ activation
pattern with particular components of the sentences being processed. Nevertheless,
Elman’s network does capture the grammatical structure of the sentences it
confronts. Sentences are not encoded by means of merely fully distributed
unstructured representations. Grammatical structure is reflected by coding
grammatical variations as slight dynamical variations in the relevant activation
patterns through state space. The syntactic contribution each word makes to the
sentence is measured by the word’s own level of activation, as encoded in hidden
state space. The key issue, for our interests, is that connectionist and classical
models differ in the way they represent constituency. Whereas in the classical
symbolic approach, constituency is context-independent (see 4.3), connectionist
29 For other philosophical implications o f  Elman’s net see Ramsey, 1992, pp. 269-71.
30 For our purposes we are interested in distributed representations. Since localist units are atomic, 
and connectionist semantics in these models develop as a function o f  the combination o f  these 
decomposable units, localist representations become functionally equivalent to the symbolic 
representations deployed in classical computationalism. Localist models would therefore provide 
manifestable evidence in favour o f Wright’s ‘psychological simplicity’ constraint— see 4.3 above.
31 For some problems with fully distributed representations which I shall obviate, see Guttenplan 
(1994, pp. 203-4)
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constituency is context-dependent.32 Context-dependency gets encoded by the
precise spatial location of a pattern of activation in representational space. Recent
commentators have highlighted this crucial feature:
[Elman’s model] brings into play the idea of invoking different 
representations of the same concepts to capture certain structural relations. In 
this type of model, propositions do have individual concepts as constituent 
parts. However, this feature does not produce a straightforward 
implementation of LOT because of the way individual concepts are 
represented in such systems. In these models, the form  of the representation of 
the concept itself—not its causal/functional relations with other concepts— 
determines its syntactic role in the proposition. In other words, we have 
implicitly ‘stored’ not one representation for a particular lexical concept but 
several different representations (encoded by patterns corresponding to 
different though nearby points in vector space), each of which account for a 
given syntactic role. Thus, we do not, on this picture, have a representation of 
BOY or APPLE but, rather, a cluster of representations of BOY-qua-[ ], 
APPLE-qua-[ ], where the bracketed blanks are filled in by the appropriate 
syntactic or conceptual role. (Ramsey, 1992, p. 269)
Given this connectionist perspective,33 I contend, we find no motivation for
32 For some classical examples o f context-sensitivity see Smolensky’s (1991) ‘cup-with-coffee’ 
story, and McClelland and Kawamoto (1986).
33 Fodor’s most powerful response to connectionism is that a connectionist model will not be able to 
explain the systematicity, productivity and inferential coherence o f  thought, unless it implements 
classical models, in which case LOT wins. An appraisal o f  Fodor’s criticism would take us far afield. 
See Elman (1998) for a connectionist attempt to account for the systematicity o f  thought which 
avoids a symbolic implementation. I shall grant for the sake o f  the argument that a connectionist
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Wright’s ‘psychological simplicity’ argument. Imagine we feed Elman’s recurrent
network with several ‘rabbit’-related sentences.34 Take the following sentences:
(c) ‘White rabbit’, and
(d) ‘White 99% undetached rabbit part’.
(c) and (d) are composed out of a set of lexically simple items: Namely, ‘White’, 
‘rabbit’, ‘99%’, ‘undetached’ and ‘part’.35 However, we should notice that in 
processing (c) and (d) the network does not store a fixed  representation of the listed 
items, as classically identified. Rather, the network learns to use a cluster of 
representations of, say, ‘rabbit’-qua-[syntactic/conceptual role,], ‘rabbit’-qua- 
[syntactic/conceptual role2], where syntactic/conceptual role, is replacing f  in 
‘White f  and syntactic/conceptual role2 is replacing f in ‘White 99% undetached f 
part’. The reason for this, as we’ve just seen, is the context-dependent character of 
the constituents. Each of the constituents to be distinguished in the structured 
sentences is encoded via different patterns of activation as a function of the context 
the constituent is embedded in. However, according to the above connectionist 
picture, there is no canonical representation of ‘rabbit’ to be singled out which is
architecture involves a connectionist model o f  cognition (see Rumelhart, McClelland et al., 1986, 
chapter 4, p. 110). Nevertheless, I hope that by the end o f  the chapter (see 4.8 below) an idea o f  how 
to answer the charge o f  ‘mere implementation’ will begin to emerge.
34 This is just a thought-experiment. I shall ignore the technical adjustments required in the 
architecture and training regime with respect to Elman’s above simulation.
35 For economy, we may ignore that ‘99%’ can be further decomposed into the following lexical 
items: ‘9 9 ’, ‘per’, and ‘cent’. Similarly for ‘undetached’.
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common to ‘rabbit’-qua-[syntactic/conceptual role]] and ‘rabbit’-qua-
[syntactic/conceptual role2] . Instead, there are two different representations
encoding for each different sentential context. Were we to apply PCA on the
sentences ‘White rabbit’ and ‘White 99% undetached rabbit part’, we would find
that both sentences would follow different, although somewhat resemblant,
trajectories in state space, ‘rabbit’-qua-[syntactic/conceptual role,] and ‘rabbit’-qua-
[syntactic/conceptual role2] would occupy different positions reflecting thus
different paths through space as a function of the previous words being processed.
Obviously, those ‘rabbit’-related vectors representing a similar grammatical role
will tend to gather in certain subregions. However, the net performs its task at the
level of the numerous context-dependent and distributed internal states. In this way,
we should not see the idiosyncratic representations of ‘rabbit’ as word-tokens of the
same word-type, as LOT and its classical form of constituency maintain. Whereas
under the LOT hypotheses—see section 4.3—exercising the concept expressed by
‘rabbit’ was the tokening of the corresponding expression of LOT—viz.,
RABBIT—, my working hypotheses is that the conceptual repertoire expressed by
‘rabbit’ in an utterance of ‘White rabbit’ is whatever real internal state the
connectionist theory maps ‘rabbit’ onto. Likewise, the conceptual repertoire
expressed by ‘rabbit’ in an utterance of ‘White 99% undetached rabbit part’ is
whatever real internal state (the same or different) the theory maps that utterance of
‘rabbit’ onto.
Assuming this connectionist setting, Wright’s argument against the 
Inscrutability Thesis loses its grip. It is not the case that 99%-UNDETACHED-
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RABBIT-PART includes a constituent RABBIT which allegedly is common to other
RABBIT-related representations. The constituent RABBIT in WHITE RABBIT is a
token of a different type from the constituent RABBIT in WHITE 99%-URP.
Lexical inclusion in English, hence, does not imply conceptual inclusion. So, when
we are confronted with several contextualized, though semantically related,
concepts, we should conclude that none of them includes the others. In this way,
neither the phrasal concept 99%-URP includes the lexical concept RABBIT, nor the
other way round.36
I conclude then that the Quinean can go with modem scientific fashion and 
make use of the ‘99%-urp’ referential scheme. A hard-line Quinean will ignore 
Wright’s argument if it appeals to unashamedly mentalistic concepts. On the other 
hand, by approaching the issue of the naturalization of concepts in a way acceptable 
to a Quinean—see 4.2—we have at least two options: either we identify concepts 
with the orthodox classical features championed by Fodor under the LOT 
hypothesis, in which case Wright may hold to his principle of psychological 
simplicity, or we identify concepts with non-classical features acceptable to a 
connectionist, and then, as we’ve seen, Wright’s argument does not go through.
The above discussion, together with the arguments offered in chapter 3,
36 It is worth remarking that on the connectionist view the finite set o f  basic clauses o f  a translational 
manual does not give a basic repertoire o f  concepts from which all other concepts are constructed. 
The connectionist basic-to-phrasal direction o f  conceptual formation is orthogonal to the requisites 
imposed by LOT’s classical constituency. The basic clauses are lexically basic, but have no 
privileged conceptual status— see 4.8 below.
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constitute the bulk of my defence of Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis. In the remainder
of this chapter, and chapter 5, I shall try to address three important criticisms
launched from the connectionist comer that may well torpedo my whole project.
4.7 Statistical Analyses, Symbolic Approximation, and Causal Efficacy
In this section I shall consider two routes the anti-Quinean may pursue in order to 
reply to the above connectionist defence of the Inscrutability Thesis. The general 
idea underlying both rejoinders is that statistical techniques extensively employed in 
data analysis—statistical techniques such as Cluster Analysis (see 4.5) and PCA 
(see 4.6)—may reveal that the connectionist approach to cognition, and in particular 
the connectionist approach to language processing, does not differ substantially 
from the symbolic approach reviewed in section 4.3. To bring up the core idea, the 
anti-Quinean may argue that connectionist constituency—i.e., context-dependent 
constituency (4.6)—can be ‘statistically forced’ into a classical—i.e., context -free 
(4.3)—mould. Were this to be the case, the anti-Quinean will contend, the results 
achieved in section 4.3, where classical constituency favoured a standard 
interpretation of Native, may equally apply once we adopt a connectionist 
architecture. To make a long story short, we may say that statistical techniques can 
help to close the gap between connectionist and classical models of cognition. This 
‘symbolic approximation’ (see below) may be accomplished in at least two ways, 
giving rise to two possible lines of argument for the anti-Quinean to exploit. In 
what follows I shall flesh out both rebuttals. Then I shall suggest two reasons as to
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why the anti-Quinean cannot help herself two either of the two lines of response in
order to reply to the connectionist Quinean of section 4.6.
First Anti-Quinean Rejoinder A lesson to learn from the employment of
distributed neural networks—where single hidden units have no representational 
power in isolation (see 4.6 above)—is that we must drop altogether the classical 
decompositional approach to cognition, and adopt a mathematically-inspired one 
where the underlying mechanisms of cognition are explained statistically. Statistical 
techniques, such as cluster analysis provide us with a higher-level description of the 
piecemeal dynamics of the units-and-weights computations of the neural level. 
These higher-level analyses permit connectionist representations to capture, for 
example, information about abstract lexical categories of the sort typically referred 
to by classical symbols. A cluster analysis of a simple sentence-processing 
simulation run by Elman (1990) will serve to illustrate this crucial feature.
Elman (1990) trained a simple recurrent network, containing 150 hidden 
units, to predict successive words in sequences of sentences.37 After the network 
learned the appropriate input/output mapping, Elman performed a hierarchical 
clustering of the 150-dimensional hidden activation space. As we saw when 
interpreting the behaviour of the acoustic network for sonar analysis (section 4.5 
above), by pairing together all those inner states as a function of the spatial
37 For present purposes we need not dwell on the details o f  Elman’s simulation. The reader may care 
to consult Elman (1990) for the minutiae, or Elman et al. (1996, chapter 2) for a recapitulation o f
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proximity among the diverse activation patterns, cluster analysis enables us to
visualize indirectly high-dimensional spaces. Figure 4.6 shows the spatial
organization of the hidden representations generated by Elman’s network.
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[Fig. 4.6]: Hierarchical clustering o f hidden unit activation patterns from the sentence- 
prediction task (Elman, 1990). The network learns distributed representations for each word 
which reflects its similarity to other words. Words and groups o f  words which are similar are 
close in activation space, and close in position in the tree. (Elman et al., 1996, p. 96)
some key aspects o f  the network. Although the tasks are similar, the reader should not mistake this 
simulation for the one reported in section 4.6.
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As the hierarchical clustering of figure 4.6 illustrates, the representations
created in Elman’s network reflect, at a high-level of description, certain abstract 
categories. In particular, we can see that the tree structure of the words’ patterns of 
activation has divided the hidden space into two groups corresponding to the 
categories NOUN and VERB. These two categories comprise the 29 lexical items 
learned by the network. If we move from left to right in the diagram we can see, for 
example, that ‘boy’ relates to an activation pattern belonging to the category 
HUMAN, which in turn is contained within a broader region identified as 
ANIMATES, which ultimately corresponds to the higher-level category NOUN. By 
looking at hidden spatial proximities in this way, the connectionist has a way of 
framing the type/token distinction which may furnish the anti-Quinean with the 
perfect tool for her purposes. The crucial idea is that, similarly to our distinction in 
spatial terms between a noun and a verb category, we may say that tokens that 
belong to the same representational type are neighbours, or more precisely, are in 
closer proximity to each other than to tokens belonging to other types. Let me flesh 
out this distinction in order to pave the way for the first anti-Quinean rejoinder.
To see the threat that cluster analysis poses to the Quinean, we need to move 
to a deeper level of analysis in Elman’s above simulation. For reasons of 
computational economy, Elman (1990) performed a cluster analysis of the hidden 
activation patterns once those patterns had been averaged over many different 
contexts. Hence, the hierarchical clustering of figure 4.6 picks out internal 
representations of lexical items which are context-insensitive. So, for instance, the 
activation pattern taken to represent ‘boy’ was the mean vector obtained by
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averaging out many idiosyncratic presentations of ‘boy’. To gain more accuracy,
Elman did a second cluster analysis; this time, of the real context-dependent
activation patterns. The goal was to observe whether the tree structure of figure 4.6
reflected what the network actually learned, or whether it was an artifact created by
the employment of mean—context-free—vectors. Since the network developed
27,454 hidden activation patterns, it would have been difficult to display
graphically the tree structure obtainable, had we performed a hierarchical cluster
analysis. However, we can appraise intuitively what’s going on. The tree structure,
Elman reports, is similar to the one graphed in figure 4.6, with the exception that
each branch is further arborized in order to reflect specific contexts within each
lexical item. Elman’s following comment brings to the fore the moot point for our
current concern:
It would be correct to think of the tree in [figure 4.6] as showing that the 
network has discovered that there are 29 types (among the sequence of 27,454 
inputs). These types are the different lexical items shown in that figure. A 
finer grained analysis reveals that the network also distinguishes between the 
specific occurrences of each lexical item, that is, the tokens. The internal 
representations of the various tokens of a lexical type are very similar. Hence, 
they are all gathered under a single branch in the tree. (Elman, 1990, p. 205)
The key question implicitly addressed in the above quote is: How can we 
represent the type/token distinction in distributed connectionist networks? Figure 
4.6 revealed how abstract lexical categories such as NOUN and VERB could be set 
apart in terms of the subregions of hidden space marked off by looking at different
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degrees of spatial proximity. In like vein, we may say that the type/token distinction
gets cashed out by the statistical development of boundary regions in hidden space.
It is the fact that different context-dependent tokens fall within the boundaries of a
given subregion what makes them belong to the same representational type.38
At this point, a clear objection breaks through.39 Consider again the recurrent 
network of section 4.6 being hypothetically fed with several ‘rabbit’-related 
sentences. As I argued earlier (see 4.6 above), theoretically we should expect the 
network to represent several ‘rabbit’-related sentences by different positions in 
hidden space; different positions reflecting the sentential context of each particular 
occurrence of ‘rabbit’. Given that, I contended, the constituent RABBIT in for 
example WHITE RABBIT is a token of a different type from the constituent
38 This appears to be the orthodox reading o f the type/token distinction in the connectionist literature 
(see, for example, Miikkulainen, 1993). In my opinion, it would be more fruitful to formulate a 
rather more radical proposal, according to which the process o f  differentiation o f  tokens belonging to 
one representational type— i.e., falling within the boundaries o f  a subregion in hidden space— turns 
out to be equivalent to the elaboration o f  different types altogether. After all, given that tokens 
(allegedly belonging to one type) preserve contextual idiosyncrasies, it would be tempting to argue 
that, granting connectionism, the type/token dichotomy becomes an artifactual distinction. Tokens, 
we may venture to say, become types themselves. Elaborating on this thought, nevertheless, would 
take us far afield. I shall follow for present purposes the orthodox— spatially inspired— connectionist 
portrayal o f  the type/token distinction.
39 The forthcoming objection should be read as a criticism launched by a hypothetical connectionist 
foe o f  Quine. To the best o f my knowledge there is no argument in the connectionist literature 
explicitly profiting from cluster analysis to argue against a connectionist version o f  Quine’s 
Inscrutability Thesis.
A Connectionist Defence o f the Inscrutability Thesis 144
RABBIT in WHITE 99% UNDETACHED RABBIT PART. Unfortunately, the 
preceding discussion puts in plain sight that my conclusion was at least premature. 
Thanks to statistical techniques such as cluster analysis, we have a scientific level 
of description of speakers’ brain states such that we can group together all those 
states involved in inferences depending on the lexical item RABBIT. Elman’s 
above clustering highlights the fact that all those ‘rabbit’-related vectors 
representing a similar grammatical role would tend to gather in certain subregions. 
In short, the family resemblance of the different contextualized representations of 
anything rabbity can be grouped together culminating in a statistical unity. I shall
call this central tendency RABBIT . Now, the fact that connectionism treats 
constituents in a non-classical, context-dependent, way need not cause any concern 
to the anti-Quinean. The reason is that above the connectionist fine-grained level, 
there is a higher statistical level of understanding which provides us with the 
conceptual stability the anti-Quinean requires. In this way, someone may contend, 
the connectionist defence of the Inscrutability Thesis offered in section 4.6 does not 
go through. The reason is simply that the constituent RABBIT in WHITE RABBIT 
and the constituent RABBIT in WHITE 99%-URP are, not tokens of different types
j|(
as I argued earlier, but rather tokens of the same type: namely, the type RABBIT . 
All different ‘rabbity’ constituents can be seen as spatially grouped together under
the communal concept RABBIT* which is stable enough to play the role that the 
classical constituent RABBIT played in the Fodorian model which favoured a 
standard interpretation of Native (see 4.3).
Cluster analysis nicely illustrates spatially how abstractions can emerge
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statistically from the fine-grained dynamics of neural nets. However, the point is
more general, and could be made with virtually any other statistical technique. After
all, the role of statistical analyses is precisely to reduce dynamical detail so as to
have a firmer (symbolic?) grip of what’s going on at the nuts-and-bolts level of
processing. Since the second anti-Quinean rejoinder runs along similar lines—i.e.,
trying to close the gap between classical and connectionist models of cognition—let
me briefly sketch it by looking at the principal components analysis performed on
the simulation run by Elman that we reviewed in section 4.6.
Second Anti-Quinean Rejoinder The anti-Quinean’s misgivings, on the other 
hand, may be confined to the fact that the orthodox interpretation of Elman’s net 
that we find in the secondary literature (e.g., Ramsey, 1992, —see 4.6 above) is 
wrong. That interpretation is that constituency can be kept context-dependent by 
encoding the precise location of each individual (idiosyncratic) pattern of activation 
in state space. The failure, the objection would run,40 is the result of thinking about 
the mathematics and statistics of what’s happening in the representational space of 
Elman’s net in a muddled way: Coding grammatical variations as slight different 
positions in hidden space does not imply that Elman’s model is not subject to a 
classical symbolic treatment—i.e, does not imply that there are not context- 
independent representations. Notice that were we to do a PCA on a classical model 
(by treating different registers as dimensions, for example), we would get results
40 This worry was raised by an anonymous referee o f  M ind and Language in response to a previous 
version o f  this chapter— see Calvo Garzbn (2000a).
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similar to those obtained on Elman’s network. Grammatical variations between,
say, a-as-object and a-as-subject would be reflected by slightly different positions in
representational space. Similarly for connectionist models, the fact that on a PCA,
a-as-object and a-as-subject are located in different positions does not mean that
there is not a perfectly good context free symbol. We might obtain context-
independent representations in Elman’s model by paying attention to particular
principal components in the analysis. Specifically, activation of the first principal
component would be a good candidate since, as we saw in section 4.6, the
contextual difference between the sentences ‘boy who boys chase chases boys’ and
‘boys who boys chase chase boys’ (see figure 4.5 above) seems to be captured by
location on the second principal component. Now, once we interpret Elman’s model
as dealing with a classical form of constituency, Wright’s ‘psychological-
simplicity’ argument may kick in for the reasons rehearsed above, discrediting thus
Quinean perverse alternatives to our standard semantic theory.41
Moreover, someone may try to close the gap between classical and 
connectionist interpretations by permitting 'infinite precision analog' between 
classical and connectionist models. In that case, it is indeed not clear that the 
representational capacities of a classical symbolic model can be distinguished from
41 I believe, nonetheless, that the burden o f  proof is still on the proponent o f  this second rejoinder. 
Notice that the fact that the second principal component captures contextual idiosyncracies is 
logically consistent with other principal components capturing further subtle differences, or 
reflecting a different contextual role altogether. However, this point is too technical to be o f  import 
for the purposes o f  this chapter.
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the representational capacities of a recurrent network. However, such a move
would give up precisely what makes symbols attractive. Namely, their ability to
abstract over classes of items, ignoring context. It is unlikely, nevertheless, that the
anti-Quinean would be willing to pursue this last line of argument, and I shall not
press on it further.
Summing up, both rejoinders exploit the use of statistical techniques to bridge 
the gap between classical and connectionist approaches to constituency. In the first 
case, context free symbolization emerges as a result of the statistical clustering of 
different, but semantically related, representations. In the latter case, the anti- 
Quinean hopes that particular principal components in a PCA will symbolize the 
network’s internal representations. In the remainder of this section, I shall offer two 
considerations aiming to disprove the anti-Quinean’s use of statistical analyses for 
her purposes. In a nutshell, the two reasons are that the anti-Quinean is ignoring: (i) 
that statistical abstractions loose processing detail, and (ii) that the abstractions 
generated statistically are causally inert, and thus cannot play any explanatory role 
as far as the dynamical processing of connectionist networks is concerned, (i) bears 
directly on the second anti-Quinean rejoinder. On the other hand, (ii) is a more 
general criticism, and aims to target both rejoinders. Let me expand on these two 
points.
(i) Using PCA to ‘symbolize’ the hidden unit representations might in fact give 
the appearance that connectionist representations are equivalent to symbols. 
Unfortunately, this move would fail to completely reflect important variations in
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form that are not captured by PCA. That is, such a move gives the illusion that the
network trades in symbols, when in fact there are important subtle variations in
hidden unit representations; variations which may have causal consequences for the
network’s behaviour. The general point, to put it bluntly, is that statistically-
generated abstractions loose computational detail. Statistical techniques such as
PCA are meant to preserve remaining regularities across contexts. In one sense,
then, symbolic models approximate connectionist ones. However, the
approximation works only to a certain extent, and the gap between classical and
connectionist accounts of constituency, I contend, will ultimately never be fully
bridged. Commenting on the recurrent network I made use of in section 4.6, Elman
notes:
The fact that the networks here exhibited behavior which was highly regular 
was not because they learned to be context-insensitive. [... Even when] these 
networks’ behavior seems to ignore context the internal representations reveal 
that contextual information is still retained. (Elman, 1991, p. 220; emphasis 
added)
Elman’s remarks capture the essence of my first counter-argument. To expand on it, 
I shall next report on two well-known neurosimulations in the connectionist 
literature run by Servan-Schreiber, Cleeremans, and McClelland (1988).
Servan-Schreiber et al. designed a network for processing sequences of letters 
randomly generated by a finite-state grammar.42 The general goal was to appraise 
what sort o f representations simple recurrent networks make use of. Similarly to
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Elman’s net (see 4.6 above), the present task is to predict successive letters in a
sequence. Sequences of letters are generated by Reber’s (1967) finite-state
grammar. A finite-state grammar is a closed circuit made up of nodes which are
connected by arcs (see fig. 4.7). The nodes stand for possible states the system can
be in.
s
Begin # 0
#4
T
[Fig. 4.7]: The finite state grammar deployed by Reber (1967; 1976). Numerals indicate 
states, and letters indicate transition arcs. Sentences are generated by traversing a path from 
initial state #0 to final state #5. After each transition a letter is produced, obtaining thus 
sequentially a string. (From Servan-Schreiber et al., 1988, p. 6)
Grammatically correct sequences are produced by moving through the circuit from 
the ‘start’ node to the ‘end’ node. The different paths between ‘start’ and ‘end’ 
correspond to the several possible transitions from one intermediate node to 
another.43 A probability of .5 is granted for every possible transition. In this way, 
we obtain a number of grammatical sequences by following different paths from
42 For an extended treatment o f  this and related issues see Cleeremans (1993).
43 The reader should not confuse the finite-state grammar circuit with common neural network 
architecture. Although the diagrams are somewhat resemblant, the above circuit is meant to be 
implemented by a serial machine such that at any given time only one state can be activated.
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node to node. So, Reber’s grammar will generate sequences such as, for example,
TXS, PVV, TSXS, or PTVPS. In the prediction task set by Servan-Schreiber et al.
the target for the network was to predict successive letters in a string being fed to
the network letter by letter.44 A network based on Elman’s recurrent architecture
was used to achieve this task (see fig. 4.8).
copy
HIDDEN UNITS
CONTEXT UNITS
[Fig. 4.8]: General architecture o f  the network, (from Servan-Schreiber et al., p. 7)
Servan-Schreiber et al. trained several networks based on this recurrent 
architecture. In an initial experiment they trained a network with just three hidden
44 Since given a sequence o f  letters several possibilities may follow, the network needs information 
about the path traversed (not simply about the preceding letter). The challenge is similar to the one 
reviewed in section 4.6, where Elman’s net needed to take into account number information over 
relative clauses. In like vein, arcs bridging nodes in Reber’s finite-state grammar may be labeled with 
words, rather than letters. Hence, TXS could be interpreted as ‘boys like girls’. Generally speaking, 
Elman and Servan-Schreiber et al. are faced with the same problem. Namely, to explain how 
networks can reflect the temporal dimension inherent in mastering increasingly complex linguistic 
structures.
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units. The network was trained on a base data set composed o f  200,000 strings
it it
QES ■
u»«* —
[Fig. 4.9]: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis o f  the H.U. activation patterns after 200,000 
presentations from strings generated at random according to the Reber grammar (Three 
hidden units). (From Servan-Schreiber et al., p. 10)
generated by Reber’s grammar. After the network reached a successful degree
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of performance, Servan-Schreiber et al. performed a hierarchical cluster analysis of
the hidden units patterns of activation (see fig. 4.9):45
Figure 4.9 shows a tree structure where strings being represented in hidden 
space similarly are clustered together. Paying close attention to the clustering, we 
can see that hidden patterns of activation are grouped separately for each different 
node in Reber’s grammar. At the bottom of the tree, for example, we can see that all 
patterns that activate the ‘end’ node are clustered together. From these results, 
Servan-Schreiber et al. conclude that the recurrent network behaves in 
accordance—to a degree of approximation (see below)—to the theoretical finite- 
state automaton corresponding to Reber’s grammar. This clustering profile seems to 
encourage at first sight the anti-Quinean position according to which classical and 
connectionist models are not as different as initially thought to be.
Things, however, are not that simple. We can see why by looking at a 
different simulation. Servan-Schreiber et al. trained another recurrent network on 
the same prediction task, but this time, instead of three, the network had 15 hidden
45 For the training details see Servan-Schreiber et al. (1988), pp. 6-11. Although the target o f  my 
first response is the ‘symbolic emergence’ allegedly achieved via PCA, for purposes o f  illustration I 
report on a cluster analysis study. A shortcoming o f  cluster analysis is that it preserves only spatial 
information, loosing the temporal dimension involved in processing sequential inputs. PCA, on the 
other hand, tells us what the trajectories between hidden states at different stages o f  processing look 
like (see 4.6). For present purposes, we need only focus on how cluster analysis risks overlooking 
representational idiosyncracies— bearing in mind that a similar point, although more complicated, 
could be made with respect to PCA.
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units. Figure 4.10 below shows the cluster analysis performed on the trained
u u\M
1ISI
2ITI
2IXI
3IXI
2IPI
1ITI
3IPI
[Fig.4.10]: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis o f  the H.U. activation patterns after 200,000  
presentations from strings generated at random according to the Reber grammar (Fifteen 
hidden units). (From Servan-Schreiber et al., p. 14)
network. If we compare the clustering previously obtained in the three-
14
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hidden-units network with the clustering obtained in the fifteen-hidden-units
network, we can see that the latter (the higher-dimensional network) delivers a
much more complex clustering of the hidden activation patterns. Broadly speaking,
there are more levels of hierarchical clustering, and more subclusters within levels.
By paying close attention to the hierarchical clustering in figure 4.10, the reader can
see that nodes appear divided, retaining information about the particular arcs
leading into them.46 If we look further left in the tree structure, we can see that
highly detailed information about paths leading to letters is retained. So, for
example, sequences of the form T VPS and XVPS are located in different
subclusters.
Servan-Schreiber et al. call our attention to the reasons for this increase of 
representational complexity:
[We] should point out that the close correspondence between representations 
and function obtained for the recurrent network with three hidden units is 
rather the exception than the rule. With only three hidden units, 
representational resources are so scarce that back-propagation forces the 
network to develop representations that yield a prediction on the basis of the 
current node alone, ignoring contributions from the path. This situation
46 To keep the record straight, only nodes #1, #2, and #3 show such ‘redundancies’. Nodes #4 and 
#5 seem to ignore contribution from the arcs feeding into them (see figure 4.10). This, however, may 
be a byproduct o f  the architecture chosen. Plausibly, more hidden units would yield a richer 
subclustering. For present purposes, focusing on nodes #1, #2, and #3 is enough to drive my point 
home.
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precludes the development of different—redundant—representations for a 
particular node that typically occurs with higher numbers of hidden units. 
When redundant representations do develop, the network’s behavior still 
converges to the theoretical finite state automaton—in the sense that it can 
still be used as a perfect finite state recognizer for strings generated from the 
corresponding grammar—but internal representations do not correspond to 
that idealization. (Servan-Schreiber et al., 1988, p. 12; emphasis added)
We can now see why the anti-Quinean second rejoinder is doomed to failure. 
The worry was that particular principal components in a PCA could deliver context- 
independent—i.e., symbolic—representations. To remind the reader, the reason 
offered was that contextual idiosyncrasies were captured by location on the second 
principal component. The anti-Quinean then hoped that the first principal 
component would make Elman’s network subject to a symbolic treatment. The 
research carried out by Servan-Schreiber et al. clearly illustrates—although see fn. 
44 above—why the anti-Quinean is being misguided. The claim that ‘coding 
grammatical variations as slight different positions in space is compatible with 
treating Elman’s model symbolically’ is correct only in a loose sense. The 
‘symbolic approximation’ works to the extent that the behaviour of Elman’s 
network converges to the function it’s being trained to perform by backpropagation. 
Namely, to predict subsequent words in sequences of sentences. Elman’s network 
does master abstract generalizations. However, this does not give us the full picture 
of the representational capacities of connectionist networks. Even though the 
behaviour driven by backpropagation can be said to deliver a symbolic 
approximation, hidden units will tend to gather as much computational detail as
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possible; detail not strictly required for the network in order to make accurate
predictions. In this way, even though contextual divergencies in Elman’s net were
captured by the second principal component, and even assuming for argument’s
sake (although see fn. 40) that other principal components may portray context-
independent representations of the sort required by classical models, the anti-
Quinean rejoinder still wouldn’t be sound. The reason is simply that the
representations obtained in hidden space still retain context-dependent detail—even
though backpropagation only ‘guides’ the network to capture an abstract functional
mapping. As Elman points out:
[Connectionist models can] lead quite naturally to generalizations at a high 
level of abstraction where appropriate, but the behavior remains ever-rooted 
in representations which are contextually grounded. (Elman, 1991, p. 221)
On the other hand, as Servan-Schreiber et al. point out, lack of 
representational resources—i.e., scarce hidden dimensionality—leads to abstract, 
context-free, representations. That is the best (worst?) case scenario where a 
symbolic approximation may be accomplished. However, the more representational 
resources at hand, the less accurate the approximation between classical and 
connectionist models will be.47 In short, the outcome of reading statistically-
47 That symbolic models can merely approximate connectionist models has been repeatedly stressed 
in the connectionist literature. Notoriously, Smolensky (1988) highlights the cleavage between 
symbolic and subsymbolic levels o f  analysis. This distinction will have important implications in the 
debate over the need for symbolic representations and rules as urged by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), 
and Pinker and Prince (1988)— see 4.8 below.
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generated symbolic representations too seriously is a failure to explain the actual
mechanisms of cognition.48
The above considerations, and in particular the lack of a robust 
correspondence between representations and function in connectionist networks, 
drive us to the second reply which can be seen as the other side of the same coin.
(ii) The moral of Servan-Schreiber et aV  s simulations is that connectionist 
representations are too rich to be identified with classical abstractions of the sort 
generated statistically in connectionist theory. The other side of the same coin is 
that the abstractions generated statistically are causally inert, failing thus to play any 
explanatory role whatsoever as far as the dynamics of connectionist networks is 
taken as our model of cognition—see 4.8 below. Let me elaborate.
The gist of the first anti-Quinean rejoinder was that high-level abstractions 
generated by cluster analysis (see above) correspond to the folk psychological 
concepts posited by classical models. In this way, the statistical central tendency of 
a pool of ‘rabbit’-related inputs—viz, RABBIT*—corresponds to the context- 
independent concept that those sympathetic to the Fodorian classical approach call 
RABBIT. There is however, I contend, a crucial disanalogy between the RABBIT* 
that emerges via cluster analysis, and the RABBIT of Fodor’s LOT. Namely, that 
whereas RABBIT* is a mere abstraction, and is thus causally inefficacious,
48 It is noteworthy that symbolic approximations may prompt the associated risk o f  missing 
potentially relevant information for future stages o f  processing. Fleshing out this issue, however, 
would take us far afield.
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RABBIT (under Fodor’s reading!) is causally efficacious.49 The anti-Quinean first
rejoinder, I believe, is the result of overlooking this key disanalogy between 
connectionist and classical models.
Cluster analysis provides us with a good way of understanding what kind of 
representations neural networks can encode. The hierarchical clustering generates a 
‘static symbolic description of a network’s knowledge’—cf. Clark (1993). 
However, we should interpret this symbolic treatment as an external abstraction 
posited from the outside in an attempt to understand what the network is doing. 
Symbolic understanding is genuinely alien to the network itself. What gets 
activated, at each different time of rabbit-related processing, is a component of the 
cluster RABBIT , not the cluster itself. In this way, we shouldn’t see the network as
actually using the context-independent concept RABBIT . The network works 
exclusively at the level of the numerous context-dependent and distributed internal 
states of the hidden units. Uniting some of these states and putting them under the
label RABBIT should not drive us into thinking that the network actually employs
the concept RABBIT*.
49 That individual lexical concepts, identified as classical constituents, are causally efficacious is not 
necessarily common currency among sympathizers o f  the classical approach. Fodor, not surprisingly, 
still battles for the genuine causal efficacy o f  classical concepts— for his latest effort in this direction, 
see Fodor (1998a). The forthcoming discussion, thus, should be read as dealing exclusively with 
Fodor’s particular approach. Other, less radical, classical (or classical-cum-connectionist) 
approaches, according to which the causality o f  mental states is not genuine but derivative, can be 
easily reconciled with my line o f  argument— see chapter 7 below.
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In like vein, with respect to the simulation run by Elman reviewed in the first
anti-Quinean rejoinder, we may say that the network only discovers 29 lexical items
(the ones shown in figure 4.6). Symbolic knowledge of abstract NOUN and VERB
categories is alien to the network. Positing those categories merely reflects the
modeler’s ‘invasive’ strategies to appraise the network’s highly distributed
representational resources. Unfortunately, the issue needs further elaboration, and a
full appraisal of its implications must await until chapter 7, where I shall elaborate
on the notion of causality in order to argue against the posits of folk psychology. Let
me move now to the final stage of this chapter, where I shall try to wrap up my
connectionist defence of the Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis by looking at one
interesting debate between the friends and foes of connectionism.
4.8 Systematicity, Compositionality, and the Generality Constraint
Fodor (1994, p. 295) says he is inclined to take LOT very seriously i f  only for lack 
of alternative candidates. As Fodor would put it, LOT is ‘the only game in town’. 
Obviously this is not a bold assertion. Fodor has argued at length on the reasons 
why he believes connectionism cannot play the role LOT does as part of a 
representationalist theory of the mind (see references below). In a nutshell, Fodor’s 
most powerful response to connectionism is that crucial aspects of cognition require 
a symbolic explanation. In particular, Fodor argues, connectionist models will not 
be able to explain the systematicity, productivity, compositionality, and inferential 
coherence of thought, unless they implement classical models, in which case LOT
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wins. The issue is a thorny one, and a full appraisal would take us far afield.50 In
this section I shall focus exclusively on how to account for the systematicity and
compositionality of thought whilst avoiding the charge of mere symbolic
implementation. Addressing this issue is essential to reaffirm the credentials of
connectionism as a genuine alternative to LOT at the cognitive level.51 Moreover,
reviewing the classical/connectionist debate will allow us to return to one of the two
caveats left unanswered in chapter 2.
An origin of Fodor’s misgivings towards connectionism as a genuine model 
of human cognition can be found in Chomsky’s works in linguistics. Let me put the 
issue in perspective, and briefly sketch the traditional debate in linguistics on ‘rules 
of grammar’ as taken by Quine and Chomsky, respectively.
In Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory Quine posed a 
problem to linguists and philosophers alike: If we can be in possession of at least 
two extensionally equivalent systems of grammar for a given language L—i.e., two 
systems that can produce, by different routes, the same set of well-formed theorems 
of L in a recursive way—on what basis do linguists claim that one grammatical 
method with its own set of derivation-rules is the correct one? To make a long story 
short, Quine holds that we are not in a position to make such a choice. Correctness
50 The reader may care to consult the locus classici o f  the classical/connectionist debate: Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1988), Smolensky (1988), Fodor and McLaughlin (1990), and Smolensky (1991). See 
also Pinker and Prince (1988) for a powerful critique o f  connectionism which focuses, not on 
Fodorian LOT-like arguments, but rather on language acquisition in children.
51 Note that Fodor wouldn’t disagree with the connectionist that plausibly the brain is similar at the 
neural— architectural— level to connectionist networks.
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is sim ply a matter o f  ‘fitting’ the behaviour o f  the speakers o f  L , and insofar as the
different alternatives are extensionally equivalent the choice will remain
unresolved.52 By contrast, Chomsky (1957; 1968) maintains that being
extensionally equivalent does not make two systems of grammar equally correct.
Quine’s behavioural constraint is too weak. There must be some further constraint
upon a putative theory which explains how we are able to deliver an infinite number
of well-formed theorems out of a finite cluster of axioms. This requirement drives
us to Chomsky’s notion of ‘creativity of language’ as accounted for by means of a
generative grammar. Roughly, linguistic structures are generated by applying
recursive sets of generative grammatical rules to other linguistic components.
Application of these generative rules, Chomsky argues, is capital for linguistic
production and comprehension. Granting this framework, Chomsky can argue
contra Quine in favour of a particular generative grammar.53 Apart from achieving
the correct output—i.e., delivering the correct set of well-formed sentences—we
must also contemplate the way we arrive at those sentences. Thus, Chomsky
contends, there is only one correct system of rules. Namely, the one that competent
speakers have somehow implicitly in mind, and which informs their judgment as to
which utterances are grammatical, and which are not. Chomsky aims to answer
52 What counts as fitting  the evidence for Quine would require some further qualification. Without 
worrying about the fine-grained detail, we may venture to say that to fit the evidence in the theory o f  
grammar is to recognize certain strings o f noises as grammatical— see Quine (1972); and chapter 1, 
above.
53 This is a simplification o f  Chomsky’s argument. For the minutiae the reader may care to consult 
Chomsky (1968).
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Q uine’s original skepticism about realism towards systems o f  rules o f  grammar. A
correct generative grammar is the one that tacitly drives the speakers via a canonical
route from the axioms of the theory of grammar to its theorems. Bearing in mind
this setting, we may now extend these ideas to the theory of mental representation.
Chomsky’s work in linguistics, together with the impressive results of digital 
computers, supported Fodor’s view of cognition as manipulation of symbols 
according to rules explicitly realised in the brain—see 4.3 above. To remind the 
reader, LOT crucially has a combinatorial syntax and semantics. Molecular 
representations are formed out of smaller constituents. Sentence crunching requires 
the sentences to have constituent structures, where the rules of crunching are 
syntactic. That is, the rules for combining or decomposing mental representations 
can be applied without regard to the semantic character of the symbols involved. 
What we have is thus that mental representations are to be seen as linguiform 
complex representations whose semantic properties are directly determined via the 
semantic properties of their constituents; the simplest constituents, then, form a 
stock of context-independent items. The combination and recombination of these 
content-bearing representational units allow thinkers to entertain and grasp novel 
thoughts.
According to Fodor’s Syntactic Image, the radical linguist of Quine’s parable 
(see 1.3) would see natives as tacitly interpreting linguistic rules which can be 
explicitly formulated in a theory of grammar. Since distributed neural networks 
encode information about sentences without employing LOT’s stock of context- 
independent items, the sympathizer of LOT will argue that connectionism cannot
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explain the systematicity and compositionality of thought. Unfortunately for the
sympathizer of Fodor, were connectionism to earn its keep empirically (see 4.5
above), the linguiform metaphor of mental representation, and in particular the
requirement of explicit linguistic-like rules for the combination and recombination
of context-free constituents, seems to be at least superfluous. As I concluded in
section 4.6, lexical inclusion in natural languages does not imply conceptual
inclusion when we move to the theory of mental representation. Under the
connectionist approach, the finite set of basic clauses of a translational manual do
not give a basic repertoire of concepts from which all other concepts are construed.
The connectionist basic-to-phrasal direction of conceptual formation is orthogonal
to the requisites imposed by LOT’s classical constituency. The basic clauses are
lexically basic, but have no privileged conceptual status. What the connectionist
then needs is a way to account for the abstract structure that seems to underlie the
systematicity and compositionality found in thought processes, but without making
use of LOT’s classical form of constituency. That is the target of the remainder of
this section. Recent research due to Elman (1998) seems to imply that the
Chomskian approach to linguistics, and Fodor’s subsequent extension to thought,
are on the wrong track.
Elman (1998) trained a network to answer a criticism, along the lines of 
Fodor and Pylyshyn’s (1988), put forward by Hadley (1992), and Marcus (1998). 
The challenge posed by these authors is to explain how connectionist networks can 
account for strong systematicity. Strong systematicity refers to a sort of 
generalization in which the network or cognitive agent must generalize to
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previously unencountered grammatical roles. For example, given a network trained
on sentences in which, say, the noun ‘boy’ only plays the role subject, the question
is whether the network can deal with novel sentences when ‘boy’ plays the role
‘object’. Elman’s simulation, as we shall see next, shows that neural networks can
account for this form of strong systematicity. These promising results will shed
some new light on the classical/connectionist debate. Let me briefly review the key
aspects of Elman’s simulation.
Elman (1998) trained a simple recurrent network on a prediction task along 
the lines of the simulations reported earlier—Elman (1990; 1992), sections 4.6, and 
4.7 above. The task is to predict successive words in sequences of sentences. The 
key point, this time, is that words have different probability of occurrence in the 
grammar (see Elman, 1998, for the details). To address the challenge of accounting 
for strong systematicity, Elman focused on the noun ‘boy’. Given that ‘boy’ never 
appeared in direct object position for any verb in the training data set, can the 
network predict ‘boy’ as a direct object after presentation of the verb ‘talk-to’? 
Generally speaking, the challenge is whether the network can successfully 
generalize to previously unencountered grammatical roles. As Elman’s research 
shows, the network does manage to account for this form of systematicity. In 
particular, the network predicts ‘boy’ in the context ‘the girl talks to ...’, even 
though the network never saw ‘boy’ in any object position during training.
Elman points out the reason for this exciting result: It is vital for the network 
to predict ‘boy’ in the context ‘the girl talks to ...’ that ‘boy’ has already been fed to 
the network during training in other contexts together with other human words—
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e.g., girl, man, woman. So, for example, as Elman argues, in the toy-language
employed for this simulation only human words appear in subject position with
verbs such as ‘eat’, ‘give’, or ‘transfer’. On the other hand, neither ‘boy’ nor other
human words appear in object position with verbs such as ‘terrify’ or ‘chase’. In
short, even though the network never sees ‘boy’ in an object position, it is trained
on roles that ‘boy’ shares with other human words (more than it does with other
types of words). These ‘behaviour-based similarity’—see Elman, 1998— between
‘boy’ and other human words is what allows Elman’s network to generalize to
previously unencountered syntactic roles.
What is noteworthy about Elman’s (1998) network is that it succeeds in its 
overall target—i.e., accounting for strong systematicity—without implementing 
classical rules of the sort Fodor sees as necessary. It is important to emphasize the 
reason for this. As I mentioned in section 4.5 above, all the knowledge the network 
acquires is superimposed on the same hardware (see also 4.9 below). This allows us 
to understand the network’s capability of generalizing to unencountered syntactic 
positions. When the network is being input a new activation pattern for ‘boy’, the 
output for other non-related types of words (e.g., ‘dragon’) remains largely 
unchanged, and vice versa. The reason is that the weight changes are distributed 
over the entire set of connections. Therefore, since the network’s representation of 
‘dragon’ is significantly different form the one of ‘boy’, new information about
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‘dragon’ will have minor repercusions on the representational storage of ‘boy’.54 On
the other hand, given that the activation patterns for, say, ‘girl’, ‘man’, or ‘woman’
are very similar to the one encoding for ‘boy’, there will be a high correlation
between weight changes and activation patterns for tokens of these word-types. In
this way, any new piece of information about ‘girl’, ‘man’, or ‘woman’ is
automatically generalized to ‘boy’, to the degree that the representations for ‘girl’,
‘man’, and ‘woman’ are similar to the one for ‘boy’. Bearing this in mind, the
behaviour of the network, nonetheless, could still ‘economically’ be described in
terms of classical rules. However, the network is alien to the spirit of the Syntactic
Image (see 4.3). It employs neither grammatical classical constituents, nor is the
processing sensitive to the syntax of such constituents. The behaviour of the
network remains rooted in representations which are context-dependent, driven by
the inherently dynamical character of the interconnection of many simple units as
explained above, and in sections 4.4-4.6.
Before moving on to the issue of compositionality, let me expand briefly on 
how Elman’s results should be interpreted as far as the debate on rules goes. This 
will be crucial to appraise fully the classical/connectionist debate. It would not be 
accurate to claim that we can account for the systematicity of thought without 
following rules. Neural networks do follow rules. However, the reader should not
54 As a matter o f  fact, the changes required to encode new information about ‘dragon’ will have a 
random effect on ‘boy’. The result is that potential representational effects w ill cancel out when 
averaging over many trials.
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infer any similarity between classical and connectionist rules.55 Given an input
domain in a training space, and a range of possible outputs, the network’s task is
‘simply’ to find a successful approximation of the input/output function. But an
input/output function is nothing but a rule—see Elman (1990). What is really at
stake then is whether the rules employed by connectionist models are equivalent to
the sort of explicit rules that classical models make use of. The learning rules
employed by neural networks concern exclusively how the weights will change as a
result of an incoming flow of activation. The mathematical description of such
changes bears no resemblance to the explicit rules being stored and retrieved by
classical machines. Connectionist networks behave in a rule-like manner
exclusively in virtue of the readjustment of connection weights according to
learning algorithms—see 4.4 above. The illusion of classical-rule-gc>ver/7e<7
behavior is a result of the non-linear character (4.4) of the activation function
performed on the hidden units. The non-linear response of connectionist networks
means that under certain circumstances hidden units react in an all-or-nothing
fashion, and under certain other circumstances, they react continuously (see figure
4.1 above). This kind of non-linear response is what permits units to behave in a
categorical, rule-like, manner.56 In short, the key point is that even though
connectionist processing is functionally equivalent to classical processing, the
representations and rules that connectionist networks make use of are highly
55 The key issue is not whether connectionist networks employ rules or not. This, at times, seems to 
be the issue Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) are concerned about.
56 For an exhaustive treatment o f this topic see Elman et al., 1996, chapter 4.
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distributed and context-dependent.57
As we saw earlier, Chomsky’s generative grammar posits sets of rules in 
order to account for linguistic productivity. The brain, he assumes, follows those 
rules. If the above connectionist picture is correct, the brain does follow rules, 
although rules rooted at the weights-and-units level of processing, and completely 
orthogonal to classical constraints. A further constraint that Fodor reads off 
Chomsky’s approach to linguistics is the requirement of semantic 
compositionality—indispensible if a semantic theory is going to be able to deliver 
an infinite number of theorems out of a finite set of axioms. As I argued earlier, 
assuming connectionism, the finite set of basic clauses of a translation manual, or a 
theory of semantics, does not furnish us with a basic repertoire of concepts from 
which all other concepts are construed. It seems then that Fodor’s demand for 
compositionality is orthogonal to the connectionist semantic enterprise. Again, as in 
the discussion on rules, further clarification is needed.
Connectionism does not drop the need to account for compositionality, but 
rather it simply drops its classical reading. Following van Gelder (1990), I shall 
distinguish between two forms of compositionality: concatenative compositionality, 
and functional compositionality. Concatenative compositionality requires the 
preservation of tokens in order to build up the increasingly complex structures of 
our mental representations. Complex representations can only be tokened by
57 The reader may care to consult Rumelhart and McClelland’s (1986) neurosimulation on English 
past tense acquisition for a neat illustration o f  how the English past tense formation can be mastered 
without recurring to explicit rules to discern between regular and irregular verbs.
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tokening their constituents. Concatenative compositionality— in van Gelder’s
terminology—amounts to the classical form of compositionality championed by
Fodor. Connectionist models are incompatible with this kind of compositionality.
According to Fodor, complex thoughts arise from the combination and
recombination of classical—content-free—constituents (see 4.3 above). To remind
the reader, Fodor’s commitment to classical constituency amounts to the claim that:
for a pair of expression types Eb E2, the first is a Classical constituent of the 
second only i f  the first is tokened whenever the second is tokened. (Fodor and 
McLaughlin, 1990, p. 186)
The reader can see why connectionism is incompatible with concatenative 
compositionality. As we saw in section 4.6, connectionist networks lack a classical 
form of constituency. The question then is: How can connectionism account for the 
compositional character of thought, given that connectionist representations employ 
context-dependent constituents. The answer comes by the hand of van Gelder’s 
second type of compositionality—functional compositionality.58 Functional 
compositionality does not require the preservation of constituents. According to van 
Gelder,
[functional] compositionality is obtained when there are general, effective, 
and reliable processes for (a) producing an expression given its constituents, 
and (b) decomposing the expression back into those constituents. (Van
58 For the reader unfamiliar with the literature, van Gelder’s functional compositionality amounts to 
what Elman et al. (1996) dub ‘interactive’ compositionality.
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Gelder, 1990, p. 361)
The combination lock metaphor (van Gelder, 1990) neatly illustrates the 
underlying mechanisms of functional compositionality. Think of the numbers in the 
combination of a lock as playing the role words do in languages. Number’s causal 
properties are context-dependent. That is, a correct sequence of numbers gets the 
lock opened. We may then say that the final state—i.e., lock being open—is 
compositional since it is dependent on a specific sequence of numbers. Numbers, 
thus, although not preserved physically, are somehow ‘functionally present’. In like 
vein, we may say that although individual concepts cannot be preserved across 
context in connectionist networks, they are still in the system.
Connectionist constituency, as found in recurrent networks, can account for 
the processing of natural languages, and the representation of complex hierarchical 
grammatical structures. The neurosimulations reported in this chapter have the 
capacity to account for the temporal dimension involved in processing sequential 
inputs, and can do so while meeting van Gelder’s (a) and (b) desideratum in the 
above quote. In this way, I conclude, connectionism with its non-classical form of 
constituency, and non-linear processing, can account for the systematicity and 
compositionality of thought. Given these results, I shall argue next, Evans’ 
generality constraint becomes innocuous against the Quinean.
As I mentioned in chapter 2 (section 2.3), Evans is confident that 
considerations regarding the productivity and systematicity of language and thought 
will definitely discredit perverse semantic theorizing a la Quine. To remind the 
reader, the pivotal factor in Evans’ argument is the existence of the generality
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constraint; a constraint to the effect that:
if a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the 
conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every 
property of being G of which he has a conception. We thus see the thought 
that a is F  as lying at the intersection of two series of thoughts: on the one 
hand, the series of thoughts that a is F, that b is F, that c is F, ..., and, on the 
other hand, the series of thoughts that a is F, that s is G, that a is H, ... (Evans, 
1982,p . 104)
Evans’ generality constraint stresses the need to posit single causally 
efficacious states in order to explain the regularities manifested in linguistic 
behaviour. In short, the generality constraint calls for a single inner state which gets 
activated whenever a cognitive episode involving a given concept occurs. This view 
is congenial with Fodor’s classical approach, and therefore threatens Quine’s 
Inscrutability Thesis. In chapter 2 I postponed addressing the issue of whether the 
generality constraint can help the anti-Quinean to narrow down the range of 
empirically adequate semantic theories. Given Evans’ full-blooded approach to 
semantics—i.e., granting that linguistic comprehension is to be accounted for at the 
neurophysiological level (see chapter 2, fn. 6)—the issue remained an open 
question. I believe, however, that the preceding discussion on concept naturalization 
(sections 4.3-4.7), and the above discussion, furnishes us with the perfect tool kit to 
tackle Evans’ ‘generality constraint’ challenge.
Evans’ generality constraint exploits the extraction of regularities typical of 
symbolic models of cognition. However, as we saw earlier, connectionism does not
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need to posit single causally efficacious states to account for linguistic regularities.
Connectionist constituents are differentiated by virtue of playing different causal 
roles, ever rooted at the level of idiosyncratic processing. This, nonetheless, does 
not suppose a shortcoming for the connectionist. If the above considerations are on 
the right track, and we can account for the productivity of language and thought via 
a functional form of compositionality, then the worry arising from Evans’ generality 
constraint is harmless. In particular, we shall be able to explain any set of inferences 
without having to posit an internal factor which is common to all inferential 
transitions. Complexity, through the connectionist lens, emerges from the non­
linear properties of simple dynamical systems. Evans’ call for a common piece of 
concept mastery becomes, I claim, an artifact created by endorsing a classical model 
of cognition.
4.9 Conclusion
Before closing this chapter let me address a minor source of worries drawn to my 
attention by U.T. Place. Place is keen on favouring connectionism as a genuine 
alternative to the Fodorian syntactic image. However, Place (e-mail 
communication) disagrees with me with regard to the implications of endorsing a 
connectionism model of cognition for Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis. Human 
language, Place contends, is superimposed on an elaborate system of pre-linguistic 
concepts, part innate and part learned (but not requiring a language of thought 
hypothesis). The function of this system is to enable organisms to recognize things
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o f  kind (and individuals for that matter) in the sense o f  pre-selecting a range o f
behavioural strategies appropriate to encounters with things of the kind in question.
In such a system of concepts, universals like that to which we assign the word
‘rabbit’, which pick out a common biological species likely to be significant as prey
to any larger predator, are likely to take precedence over a universal such as, for
example, Quine’s ‘undetached rabbit part’—see chapter 1. The reason, Place
argues, is simply that having a set of behavioural strategies appropriate for dealing
with the former is going much more useful to an average predator than is the latter.
I don’t think that Place’s considerations can endanger our perverse semantic
theory, PT4 (see chapter 3). Indeed, the complaint we can see emerging from Place’s
comment did not escape Quine’s notice. Plausibly, there is a positive constraint
between ‘behavioural strategies’ and ‘significant survival value’. As Quine notes:
Man is a body-minded animal, among body-minded animals. Man and other 
animals are body-minded by natural selection; for body-mindedness has 
evident survival value in town and jungle. (Quine, 1973, p. 54)
Hence, if a predator targets whole enduring rabbits it will surely have more chances 
to survive and pass those hunting skills down to future generations, than if it chases 
small undetached rabbit parts (such as a rabbit’s claw), ignoring the rest of the 
rabbit. However, a predator being body-minded should not be confused with being 
ra^/uY-minded, for instance. Quine’s notion of ‘body-mindedness’ is not that 
restrictive—as a matter of fact, that’s the very point at stake. As Quine points out 
following the above passage:
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When the time comes for the precision of physical science, the notion of body 
can give way to the more inclusive, more recondite, and more precise notion 
of physical object. Any arbitrary congeries of particle-stages, however 
spatiotemporally gerrymandered or disperse, can count as a physical object.59 
(Quine, 1973, p. 54)
In this way, by favouring a loose notion of ‘body-mindedness’, the only problem 
left for the perverse semanticist is to reconcile being 99% body-minded with having 
survival value. But this should not be cause of concern for the Quinean. Survival 
value is partly determined by the afferent/efferent connections possessed by 
organisms. Afferent/efferent connections appropriately linked to certain 
environmental features lead to better chances of survival. Environmental features 
can be naturalistically/evolutionarily anchored by looking at the production of 
certain efferents in differential response to afferents. At this point, I claim, what 
defines a given stimuli cannot help distinguish between, say, rabbits and 99%-urp. 
The causal chain leading to a given afferent/efferent pattern stretches back, through 
several stages, to the image of a rabbit in the retina, to certain patterns of light rays 
produced on the rabbit’s surface, and finally, to the rabbit itself. Also, we are 
designed by evolution to maintain a degree of constancy between the several 
representational stages that occur between afferent and efferent response, and the 
perceived objects themselves. However, evolutionary arguments cannot help to 
make the referential indeterminacy urged by the Quinean dissipate. Note that, were 
we to favour the ‘99%-urp’ referential scheme, we would discover that the chances
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for the predator to survive are as high when it chases a 99%-urp as they are when
the whole rabbit is being chased. In terms o f  survival value, there is no real
significance between rabbits and 99%-urp.60
The purpose of this chapter has been to show that considerations urged by
Wright (1997) regarding complexity in the psychological theory that accompanies
semantic theorizing are unable to discredit perverse semantic theorizing. In a worst-
case scenario for the Quinean, a standard interpretation of Native might be
favoured. However, I argued, the price to pay would be the endorsement of a LOT
hypothesis. Research in neurobiology and cognitive science appears to discredit the
LOT hypothesis, and favour a connectionist model of cognition. I f  connectionism is
correct then, I claimed, Wright’s ‘psychological simplicity’ criterion is
unmotivated, favouring neither a standard nor a perverse interpretation of Native.
Therefore, my connectionist defence of Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis is dependent
on whether future empirical research confirms or disconfirms the Fodorian LOT
hypothesis. The issue, I admit, is still an open empirical question. At this point,
thus, the best way to frame the results of this chapter is conditionally (see chapter 7
below).
Granting for argument’s sake that connectionism is the correct model of 
cognition, the Quinean has more reasons to celebrate. The Inscrutability Thesis
59 For an expansion on this point, see Quine (1973), §§ 23; 34. See also chapter 1 above.
60 Place’s point may nonetheless hold when the part being chased is for example a 1%-urp. 
However, I would need to see in more detail an argument along Place’s lines against such perverse 
option before submitting it to critical scrutiny.
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would not be the only Quinean thesis to obtain neuroscientific support.
Connectionism appears to vindicate Quine’s holistic approach to semantic content
as well. Quine’s semantic holism, in a nutshell, maintains that the relevant unit of
meaning is not the word or the sentence, but rather the language—or the organism’s
cognitive theory—as a whole. Semantic holism is vindicated because of the
superpositional character of connectionist representations. The basic idea is that
fully distributed neural networks exploit superpositional storage techniques.61 As I
mentioned earlier (section 4.5) a single set o f weights allows neural networks to
constantly generate the right activation patterns in the face of the activation from
new input patterns. Representations are said to be fully superposed if the resources
the network employs to represent one item are the same as those required to
represent a different item:
Thus, if a network learns to represent item 1 by developing a particular 
pattern of weights, it will be said to have superposed its representations of 
items 1 and 2 if it then goes on to encode the information about item 2 by 
amending the set of original weightings in a way which preserves the 
functionality (some desired input output pattern) required to represent item 1 
while simultaneously exhibiting the functionality required to represent item 2. 
A simple case would be an autoassociative network which reproduced its 
input at the output layer after channeling it through some intervening 
bottleneck (such as a small hidden-unit layer). Such a net might need to find a 
simple set of weights which do multiply duty, enabling the net to reproduce 
any one of a whole set of inputs at the output layer. If all the weights turned 
out to be playing a role in each such transition, the representation of the
61 For the reader interested in expanding on superposition the locus classicus is Van Gelder (1991).
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various items would be said to be fu lly  superposed. (Clark, 1993, p. 17)62
Superpositional processing of all the existing informational states of a 
network fit perfectly with the thesis of semantic holism. The content of a concept, 
as described in connectionist terms, would be determined by the superposition of all 
the available representational resources, which are a function of the whole range of 
input/output patterns that the network has been trained on. It seems then that 
Quine’s overall behaviouristic position fits like hand in glove with the 
neurophysiological level of explanation provided by connectionist recurrent 
networks.
I conclude then that the Quinean can go with modem scientific fashion and 
make use of the ‘99%-urp’ referential scheme. Unfortunately, the anti-Quinean has 
one more rejoinder up her sleeve. This other criticism exploits recent experimental 
research which highlights the existence of an objective criterion of conceptual 
similarity in connectionist terms. The anti-Quinean then hopes that a connectionist 
sympathizer of Wright may still manage to press on his ‘psychological simplicity’ 
argument by submitting standard and perverse concepts to the test of ‘conceptual 
similarity’. The anti-Quinean will argue that standard concepts are more similar to 
their Native counterparts than perverse ones are. In my opinion this criticism is far 
more serious than those previously addressed in this chapter. In the next chapter I 
shall expand on this criticism and offer a solution which, I hope, succeeds in
62 See Van Gelder, 1991, p. 43, for a more technical definition o f  fully superpositional 
representation.
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retaining the empirical adequacy of the perverse semantic theory offered in chapter
3 above.
5STA TE SPACE SEMANTICS AND 
CONCEPTUAL SIMILARITY
5.1 Introduction
Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore (1992; 1996) have launched a powerful attack 
against Paul Churchland’s connectionist theory of semantics—aka State Space 
Semantics (see chapter 4, section 4.5). In one part of their attack, Fodor and Lepore 
argue that the architectural and functional idiosyncrasies of connectionist networks 
preclude us from articulating a notion of conceptual similarity applicable to State 
Space Semantics. Aarre Laakso and Gary Cottrell (1998; 2000) have recently run a 
number of simulations on simple feedforward networks, and applied a mathematical 
technique for measuring conceptual similarity in the representational spaces of 
those networks. Laakso and Cottrell contend that their results decisively refute
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Fodor and Lepore’s criticisms. Paul Churchland (1998) goes further. He uses
Laakso and Cottrell’s neurosimulations to argue that connectionism does furnish us
with all we need to construct a robust theory of semantics and a robust theory of
translation. Although the Fodor-Lepore/Churchland debate concerns exclusively
the metaphysical status of State Space Semantics (see 5.2 below), Churchland
(personal communication) believes that the outcome of the debate—were
connectionist semantics a la Churchland1 to earn its keep—may have a negative
bearing upon the comiectionist defence of Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis put forward
in the previous chapter. In particular, Churchland contends that a connectionist
sympathiser of Wright may be able to exploit Laakso and Cottrell’s
neurocomputational results in order to vindicate a version of Wright’s
‘psychological simplicity’ argument, thus putting in jeopardy any Quinean perverse
semantic theory (see chapter 4, section 4.2, above). In this chapter I shall argue that
whereas Laakso and Cottrell’s neurocomputational results may provide us with a
rebuttal of Fodor and Lepore’s argument, Churchland’s conclusion is far too
optimistic. In particular, I shall try to show that connectionist modeling does not
provide any objective criterion for achieving a one-to-one accurate translational
mapping across networks, as the foe of Quine requires.
1 Other connectionist approaches to the theory o f  semantics, and the theory o f mental representation, 
seem to avoid the criticisms put forward by Fodor and Lepore that I’ll review in this chapter. For 
present purposes I shall concentrate in Churchland’s proposal, ignoring other connectionist, maybe 
more fruitful, semantic proposals. For a general appraisal o f  the landscape, and how connectionist 
semantics can be given its best shot, see Tiffany (1999).
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Before getting started, let me briefly outline the programme of this chapter. In
section 5.2 I shall briefly review State Space Semantics, and what the problem for
the theory is, all according to Fodor and Lepore. In section 5.3 I shall introduce a
mathematical technique for measuring conceptual similarity across networks that
Laakso and Cottrell have recently offered in order to address Fodor and Lepore’s
challenge. In section 5.4 I shall show how Churchland makes use of Laakso and
Cottrell’s results to argue that connectionism can furnish us with all we need to
construct a robust theory of semantics, and a robust theory of translation—
robustness that may potentially be exploited by a connectionist foe of Quine to
argue against the Inscrutability Thesis. In section 5.5 I shall argue that Churchland’s
conclusion is far too optimistic. In particular, I shall try to show that the notion of
conceptual similarity available to the connectionist leaves room for a “connectionist
Quinean” to kick in with a one-to-many translational mapping across networks. In
section 5.6 I shall highlight a potential problem for Laakso and Cottrell’s rebuttal of
Fodor and Lepore’s criticism, and Churchland’s subsequent defence of State Space
Semantics, that has been completely ignored in the connectionist literature.
Conclusions and suggested directions for future research will follow in section 5.7.
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5.2 State Space Semantics: The Problem
As we saw in chapter 4, Churchland (1986) has proposed a new, connectionist- 
inspired, approach to the theory of mental representation known as State Space 
Semantics. Briefly, the basic idea behind Churchland's proposal was that
[the] brain represents various aspects of reality by a position in a suitable state 
space, and the brain performs computations on such representations by means 
of general coordinate transformations from one state space to another. 
(Churchland, 1986, p. 280)
Churchland invites us to view concepts as points in a partial state space of a 
dynamical system. These points correspond to the tips of the vectors determined by 
the levels of activation of the different units in hidden layers. The semantic 
characteristics of a concept can then be seen as a function of the place that that 
concept—i.e., point—occupies in a geometrically characterized hyperspace. In this 
way, Churchland proposes, we may talk of semantic similarity between concepts in 
terms of the proximity of their respective absolute positions in state space, as 
identified in relation to a number of semantically relevant dimensions.2
Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore (1992; 1996) have recently launched a 
powerful attack against Churchland’s proposal. One of their objections can be
2 The reader not familiar with the basic tenets o f  connectionist theory is urged to visit chapter 4, 
sections 4.4-4.6, above.
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summarized as follows:3 State Space Semantics understands conceptual similarity
across networks as similarity in the activation patterns across those dimensions that
specify the networks’ representational spaces (see 4.4 above).4 However, under this
connectionist framework, it seems that two individuals—i.e., networks—cannot
possibly entertain the same concept. And the reason for this is that processing in
connectionist networks is highly idiosyncratic. Differences, for instance, in the
encoding of the input data, in the architecture of the model, and in the
dimensionality in hidden space, strongly constrain how a network proceeds in order
to achieve successful performance. Learning, in short, is highly sensitive to the
idiosyncrasies of neuromodeling. These considerations have driven Fodor and
Lepore to argue against State Space Semantics as a putative theory of mental
representation. Idiosyncrasies in encoding, architecture, or hidden dimensionality
make it impossible to talk of similarity of patterns of activation across networks. It
then seems to follow straightforwardly, Fodor and Lepore argue, that we cannot talk
either of similarity of positions in state space across networks. It is important
3 What follows is a simplification o f  one part o f Fodor and Lepore’s argument. Although for our 
present purposes it will suffice. For an appraisal o f  Fodor and Lepore’s overall argument against 
State Space Semantics, the reader may care to consult the exchanges between Fodor and Lepore, and 
Churchland in McCauley (1996), and Fodor and Lepore (forthcoming). For a defence o f  State Space 
Semantics, see Tiffany (1999). For a rebuttal o f  Churchland’s general strategy to bypass Fodor and 
Lepore’s criticism see Calvo Garzbn (in preparation b).
4 Just a word on notation. In what follows, I shall employ the terms ‘activation pattern’, ‘vector, and 
‘point’ interchangeably as referring to one and the same thing. Namely, to the unit o f  representation 
in connectionist semantics.
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however to emphasize the root of their distrust. Fodor and Lepore’s claim is not that
connectionism cannot define what it is for two individuals to entertain similar
concepts. Their claim is not that connectionism lacks a measure to judge whether
different individuals represent a given input in the same conceptual way. Fodor and
Lepore write:
If the paths to a node are collectively constitutive of the identity of the node, 
[...] then only identical networks can token nodes of the same type. Identity of 
networks is thus a sufficient condition for identity of content, but this 
sufficient condition isn’t robust; it will never be satisfied in practice.5 (Fodor 
and Lepore, 1996, pp. 146-7)
As this quote illustrates, Fodor and Lepore are not denying the logical point that we 
can have a connectionist measure of conceptual similarity—see section 5.3 below. 
Their point is rather ontological—viz., that the conditions for conceptual similarity 
set out by State Space Semantics will never allow two individuals to share a given 
concept (given that human brains have different numbers of neurons, which are 
differently connected to each other, and which exhibit different patterns of causal 
connectivity).
Churchland does not seem to be moved by Fodor and Lepore’s criticism:
5 At this point, Fodor and Lepore are actually targeting the classical Quinean “web” picture o f  
theories/languages/belief systems, in order to argue that it cannot provide a robust account o f  
conceptual identity. However, the argument applies equally to State Space Semantics, and its 
incapability to furnish us with a robust notion o f  conceptual sim ilarity— see Fodor and Lepore, 1996, 
pp. 146-ff.
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The short answer to [Fodor and Lepore’s] critique is that content is not, in 
general, assigned in the manner described. A point in activation space 
acquires a specific semantic content not as a function of its position relative to 
the constituting axes of that space, but rather as a function of (1) its spatial 
position relative to all of the other contentful points within that space; and (2) 
its causal relations to stable and objective macrofeatures o f the external 
environment. (Churchland, 1998, p. 8)
Churchland hopes to bypass Fodor and Lepore’s attack by equipping State Space 
Semantics with a non-absolute measure of conceptual similarity. As we saw earlier, 
patterns of activation get their content as a function of the content of the dimensions 
that define the representational space in question. Conceptual similarity across 
networks was then defined in terms of the similarity of the absolute positions within 
each state space. By contrast, Churchland now puts the emphasis on the similarity 
of the relative positions of different activation patterns. We may then define 
conceptual similarity across networks in terms of the position of a given pattern of 
activation in relation to other patterns in the same representational space. In this 
way, we may say that two networks share the same conceptual repertoire if the set 
o f relations among the activation patterns in the first network is isomorphic—see 
section 5.4 below—to the set of relations obtained in the second network.
Churchland’s new account shows some promise in the fact that a non-absolute 
definition of similarity relaxes the demands on State Space Semantics. Note that 
now we can ignore the different dimensionality, as well as the particular 
microcontent of each dimension of each state space. All we need then—or so it
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appears to Churchland—is to establish a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for a relative definition of conceptual similarity. To achieve these goal, Churchland
turns to some empirical research carried out by Laakso and Cottrell. That research is
the subject matter of the following section.
5.3 A Connectionist Measure o f Conceptual Similarity
Laakso and Cottrell (1998; 2000) have recently taken up Fodor and Lepore’s 
challenge (see 5.2 above). According to Laakso and Cottrell, we do have a criterion 
forjudging conceptual similarities across different connectionist networks. Namely, 
by measuring distances among points within the hidden space of a given network, 
and correlating those measures with the measures obtained within the hidden space 
of a distinct network. They illustrate their strategy with a simple case—see Laakso 
and Cottrell (2000). Take two networks—network #1 and network #2—with one 
and two hidden units, respectively. Both networks learn to represent three 
unspecified things, say A, B, and C. Network #1 represents A, B, and C with the 
following vectors:
A = <0>, B = <50>, and C = <100>.
On the other hand, network #2 represents the same three things with the following 
vectors:
A = <0, 0>, B = <30, 30>, and C = <80, 0>.
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We can then form the following matrices (see fig. 5.1 below) by considering the 
distances between all the representations within network #1, and also comparing the 
distances between all the representations in #2. Now, by computing these distances, 
we can employ a mathematical measure of similarity with which to compare the 
representations of networks #1 and #2. Since both matrices are symmetric we can 
extract the respective vectors and compare them.
Distances Between Representations
1-Unit Network 2-Unit Network
A B C A B C
A 0 50 100 A 0 42 80
B 50 0 50 B 42 0 58
C 100 50 0 C 80 58 0
[Fig. 5.1]: Symmetric matrices obtained by taking Euclidean distances between all the 
representations in each network. (From Laakso and Cottrell, 2000)
In our example, the two vectors are:
<50, 100, 50>,and 
<42, 80, 58>
which, having the same dimensions, can be easily compared. The idea, in short, is 
that points in different hidden spaces stand for the same, or similar, things in case 
there is a high correlation between the distances among the sets of points—i.e.,
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concepts—in the respective networks. With this mathematical measure, Laakso and
Cottrell argue, we need not worry about Fodor and Lepore’s argument. Different
dimensionality, architecture or encoding bring no trouble, insofar as correlated
distances between points in the respective spaces are preserved.
Laakso and Cottrell tested this strategy in two different experiments. In the 
first experiment, they trained several three-layer feedforward nets, all containing 
three hidden units, on a colour-categorization task. The networks were trained using 
four different input encodings. The outputs were: “red”, “yellow”, “green”, “blue”, 
and “purple”. After obtaining the activation patterns at the hidden layer for each 
different input pattern, Laakso and Cottrell computed the Euclidean distances 
between each different pair of activation patterns in hidden space for a given net. 
Finally, they compared the activation patterns in the two nets by computing the 
correlations among the hidden activation patterns obtained in each net. Laakso and 
Cottrell reported that the representations obtained for every input presented were 
highly correlated across networks.
Though an important result as it is—think of the various input encodings as 
corresponding to different species’ sensory modalities—all the networks contained 
the same number of hidden units, and thus did not fully address Fodor and Lepore’s 
challenge. Laakso and Cottrell then ran a second experiment, again on a colour- 
categorization task, but this time employing networks with different internal 
dimensionality, as well as different input codings. The networks employed had 
between 1 and 10 hidden units. Once the networks mastered the categorization task, 
the mathematical measurements were computed as above, and as in the previous
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experiment, the correlations obtained were very high, independently of the number
of hidden units employed by the networks.6 From these results, Laakso and Cottrell
conclude:
Our measure is a robust criterion of content similarity, of just the sort that 
Fodor and Lepore demanded in their critique of Churchland. It can be used to 
measure similarity of internal representations regardless of how inputs are 
encoded, and regardless of number of hidden units. Furthermore, we have 
used our measure of state-space similarity to demonstrate empirically that 
different individuals, even individuals with different “sensory organs” and 
different numbers of neurons, may represent the world in similar ways. 
(Laakso and Cottrell, 1998, pp. 595-6)
Laakso and Cottrell’s results get connectionist semantics off the ground, and 
seem to shed new light on the Fodor-Lepore/Churchland debate over the fate of 
State Space Semantics.7 The question I would like to pursue next is to what extent
6  For the details o f  both experiments, see Laakso and Cottrell (1998).
7  Just a word o f  caution. To keep the record straight, Fodor and Lepore’s point is not an epistemic 
one. What can or cannot be judged, or measured is not what’s at stake— see section 5.2 above. Both 
Laakso and Cottrell (1998), and Churchland (1998) seem, at times, to be taking Fodor and Lepore to 
be presenting an epistemic challenge. So, for example, commenting on Laakso and Cottrell’s 
strategy, Churchland writes: “The truly important point is that we can tell whether or not [various 
networks settle on the same cognitive configuration in response to their shared problems]. We can 
say what their internal cognitive similarity consists in, and we can give an objective numerical 
measure o f  that similarity” (Churchland, 1998, p. 24; my emphasis). In response to a previous 
version o f  this chapter— see Calvo Garzon (2000b)— an anonymous referee for Philosophical 
Psychology urges that Churchland’s epistemic reading may be evading the real issue prompted by
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Churchland can make use of Laakso and Cottrell’s results to reaffirm the credentials
of State Space Semantics as a robust theory of mental representation. In the
remainder of this chapter I shall elaborate on this issue in order to argue that the
metaphysical status of State Space Semantics may be worse than Churchland would
be willing to admit. As a result, I shall contend, a connectionist foe of Quine won’t
be able to make use of Laakso and Cottrell’s neurosimulations to reinforce Wright’s
‘psychological simplicity’ argument.
5.4 Similarity o f Prototypical Trajectories: A Solution?
Laakso and Cottrell conducted their simulations with simple feedforward nets on a 
colour-categorization learning task. The output was a single word—either “red”, or 
“yellow”, etc. However, if we are to account for the whole range of human 
cognitive capacities, we need to expand Laakso and Cottrell’s results, at least, to 
simple recurrent networks of the kind employed to process sentences belonging to a 
small portion of a natural language. As we saw in chapter 4 (section 4.6), Jeff 
Elman (1992) designed a simple recurrent network which exhibited appropriate 
sensitivity to the syntactical dependencies found in sentences. To remind the reader, 
a simple recurrent network, thanks to the employment of feedbackward pathways, 
can deploy some sort of short-term memory, that allows the network to process
Fodor and Lepore. Namely, to find a robust notion o f conceptual similarity. For present purposes, 
however, we need not dwell on this potential shift o f target, for my criticism o f State Space 
Semantics (see sections 5.5, and 5.6 below) is rooted in different grounds.
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contextualized sequential information. Simplifying statistical techniques, such as
Principal Components Analysis—henceforth abbreviated PCA; see 4.6—allowed us
to identify those hidden dimensions along which important variations take place.
PCA was useful because it helped us make conceptual sense of the processing by
‘localizing’ information in hidden state space. Thanks to PCA we could observe
the temporal trajectories of the hidden patterns through state space by paying
attention to those input-output correlations that make the highest contribution to the
net’s overall ouput behaviour. To remind the reader (see chapter 4, section 4.6,
above) PCA analyzes sets of hidden activation patterns, and represents their internal
correlations by showing grammatically similar sentences as following closely
resembling trajectories in the simplified space obtained by plotting particular
principal components along certain axes. So, for example, a PCA performed on a
simple recurrent network’s representations of the sentences ‘boy who boys chase
chases boy’, and ‘boys who boys chase chase boy’ yielded the following hidden
space trajectories by plotting the second principal component along the ordinate
(see fig. 5.2).
Churchland (1998) considers how Laakso and Cottrell’s experiments might 
apply to the case of simple recurrent networks. As figure 5.2 illustrates, 
representational similarity within a network consists in the spatial proximity of the 
trajectories obtained as an effect of the sequential processing undergone. We now 
only need a notion of similarity of trajectory within a hidden space between distinct 
recurrent networks. Extrapolating from the case of simple feedforward networks,
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who
who
boys
chase
chase
boys
chases
chase
boys
boy
0 -x- 5 -3 -y- 0
[Fig. 5.2]: Trajectories through state space for ‘[boy who boys chase chases boy’ and ‘boys 
who boys chase chase boy’]. After the indicated word has been input, each point marks the 
position along the second principal component o f hidden unit space. Magnitude o f  the second 
principal component is measured along the ordinate; time (i.e., order o f  words in sentence) is
State Space Semantics and Conceptual Similarity 193
measured along the abscissa. [...The] sentence-final word is marked with a ]s. (Adapted from 
Elman, 1992, pp. 162-3)
Churchland contends:
Two networks have the same conceptual organization if and only if there is 
some rotation, translation, and/or mirror inversion of the prototype-trajectory 
family of the first network such that, when the space (or relevant subspace) of 
the first network is projected onto the space (or relevant subspace) of the 
second, all of the corresponding trajectories (as identified by what sensory 
inputs activate them) coincide perfectly. (Churchland, 1998, p. 29)8
With this criterion at hand, Churchland reaffirms the credentials of State Space 
Semantics:
The account we are currently piecing together ... is not just a syntactic 
account; for it promises to do what we have always expected a semantic 
theory to do. It ... provides a criterion for assigning the same contents to the 
representational vehicles of distinct individuals. It gives us, that is, a criterion 
for accurate translation across the representational/cognitive systems of 
distinct individuals. {Ibid., p. 31)
Churchland (personal communication) believes that the current debate over 
the fate of State Space Semantics has a direct bearing upon the connectionist
8  Strictly speaking we may need to compare actual trajectories, rather than prototypical ones, for the 
latter are abstractions generated statistically, and thus are causally inert as far as the dynamics o f  the 
processing goes (see chapter 4, section 4.7 above, and chapter 7, section 7.4 below). We may stay 
with prototypical trajectories, for present purposes, with the proviso that the argument can be put in 
terms o f  actual trajectories, at the expense o f  having to compute ‘many’ more distance relations.
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defence of Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis produced in chapter 4. In particular,
Churchland claims that a connectionist sympathizer of Wright may be able to
exploit the notion of ‘similarity of prototypical trajectory’ spelt out on this section,
in order to discredit perverse theories of semantics. As I argued in chapter 4, a
Quinean may seek to naturalize concepts via a LOT hypothesis, or in a
connectionist architecture. In the former case, our standard theory, ST, would be
favoured over the fiilly-perverse alternative, PT4 (see section 4.2 above). Whereas in
the latter case, a connectionist setting, I argued, is neutral between ST, and PT4.
Churchland, however, believes that the foe of Quine is not forced to endorse, as my
twofold picture suggests, a LOT hypothesis in order to make her case. A
connectionist sympathizer of Wright may well go for the second option, while
denying the alleged neutrality between the standard and the perverse renderings of
Native. Churchland speculates that whereas we should expect to find that the
prototypical trajectories of Native sentences coincide perfectly with the prototypical
trajectories of standard English sentences, the prototypical trajectories of perverse
English sentences, we may expect, will diverge, showing thus that Native and
perverse English lack a common conceptual organization (the reason for this
disanalogy will become apparent in the next section). If Churchland’s
considerations are on the right track, the foe of Quine may be able to recast
Wright’s notion of ‘psychological simplicity’ in terms of prototypical trajectories,
and argue that perverse prototypical trajectories are doomed to be more complex,
due to the complexity that afflicts the conceptual repertoire of the basic clauses of
the perverse semantic theory (see 4.2 above).
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In the next section I shall argue that the Quinean has nothing to fear from
these considerations. In particular, I shall try to show that Churchland’s defence of
State Space Semantics fails to bring robustness to semantic discourse, and lacks a
connectionist notion of synonymy of the kind required by a robust theory of
translation, and by extension, by a robust theory of mental representation, which
would discredit perverse semantic theorizing.
5.5 A Connectionist Approach to Radical Translation: First Reply to Churchland
For argument’s sake, I will agree with Churchland’s first contention—namely that 
fit of prototypical trajectories via rotations, translations, etc. provides us with a 
connectionist notion of conceptual similarity.9 We may also agree, in virtue of 
Laakso and Cottrell’s experimental results, that neural networks do create hidden 
representations whose contents can be objectively compared—although see sections
9  Although it is not clear to me whether fit o f  prototypical trajectories via rotations, translations, etc. 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for conceptual similarity, rather than a sufficient condition- 
fullstop. Churchland (1998, p. 29) expresses similar worries. However, I don’t think our worries are 
motivated by the same problem. According to Churchland, the fitting o f  the trajectories may be only 
a sufficient condition in view o f cases where concept identity across individuals involves causal 
connections to very different environmental features. Churchland’s favourite example is Isaac 
Newton and Christian Huygens’ conceptions o f  light as stream o f  particles, and as wave train, 
respectively. I would simply argue that whether fit o f  trajectories is a necessary condition or not for 
conceptual similarity is purely an empirical question, independent o f  whether concepts across
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5.6, and 5.7, below. This certainly marks a watershed with respect to a mere
connectionist syntactic theory. But the question I now want to pursue is: Can State
Space Semantics provide a criterion for specifically one-to-one translational
mappings across networks? In what follows I shall introduce a connectionist
reading of Quine’s Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference along the lines
proposed in chapter 4 (section 4.6), in order to argue that State Space Semantics
cannot provide such a robust criterion.10
Let us consider extensions of the three semantic theories of Native reviewed 
in chapters 1, and 3 (the standard theory, ST; Hookway’s hybrid alternative, PT3; 
and the fully-perverse proposal that I advanced in chapter 3, PT4). The extensions of 
ST, PT3, and PT4—ST*, PT3*, and PT4*—are meant to produce behaviourally 
supported satisfaction conditions for the Native compound expressions ‘bianco 
gavagai’ and ‘bianco gato’. Natives utter ‘bianco gavagai’ and ‘bianco gato’ only
individuals are linked to the world in similar ways or not. Fleshing out this thought would take us far 
afield from our present purposes— see Calvo Garzon (in preparation b).
1 0  Let me stress from the start that a rebuttal o f Churchland’s criterion is not necessarily dependent 
upon agreement on Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis. Parallel arguments to the one I’m about to offer 
may well be urged by an anti-Quinean (thanks to an anonymous referee for Philosophical 
Psychology for stressing this point in response to a previous version o f  this chapter— see Calvo 
Garzon, 2000b). Nonetheless, although focusing on the theory o f  reference from a Quinean 
perspective simply shows my personal biases, that will permit me tackle straightforwardly a potential 
line o f  attack to be reviewed in due course against the perverse semantic theory o f  reference I offered 
in chapter 3, and defended in chapter 4. For an overall attack on Churchland’s general theory o f  
content not dependent on semantic skepticism as prompted by Quine see Calvo Garzon (in 
preparation b).
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when a white rabbit, and a white cat show up in their visual field, respectively. Our
standard theory, ST*, would deal with the satisfaction conditions of those
expressions in the following way:
ST*
Axioms:
(a) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is a rabbit)
(ai) (x)(x satisfies ‘gato’ iff x is a cat)
(a2) (x)(x satisfies ‘blanco’A/  iff (x is white & x satisfies /))
Theorems:
(a3) (x)(x satisfies ‘blanco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is white & x is a rabbit))
(a4) (x)(x satisfies ‘blanco’A‘gato’ iff (x is white & x is a cat))
On the other hand, an extension of Hookway’s disjunctive route (see chapter 1,
section 1.6, above) would account for the Native compounds as follows:
p t 3*
Axioms:
(b) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is an undetached rabbit part)
(b^ (x)(x satisfies ‘gato’ iff x is a cat)
(b2) (x)(x satisfies ‘bianco’ iff either
(a) ‘bianco’ occurs together with ‘gavagai’ and x is an undetached 
part of a white rabbit
or
(b) ‘bianco’ occurs in some other context and x is white)
Theorems:
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(b3) (x)(x satisfies ‘ bianco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is an undetached part of a
white rabbit))
(b4) (x)(x satisfies ‘ gato’A‘bianco’ iff (x is white & x is a cat))
And finally, an extension of the fully-perverse semantic theory PT4, PT4*, would 
offer the following counterpart:
PT3*
Axioms:
(c) (x)(x satisfies ‘gavagai’ iff x is a 99% undetached rabbit part)
(c,) (x)(x satisfies ‘gato’ iff x is a 99% undetached cat part)
(c2) (x)(x satisfies ‘ bianco’A/  iff (x is white & x satisfies /))
Theorems:
(c3) (x)(x satisfies ‘blanco’A‘gavagai’ iff (x is white & x is a 99%
undetached rabbit part))
(c4) (x)(x satisfies ‘blanco’A‘gato’ iff (x is white & x is a 99%
undetached cat part))
Assuming that ST* is behaviourally fully adequate, PT3* and PT4* are 
behaviourally fully adequate too. A translator guided by either PT3* or PT4* will 
predict native assent to/dissent from the queries ‘Blanco gavagai?’ and ‘Blanco 
gato?’ in exactly the same sort of circumstances in which one guided by ST* would.
Imagine now that we train a simple recurrent network, call it N, on Native 
sentences of which these are examples:
(1)’ Blanco gavagai.
(2)’ Blanco gato.
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Also we train three simple recurrent networks—call them network A, network B 
and network C—with English sentences derived from ST*, PT3* and PT4*, 
respectively.11 Sentences for network A are:
(1) There is a white rabbit.
(2) There is a white cat.
Network B’s counterparts are:
(1)* There is an undetached part of a white rabbit.
(2)* There is a white cat.
And, finally, sentences for network C are:
( 1 ) * * There is a white 99% undetached rabbit part.
(2)** There is a white 99% undetached cat part.
According to Churchland’s earlier conclusion (see section 5.4), State Space 
Semantics should furnish us with an objective criterion for judging sameness of 
content which will deliver an accurate translational map.12 Imagine then a thought-
11 This is just a thought experiment. I shall ignore the technical adjustments required in the 
architecture and training regime with respect to Elman’s above simulation.
1 2  An anonymous referee for Philosophical Psychology points out in response to a previos version o f  
this chapter— see Calvo Garzon (2000b)— that the truth-conditional semantics invoked to spell out 
ST*, PT3*, and PT4* might be at odds with Churchland’s connectionist approach to semantics. This, 
however, should not cause any concern. As noted in chapters 2, and 4, we may naturalize concepts,
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experiment in which we apply Principal Components Analysis to the sentences
produced by networks N, A, B, and C. Consider first just N and A. We should
expect to find that the prototypical trajectories of (1) and (2) in A would bear a
strong correlation in certain hyperplanes, as identified by Principal Components
Analysis (see section 5.4 above), to the prototypical trajectories of (1)’ and (2)’ in N
respectively. Why is that the case? In Churchland’s view, the driving force in
assigning content to the prototypical trajectories of sentences (or for that matter, to
prototypical points in feedforward networks) comes in terms of the relative spatial
position which trajectories (or points) bear to one another within a representational
space. In other words, content is primarily assigned—although see below—as a
function of the concept-to-concept relations holding within a cognitive system. We
may then conclude that the prototypical trajectories in N for ‘bianco gavagai’ and
going from natural languages to mental representations, by focusing upon the relation between the 
concepts belonging to a speaker’s conceptual repertoire, expressed by words, and the information 
content o f  real internal states in her brain. So, assuming there is such a relation— and Churchland 
(personal communication) agrees— ST*, PT3*, and PT4* will each find a counterpart in State Space 
Semantics such that a network’s representation of, say, the phrasal concept BLANCO GAVAGAI 
consists o f a particular pattern o f  activation across its hidden units. In this picture, semantic content 
consists o f a particular combination o f  values along each o f  the relevant dimensions that define the 
subspace in question. Thus, by following the standard semantic theory, ST*, a hidden pattern o f  
activation < h i, ..., hn> across the hidden units {H i, ..., Hn} will carry information about white 
rabbits, as a function o f the degree o f  rabbitness and whiteness along RABBIT and WHITE 
semantic dimensions. Similarly, a State Space Semantic reading o f  PT3*, and PT4* w ill deliver 
representations identifiable, along other dimensions— along UNDETACHED/RABBIT/PART, and 
99%/UNDETACHED/RABBIT/PART semantic dimensions, respectively.
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‘bianco gato’ perfectly correlate with the prototypical trajectories of sentences (1)
and (2) in A. And the reason for this is that the internal relations of Native
sentences are isomorphic to the internal relations that hold for “standard English”
sentences: For instance, ‘bianco’ bears the same relation to ‘gavagai’ and ‘gato’ as
‘white’ does with respect to ‘rabbit’ and ‘cat’. Following Churchland’s earlier
suggestion, there will be some rotation, translation and/or mirror inversion of the
network A’s prototypical trajectories such that they will match perfectly all
trajectories obtainable in N’s space.
Assuming this to be the case, next question is: Does this connectionist 
account of content similarity give us a one-to-one mapping between Native and 
English? In other words, will the isomorphism found between N and A reemerge 
when comparing N with B, and with C—fully perverse English? Churchland 
certainly does not want this to be the case, for he is willing to conclude that State 
Space Semantics provide us with the means of achieving a robust translation 
between languages, as we should expect from a rigorous theory of semantics (see 
Churchland, 1998, p. 31). However, I shall argue that whereas in the case of B (the 
hybrid theory, PT3*), Churchland may be right, in the case of C (our fully perverse 
theory, PT4*), we will find a perfect isomorphism with respect to N, or at least, as 
perfect as the isomorphism between N and A is supposed to be.
Under PT3*, the satisfaction conditions of ‘bianco’ are linked to undetached 
parts of white-... when ‘bianco’ is coupled with ‘gavagai’. In all other cases, PT3* 
behaves standardly, taking ‘bianco’-related utterances to be associated with whole
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enduring white cats, for example. Hence we may predict that the relation that
‘white’ bears to ‘rabbit’ and to ‘cat’ in network B is a heterogeneous relation.13 On
the other hand, the relation that ‘white’ bears to ‘rabbit’ and to‘cat’ under network
A is an homogeneous relation. And since we are assuming that the relation that
‘bianco’ bears to ‘gavagai’ and ‘gato’ is homogeneous as well, the prototypical
trajectories in network B’s hidden space will diverge, we may predict, with respect
to the trajectories obtained in the Native Network.14 Nevertheless, the hybrid
character of PT3* (i.e., standard-cum-perverse) seems to be alien to Quine’s original
pursuit. Quine’s aim was to produce a fully perverse alternative to ST in the sense
that for every standard referent that ST picks out, a perverse counterpart is offered.
This is precisely what PT4* achieves.
1 3  The reader not familiar is urged to visit chapters 1, and 2 for an appraisal o f  Hookway’s ‘divide- 
and-rule’ perverse semantic strategy.
1 4  The reader may wonder whether we could broaden the scope o f  PT3*’s perversity. Axiom (b2) in 
PT3* would then need to have indefinitely many disjuncts (see chapter 2, section 2.1 above). We will 
require an indefinite number o f  disjuncts in order to link the satisfaction conditions o f ‘bianco’ to the 
appropriate wholes o f  undetached parts o f rabbits, cats, cows, paper, etc., etc. And the same would 
happen with respect to all those axioms required for dealing with any other Native colour-word. 
Therefore, it may be the case that the perverse semanticist w ill not be able to state a fully-perverse 
disjunctive semantic theory. However, we ought to notice that this difficulty is rooted on rather 
speculative grounds. As I noted in chapter 2, it is not obvious that the aforementioned difficulty 
could not be overcome by some baroque plot which the Quinean has up his sleeve. Nevertheless, I 
shall not expand on these considerations, for if  we were able to homogenize the internal relations o f  
PT3*, we would have a perfect isomorphism with respect to Native, which is what I aim to show now 
with PT4*.
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Under our fully perverse network C, the relation that ‘white’ bears to ‘rabbit’
and ‘cat’ is an homogeneous relation. The relation that ‘white’ bears to ‘rabbit’ and
‘cat’ under network C is exactly the same internal relation as the one that ‘white’
bears to ‘rabbit’ and ‘cat’ in network A.15 We supposed above that the internal
relation ‘white’ bears to ‘rabbit’ and ‘cat’ in A is the same internal relation as
‘bianco’ bears to ‘gavagai’ and ‘gato’ in N. Therefore, prototypical trajectories in
network C’s hidden space will be similar to the prototypical trajectories in N. That
is, by rotating or translating the prototypical trajectories of sentences (1)** and
(2)**, we’ll find that they coincide perfectly with the trajectories followed by (1)’
and (2)’ in N. This neatly shows, I believe, that there are no grounds for favouring
sentences (1) and (2) over sentences (1)** and (2)** as giving the semantic contents
of (1)’ and (2)’ 16. In this way, I conclude, a connectionist foe of Quine won’t be
able to discredit perverse semantic theorizing as suggested by Churchland (see 5.4
above). Granting that prototypical trajectories of standard English sentences
coincide perfectly with those of Native sentences, there are no grounds—or, at least,
no grounds revealed by the light of Churchland’s considerations—for maintaining
that perverse English trajectories won’t fit equally well.
1 5  Note that derivations in PT have exactly the same syntactic structure as derivations in the standard 
theory, ST (see chapter 4, sections 4.6, and 4.8 above).
1 6  In response to previous versions o f  this chapter, some philosophers have worried that 
considerations regarding simplicity, both in the axiomatic and derivational structure o f  semantic 
theories, and in the psychological theory that accompanies semantic theorizing, could discredit PT4*. 
For arguments against structural and psychological simplicity constraints, see chapters 2, and 4, 
respectively.
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In the remainder of this section I shall address a potential rejoinder that
someone sympathetic to Churchland may try out. But before that let me introduce a 
caveat to deal with a potential source of misunderstanding. Someone may worry 
that the argument I’ve advanced in this section relies too heavily on the internalist 
part of Churchland’s theory of content.17 As I mentioned above, Churchland’s way 
of determining content comes primarily in terms of the internal similarity among 
prototype-trajectories. In simple cases as the toy languages we’ve been considering, 
Churchland would agree that we can safely put the burden on the internalist side— 
Churchland (1998, pp. 29-30). However, not all constraints on content assignment 
are going to be internal—and so Churchland agrees (see section 5.2 above). We 
need to consider the external causal relations linking trajectories and points in 
hidden space to environmental features. Someone might then hope that we may be 
able to exploit some sort of externalist constraint to ‘anchor’ content, bringing, 
thus, robustness to semantic theory. I believe that this putative line of argument is 
doomed. Fortunately, having developed my argument by looking at Quine’s parable 
of Radical Translation—see fn. 10 above—it won’t be difficult to see why.
The externalist part of Churchland’s theory of content would highlight the 
fact that networks A, B, and C stand in different causal relations to “stable and 
objective macrofeatures of the external environment” (see Churchland, 1998, p. 8). 
Nevertheless, even though different networks may enjoy orthogonal patterns of 
connectivity with the environment, the very point of Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis is
1 7  Thanks to an anonymous referee o f Philosophical Psychology  for bringing this worry to my 
attention— see Calvo Garzon (2000b).
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that there is no fact o f the matter as to which objective macrofeatures are the ones
being pinned down—see chapter 1. Churchland seems to ignore this obvious point
when he notes that:
[what] we have, then, is [...] networks with highly idiosyncratic synaptic 
connections; [...] networks with hidden-layer neurons of quite different 
microcontents; [...] networks whose input-output behaviors are nevertheless 
identical, because they are rooted in a common conceptual framework 
embodied in the activation spaces of their respective hidden layers. 
(Churchland, 1998, p. 11; emphasis added)
I ignore what moves Churchland to make such a strong contention.18 We may fix 
the representational content of a given hidden pattern of activation by considering, 
partly, the causal patterns of connectivity between the input—sensory—units of the 
network, and those environmental macrofeatures that are responsible for the spread 
of activation to the hidden layers. However, since the relevant environmental 
features are observationally indistinguishable (see chapter 1 above), we cannot 
appeal to externalist constraints in order to single out one particular correct 
translational mapping of N—rabbits, say—as opposed to the others. This clearly 
illustrates a weakness in Churchland’s defence. Note that the fact that different 
network’s input-output patterns of behaviour can be identical need not come, contra
1 8  Indeed, “[...] input-output behaviors are nevertheless identical, BECAUSE  they are rooted in a 
common conceptual framework” (capitalization and emphasis added) seriously risks begging the 
whole issue in Churchland’s defence o f  State Space Semantics. Nevertheless, for present purposes, 
we need not press on this point— see Calvo Garzon (in preparation b).
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Churchland, as a consequence of sharing a common conceptual framework. But all
this is by now, I hope, pretty obvious. Let us move on then to a more interesting line
of response hinted by Churchland.
Churchland (personal communication) agrees with the general line of 
argument of this section. In particular he agrees that there will be some systematic 
isomorphism between the trajectory-structures of networks A and C—i.e., the 
standard and the fully-perverse networks—such that we would be justified in 
pairing the standard and the fully-perverse translations as the inscrutable 
alternatives. However, Churchland is not ready to surrender. And the reason is, 
Churchland believes, that networks A and C will display some fine-grained 
structure that hopefully can be distinguished under Principal Components 
Analysis.19 Someone sympathetic to Churchland may then hope to exploit these 
potential fine discriminations in the following way: Suppose network C is trained to 
achieve grammatical competence on an extended set of fully-perverse sentences, 
which will require it to master, among other things, the grammar of percentile 
fractions, the grammar of wholes and parts, both detached and undetached, and a 
substantial vocabulary that is absent in the coding activity o f network A. We may 
therefore be able to discriminate between the two networks by examining their
1 9  In fairness to Churchland it must be noted that the worry I am about to introduce next is not fully 
worked out, but is a preliminary reaction o f Churchland to a previous version o f  this paper. Since the 
line o f  argument is not fully developed, it will be difficult to submit to critical scrutiny. We may then 
read the remainder o f  this section as a sketched worry prompted by a hypothetical sympathizer o f  
Churchland.
State Space Semantics and Conceptual Similarity 207 
respective state-space trajectories. Prototypical trajectories in network C will
presumably have additional ‘kinks’ and ‘elbows’, which will reflect the additional
words whose combinations make up those trajectories. This, despite the fact that its
coarse-grained structure might map up rather nicely onto the prototypical
trajectories of network A.
I believe, however, that in our present case, this putative line of response is 
also doomed to failure. The reason is that we are to assume that Elman’s model can 
be extended to encompass the processing of a real natural language. If it can then 
there is no vocabulary deployed by network C that is absent in the coding activity of 
network A. Fortunately, the discussion in chapter 4 will help us see the reason for 
this. As I argued in section 4.2, we may devise translation manuals for fellow 
speakers of our Home language (see chapter 4, fn. 4). Therefore, a propos the 
standard and the fully-perverse training domains of section 5.5 (networks A, and C),
I may translate your English sentence ‘There is a white rabbit’ homophonically as 
my ‘There is a white rabbit’. Or I could translate it heterophonically as my ‘There is 
a white 99%-urp’. Since my sentence ‘There is a white 99%-urp’ is a well-formed 
sentence of English, it is one you could produce and, hence, must be subject to 
translation into my English. Again, my homophonic manual would equate it with 
my ‘There is a white 99%-urp’, whereas my heterophonic manual would translate it 
as ‘There is a white 99% undetached part of a 99%-urp’. Once again, this sentence 
is also a well-formed sentence in your English. So, once again, I can translate it 
either via my standard manual or via my perverse manual. Obviously the process 
iterates indefinitely. This neatly illustrates the fact that whatever vocabulary the
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enlarged network C deploys will also be present in the coding activity of the
enlarged network A. In short, in the enlarged case the languages that networks A
and C are trained on are formed out of the same lexicon. I conjecture that we won’t
then be able to discriminate between them by looking at additional ‘kinks’ and
‘elbows’ in their respective trajectories since, even though we may build
increasingly complex phrasal structures by the usual combinatorial means, these
structures belong to the same lexical body, and enjoy similar internal relations
within each network. If these considerations are correct, then it follows that
Churchland cannot appeal to fine-grained divergencies to make his case. I conclude,
contra Churchland, that State Space Semantics does not provide a robust criterion
for accurate translation across individuals; and having developed my argument by
looking at Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis as illustrating indeterminacy in the
semantic field, the conclusion to draw is that State Space Semantics is not a viable
candidate to exemplify robustness across representational/cognitive individuals—
pace Churchland, 1998, p. 31.20
5.6 The Collateral Information Challenge: Second Reply to Churchland
2 0  It must be stressed, in fairness to Churchland, that the issue won’t be settled purely on theoretical 
grounds. In Calvo Garzdn (in preparation a) my goal is to see if  Churchland’s claim can be falsified 
empirically by training networks A, B, and C on different sets o f  sentences derived from ST*, PT3 *, 
and PT4 *, respectively, and computing the correlations o f trajectories across networks. I hope that 
these neurosimulations will back up the theoretical argument o f  this section.
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In sections 5.2-5.5, I focused exclusively upon one part of Fodor and Lepore’s
attack against State Space Semantics. Namely, the part where Fodor and Lepore
exploit the architectural and functional idiosyncracies of connectionist networks in
order to weaken the metaphysical status of State Space Semantics. We saw how
Churchland’s deployment of Laakso and Cottrell’s neurocomputational results
failed to bring the required robustness to connectionist semantics. In this section I’d
like to draw the reader’s attention to a different problem for Laakso and Cottrell’s
rebuttal of Fodor and Lepore’s criticism, and Churchland’s subsequent defence of
State Space Semantics; a problem that to the best of my knowledge has been
completely ignored in the connectionist literature.21 Fodor and Lepore exploit the
potentially orthogonal histories of different individuals to introduce what they
labeled ‘the collateral information problem’:
The point is that if a semantics recognizes dimensions of state space 
corresponding to all the properties of dogs about which our beliefs differ, then 
even assuming that your state space has exactly the same dimensions as mine, 
the location of the dog concepts in our respective spaces is likely to turn out 
to be quite significantly different. This should be all sounding like old news;
2 1  Although this other problem is not directly relevant to the connectionist defence o f  the 
Inscrutability Thesis advanced in chapters 4, and 5, I considered that it would be o f  interest to the 
general reader to discuss it before ending the first part o f  my dissertation. This is in part due to the 
lack o f  echo in the literature, and the fact that Laakso (personal communication), Cottrell (personal 
communication), and Churchland (personal communication) have acknowledged that Fodor and 
Lepore’s forthcoming criticism has not been addressed in their respectives replies— Laakso and 
Cottrell (1998; 2000), and Churchland (1998).
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it’s just the worry, familiar from attempts to construct a notion of content 
identity, that a lot of what anybody knows about dogs counts as idiosyncratic; 
it’s “collateral information”, the sort of thing that Frege says belongs to 
psychology rather than semantics. If we are to have a notion of meanings as 
shared and public property, a robust notion of meaning, we must somehow 
abstract from this idiosyncratic variation. (Fodor and Lepore, 1996, pp. 156-7)
In this passage, Fodor and Lepore target Churchland’s earlier reading of State 
Space Semantics (that is, Churchland’s definition of semantic similarity in terms of 
absolute positions in state space with respect to a given set of dimensions; see 
section 5.2)22 We may update their charge to address Churchland’s latest approach 
to connectionist semantics (that is, Churchland’s definition of semantic similarity in 
terms of relative positions in state space, such that different dimensionality across 
networks becomes harmless—see section 5.2). Their charge becomes: Even 
assuming that the set of relations among the patterns of activation in your state 
space is similar to the set of relations obtained in mine, and even assuming that the 
distances among the sets of vectorial representations in our respective state spaces 
are highly correlated, the location of the dog concepts in our respective spaces may 
still differ significantly.
Fodor and Lepore exploit the fact that different individuals are likely to have 
had very different encounters with diverse environmental features. The reader, 
nevertheless, may wonder why this should be a problem. As Fodor and Lepore 
(1996, pp. 157-ff.) point out, it is at first sight difficult to appraise how we can
2 2  Note that Fodor and Lepore assume, as a best-case scenario for Churchland, that different state 
spaces enjoy the same dimensionality.
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entertain the same concepts if, according to State Space Semantics, all dimensions
in hidden space determine the semantic content of our conceptual repertoires. Fodor
and Lepore consider two ways out for Churchland: On the one hand, the defender of
State Space Semantics may help herself to an analytic/syntehtic distinction, in order
to discriminate between those hidden dimensions that are highly relevant in
determining content—and which hopefully we all share!—and those dimensions
which are less relevant, or not relevant at all—and which hopefully correspond to
those axes in state space that reflect historical idiosyncracies. On the other hand,
Fodor and Lepore argue, we may appeal to the empiricist assumption that all
concepts are (statistical) functions of ‘sensory’ concepts. This would also furnish us
with a robust account of conceptual similarity since all dimensions would then
correspond to sensory properties. Hence, we may say that two individuals share
their conceptual repertoires if they have relevantly similar sensory connections.
Unfortunately, Fodor and Lepore would recommend neither of these two options to
their connectionist enemy. Regarding the first option, honouring an
analytic/synthetic distinction may bring well-known problems that the reader
familiar with the philosophy of language literature will be aware of.23 On the other
hand, Fodor and Lepore wouldn’t recommend the second option either. Although
dressed in connectionist clothing—viz., statistical, rather than boolean functions—
2 3  Treating these problems would take us far afield. However, since Churchland himself rejects the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, we may for present purposes agree with Fodor and Lepore, and 
Churchland, and ignore that option. The reader not familiar witrh the problems with analyticity may 
care to consult Quine’s seminal ‘Two Dogm as’, and Haack, 1979.
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the assumption is an embarrasing one that would inherit all the problems that
afflicted classical empiricism. In short, State Space Semantics is caught on either of
two homs—honouring an analytic/synthetic distinction, or resurrecting empiricism;
and neither of these alternatives is very attractive, both in Fodor and Lepore’s, and
in Churchland’s view.
In his latest defence of State Space Semantics, Churchland (1998) does not 
address the collateral information problem.24 Laakso and Cottrell’s 
neurosimulations showed us that conceptual similarity could be objectively 
measured “regardless of how inputs are encoded, and regardless of number of 
hidden units” (Laakso and Cottrell, 1998, pp. 595-6; see section 5.3 above). This 
however, I claim, does not address the collateral information problem since in 
Laakso and Cottrell’s simulations information across networks was never compared 
regardless o f the training histories o f the networks.25 In the experiment reported in 
section 5.3, several networks were trained on a colour-categorization task. The 
networks were trained on four different encodings of the input data: a real 
encoding, a binary encoding, a gaussian encoding, and a sequential encoding—see
2 4  It may be the case that Churchland drops the issue after his exchanges with Fodor and Lepore in 
McCauley (1996), confident that the battle has been won. I doubt that this is the case, but I won't 
press on this issue here (see Calvo Garzon, in preparation b). The purpose o f  this section is more 
modest. I shall simply argue that Churchland wouldn't be able to appeal to Laakso and Cottrell's 
results to address the 'collateral information problem'. I encourage the reader to consult McCauley 
(1996) to check by herself whether Churchland is justified in dropping the issue.
2 5  Cottrell (personal communication) emphasizes that their neurosimulations were never intended to 
address this problem, and that they actually shouldn’t— see below.
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Laakso and Cottrell, 1998, for the details. All encodings, however, were variations
of the same set of data. The idea was to illustrate that individuals with contrasting
sensory modalities may categorize the world in similar ways.
If we are to make use of Laakso and Cottrell’s neurosimulations to address 
the collateral information problem, I contend, we need to train different networks 
on different sets o f data (that would amount to equipping individuals with different 
histories of categorization and concept acquisition). For purposes of illustration, let 
us consider the following two ways in which this may be accomplished. On the one 
hand, networks may be trained under what I shall call an inductively robust training 
regime. An inductively robust training regime comprehends a set of data that allows 
a network to induce a given regularity with the employment of the (ideally) 
minimum number of samples (see below). On the other hand, by inductively weak 
training regime I have in mind a set of data such that a network being trained on this 
set requires to ‘see’ a large number of samples before being able to induce the same 
regularity from the environment.26
It will be easier to illustrate the distinction with a simple example: Imagine a 
simple feedforward network trained to perform an addition function, such that the
2 6  It goes without saying that the input patterns presented to a pair o f  networks under inductively 
weak, and inductively strong training conditions, respectively, must belong to the same base data set. 
Notice that no correct generalization can be learned outside a given training space— cf. Elman, 1998. 
The dubbing ('inductively robust' versus 'inductively weak' training regimes) is due to Bill 
Casebeer. Many thanks to him for very helpful discussion on the topic o f  this section.
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sum of the input values gives you the output value.27 This can be achieved simply
by designing a network with two input units, two hidden units, and one output unit
(with a linear activation function—see chapter 4, section 4.4). For purposes of
illustration, let us consider only inputs between 0.0 and 0.5 with a single decimal
place, such that there are 36 possible sets of input patterns, and the output value
ranges between 0 and 1. Although the network could be presented with 36
combinations of members, the network need not see all of them in order to master
its task. In fact, a network exposed to just 5 sets of exemplars can successfully learn
the addition function for all 36 possible cases. The trick is simply to expose the
network to a representative portion of its overall training domain. Thus, the
following sets of input patterns would constitute what I called earlier an inductively
robust training regime:
Training regime a
<0 .0, 0 .0>, 
<0 .1, 0 .2>,
<0.3, 0.3>,
<0.4, 0.4>, and 
<0.5, 0.5>.
Training regime b
< 0 .0 , 0 .0>, 
<0 .1, 0 . 1>, 
< 0 .2 , 0 .2>,
27 The example is taken from Plunkett and Elman (1997), although their discussion o f  the network is 
alien to our current concerns.
<0.3, 0.4>, and 
<0.5, 0.5>.
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On the other hand, the less representative the samples are (i.e., the more 
restricted they are to specific regions of the training domain), the bigger the amount 
of data the network will have to see in order to induce the correct generalization. In 
this way, the follwing set of input patterns would constitute what I called earlier an 
inductively weak training regime:
Training regime c
<0.0, 0.2>, <0.0, 0.3>,
<0.1, 0.2>, <0.1, 0.3>,
<0.2, 0.0>, <0.3, 0.0>,
<0.4, 0.0>, <0.0, 0.4>,
<0 .1, 0 . 1>, <0 .2 , 0 .1>,
<0.3, 0.1>, <0.2, 0.2>,
<0.5, 0.5>, and <0.0, 0.0>.
Notice that, unlike in training regimes a, and b, where the subset chosen spans 
the full range of possible outputs at evenly-spaced intervals, training regime c draws 
most of it examples from cases where the sum of both inputs is between 0.2, and
0.4. A network trained under these conditions is exposed to less representative 
samples, and will thus require to see many more patterns before being able to
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induce the same regularity discovered by networks trained under ‘robust conditions’
a, and b, above.28
I shall argue next that Laakso and Cottrell’s technique (5.3) can deliver high 
correlations only when measuring similarities across networks that have been 
trained on inductively robust regimes. Unfortunately for the friend of State Space 
Semantics, to address the problem of collateral information we need to compare 
networks that have been trained under inductively robust conditions with networks 
trained under inductively weak conditions, I contend.29 Let me elaborate.
Following the above distinction between inductively robust versus inductively 
weak training regimes, we may interpret the collateral information problem in at 
least two ways. In a best-case scenario for Churchland, we may identify the 
histories of two individuals with two networks both trained under different, 
although inductively robust, conditions. In that case, even though the networks are 
exposed to different input patterns, they will partition their state spaces similarily by 
sampling, for example the base data set at different evenly-spaced intervals (as 
training regimes a, and b, above exemplify). A high degree of correlation would
28 Obviously, if  the distribution o f  data is not representative at all o f  the full range o f  possibilities, 
the network will learn a somewhat different function. For argument's sake I assume that the network 
ends up below a pre-established area in the error landscape, so that it adds correctly any two pairs o f 
numbers between 0.0 and 0.5. There are further technical subleties that we may obviate for present 
purposes that I discuss elsewhere— see Calvo Garzon, in preparation b.
29 To be precise, comparing networks both being trained under diverse inductively weak regimes 
would furnish a more realistic setting to address Fodor and Lepore's challenge. Although to make the 
point more vivid, I shall compare inductively robust with inductively weak training regimes.
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then be expected. Given that the different training sets span the full range of
possible outputs, we may expect the set of internal relations among points in one
hidden space to be isomorphic with the set of internal relations in the other
network’s hidden space. In a worse-case scenario, however (although see fn. 29
above), one network would be trained in an inductively robust regime, and the other
network in an inductively weak regime. These networks will be trained on input
patterns which are, respectively, more and less representative of their common
task.30 I take it that this is a more plausible interpretation of the collateral
information problem. After all, my concept dog and your concept dog may plausibly
be associated with highly divergent inferential regimes—think of me as a dog
breeder (an inductively robust training environment), and you having had spare
encounters with dogs in your life (an inductively weak training environment) who
has eventually come to be able to tell dogs from non-dogs as well as I can.
Unfortunately, under this second scenario (inductively robust versus inductively
weak training regimes), we will expect to find a low correlation across our
30 Someone may wonder whether any network trained under inductively weak conditions will be 
able to extract the correct generalizations. This should not be a problem. Homick et al. (1989) have 
established that a simple feedforward network with a sigmoid activation function can behave as a 
universal approximator. That is, for any given function with a finite range and a finite domain, the 
function can be computed to an arbitrary level o f  accuracy. A different point is what counts as an 
arbitrary level o f  accuracy. Addressing this issue would require introducing some conceptual 
machinery in connectionist theory, such as 'error landscapes', that would take us far afield. The 
point, however, is too technical to be o f  import to this chapter— although see Calvo Garzon, in 
preparation c.
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networks. Networks trained under inductively different conditions will be exposed
to different, and maybe orthogonal, experiences on input pools of data—while
acknowledging the fact that a public concept is being shared. Assuming that Fodor
and Lepore’s challenge is to be read in this way, different networks are highly
unlikely to come out with similar solutions, or to partition their state spaces in
similar ways (cosmic flukes apart!). The set of internal relations among points in
one hidden space won’t be isomorphic with the set of internal relations in another
network’s hidden space.
I conclude that a connectionist sympathiser of Churchland could not make use 
of Laakso and Cottrell’s neurosimulations to address Fodor and Lepore’s collateral 
information challenge. Obviously, the above considerations are not 
unsurmountable, and, in fairness to Churchland, the case against State Space 
Semantics is less than conclusive. For one thing, someone may be ready to bite one 
or other of Fodor and Lepore’s bullets, and grant either an analytic/synthetic 
distinction, or empiricism. However, since Churchland explicitely rejects both 
options, I didn’t consider them in the present discussion.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that appealing to Laakso and Cottrell’s mathematical 
measure of conceptual similarity does not bring Churchland’s optimistic 
conclusion. Namely, the conclusion that State Space Semantics can furnish us with 
a determinate theory of semantics and a robust theory of translation. Wrapping up
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their overall criticism, Fodor and Lepore (1996) argue that State Space Semantics
looks pretty much like an updated version of empiricism, with all its flaws.
Churchland (1998), and Laakso and Cottrell (1998; 2000) argue that State Space
Semantics, when reinforced with Laakso and Cottrell’s results, can be distanced
from empiricism: Conceptual similarities in hidden space can be objectively
measured regardless of idiosyncrasies at the level of the input encoding. Churchland
has ironically urged that if we are going to start with historical comparisons, his
proposed connectionist theory fits better with Platonism. The moral of this chapter
is neither Hume, nor Plato; Connectionist Semantics provides the right tool kit for a
“connectionist Quinean” to kick in with his old-fashioned behaviouristic arguments
for the Inscrutability Thesis transposed into a neuroscientific fashion—see chapter 4
above.
On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that if a semantic irrealist a la 
Quine can make connectionism her home, the results of this chapter might have a 
broader impact than I have argued for here. For strategical reasons, I’ve assumed 
throughout the last two chapters a representationalist framework. Both Fodor and 
Lepore, and Churchland would agree that a general theory of mental representation 
is required in order to explain human higher cognitive capacities. Their 
disagreement reduces to which model of cognition is correct: A LOT model with 
classical constituency, and classical processing, or a connectionist model where 
constituency and processing are non-classical—see Calvo Garzon, 2000a. This 
however may prove to be a trivial distinction, were the Quinean to earn her keep as 
a connectionist, for both Fodor and Lepore, and Churchland may well sink together
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in the boat of representationalism. But I shall leave these matters for another
occasion.31
This chapter closes the connectionist defence of Quine’s Thesis of the 
Inscrutability of Reference that has been the subject matter of Part I of my 
dissertation. The connectionist setting developed in chapters 4, and 5, however, has 
in my view implications for the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of 
mind, that go well beyond the treatment of the semantic notion of reference 
discussed so far. In Part II of this work (chapters 6, and 7, below) I shall propose to 
extend the results of chapters 4, and 5 to the debate over the ontological status of 
the propositional attitudes. The object of Part II will be to produce a Connectionist 
Defence of the Elimination of the Mental.
31 In Calvo Garzon, in preparation c, I argue that a connectionist model o f  cognition may show that 
representationalist theories o f  mind cannot earn their keep. For some anti-representationalist 
positions see Keijzer, 1998; Ramsey, 1997; and Van Gelder, 1995; 1998. Notorious connectionist 
dissenters include Clark and Toribio, 1994; and Clark, 1997, chapter 8.
Part II
The Elimination o f the Mental
[Funes], no lo olvidemos, era casi incapaz de ideas 
generates, platonicas. No solo le costaba comprender que 
el slmbolo generico perro abarcara tantos individuos 
dispares de diversos tamahos y  diversa forma; [...] Su 
propia cara en el espejo, sus propias manos, lo sorprendlan 
cada vez. [...] Sospecho, sin embargo, que no era muy 
capaz de pensar. Pensar es olvidar diferencias, es 
generalizar, abstraer. En el abarrotado mundo de Funes no 
habla sino detalles, casi immediatos.
[Funes] was, let us not forget, almost incapable o f general, 
platonic ideas. It was not only difficult for him that the 
general term dog embraced so many unlike specimen o f  
different size and different forms; [...] His own face in the 
mirror, his own hands surprised him on every occasion [...] 
I  think that he was not very capable o f thoughts. To think is 
to forget a difference, to generalise, to abstract. In the 
overly replete world o f Funes, there was nothing but details, 
almost contiguous details.
—Jorge Luis Borges, Ficciones
6CAN WE TURN A BLIND EYE TO ELIMINA TIVISM?
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I shall rejoin to two arguments that Stephen Stich has recently put 
forward against the thesis of eliminative materialism. In a nutshell, Stich (1990; 
1991) argues that (i) the thesis of eliminative materialism, according to which 
propositional attitudes don’t exist (see chapter 7, below), is neither true nor false, 
and that (ii) even if it were true, that would be philosophically uninteresting. To 
support (i) and (ii) Stich relies on two premises: (a) that the job of a theory of 
reference is to make explicit the tacit theory of reference which underlies our 
intuitions about the notion of reference itself; and (b) that our intuitive notion of 
reference is a highly idiosyncratic one. In this chapter I shall address Stich’s anti-
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eliminativist claims (i) and (ii). I shall argue that even if we agreed with premises 
(a) and (b), that would lend no support whatsoever for (i) and (ii).
Before getting started, let me briefly outline the programme of this chapter. In 
section 6.2 I shall review Stich’s first anti-eliminativist argument. Stich interprets 
the thesis of eliminativism as the claim that the theoretical terms of folk psychology 
fail to refer. Assuming that the job of a theory of reference is to make explicit the 
tacit theory of reference which underlies our intuitions about the notion of reference 
itself, Stich’s argument rests upon an empirical claim. Namely, that people who 
know folk psychology has been discredited actually lack clear intuitions about the 
reference of the theoretical terms of folk psychology. Stich concludes then that the 
thesis of eliminativism lacks determinate truth conditions, and is not true but not 
false either. In section 6.3 I shall argue that Stich’s anti-eliminativist conclusion 
does not follow from the empirical assumption he relies on. Even though intutions 
can be partly relevant when assigning truth values to sentences, I shall argue that an 
analysis of the logical form of belief-sentences still drives us to the eliminativist’s 
conclusion. In section 6.4 I shall review Stich’s second anti-eliminativist argument. 
What’s at stake, Stich claims in opposition to his previous argument, is not whether 
the thesis of eliminativism lacks determinate truth conditions. Even if the 
eliminativist thesis were true, Stich now contends, that would be philosophically 
uninteresting. Stich sees the notion of reference as ultimately an idiosyncratic word- 
to-world semantic mapping. The idiosyncracy of reference, Stich believes, is what 
makes the eliminativist thesis philosophically uninteresting. Even though under a 
theory of reference, eliminativism may obtain, by assuming the idiosyncracy of
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reference we are likely to encounter alternative theories of reference under which 
eliminativism does not follow. In section 6.5 I shall argue that Stich is exploiting 
the idiosyncracy of reference to give a free ride to his anti-eliminativist conclusion. 
To advance the flavour of my rejoinder, I shall contend that if according to our 
sanctioned theory of reference eliminativism follows—premise that Stich grants—, 
then it will still follow for any alternative theory of reference Stich may properly 
consider (although see below). Conclusions will follow in section 6.6. In addition, I 
shall outline Stich’s (1996) latest anti-eliminativist view according to which the 
theory of reference just isn’t the place to go to when trying to settle ontological 
disputes. Stich’s latest twist in the eliminativist plot distances him from the 
arguments to be addressed in chapter 6. However, full treatment of Stich’s lastest 
anti-eliminativist arguments will have to await until chapter 7, where I shall 
produce a connectionist defence of the thesis of eliminative materialism. So, 
without further ado, let us take Stich’s arguments in turn.
6.2 Eliminativism and Folk Semantics
Stich interprets the thesis of eliminativism as the claim that the theoretical terms of 
folk psychology fail to refer.1 However, Stich holds that the theory of reference is a 
branch of psychology:
1 This is in my opinion— and according to Stich’s latest views on the matter (see 6.6 below, and 
chapter 7, section 7.5)— a highly controversial assumption. Put bluntly, it strikes me as bizarre that 
ontological matters— i.e., whether something exists in the (physical world)— depends on what
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It is my contention that a ‘philosophical’ theory of reference is in fact a bit of 
psychology. It’s aim is to make explicit the tacit theory of reference that is
presumed to underlie our intuitions about questions like [(a) Does ‘____ ’
refer to  ? and (b) Does ‘____’ refer to anything at all?]. (Adapted from
Stich, 1991, pp. 240-1)
Stich then contends that the relevant responses of psychological subjects fail to 
determine whether or not the theoretical terms of folk psychology refer, once they 
realise that folk psychology has been discredited empirically.
[There] is good reason to suppose our tacit theory of reference says little or 
nothing about questions like [(a) and (b)] when the term in question is a 
theoretical term in a largely discredited theory. (Ibid., p. 241)
Stich supports this claim by considering our commonsense intuitions about 
reference in the following experiment:
Start with a theory that you take to be largely correct, and focus on some 
theoretical term central to that theory. Now imagine that the theory is found to 
be much worse than you supposed. One tenet after another must be rejected 
and replaced by a very different, and incompatible, tenet. At each step, ask 
whether the term, as it was embedded in the old theory, can plausibly be said
semantic relations a theory o f  reference posits. In short, it seems to me clearly intuitive that whether 
a relation o f reference, between a set o f  theoretical terms and the referents they putatively pick out, 
obtains or fails to obtain is an a posteriori consequence o f  our ontological commitments; 
commitments which must be rooted elsewhere— see chapter 7 below. I shall, nonetheless grant 
Stich’s interpretation without further ado for present purposes.
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to refer to anything. It is my experience that most people who play this game 
report that when the theory is imagined to be seriously mistaken, they often no 
longer have any clear intuitions about the reference of the term. (Ibid., p. 
240)2
In short, Stich’s first argument against the thesis of eliminativism rests upon an 
empirical claim. Namely, that people who know folk psychology has been 
discredited actually lack clear intuitions about the reference of the theoretical terms 
of folk psychology. Our tacit theory of reference remains silent when confronted
with questions like “Does ‘ believes that p’ refer to anything at all?” (Ibid., p.
241). Therefore, Stich concludes, the thesis of eliminativism lacks determinate truth 
conditions, and is not true but not false either.
6.3 Rejoinder to Stich’s First Argument
Let me start with one caveat in order to reply to Stich’s above argument. Stich’s 
argument hinges on what theory of reference we employ. As we saw, by favouring a 
psychological approach to the theory of reference, Stich reached his anti- 
eliminativist conclusion. An obvious starting point for a rejoinder would then be to 
ask whether we are justified in making use of commonsense intuitions when dealing 
with semantic notions such as reference. Stich (1996) wonders what makes a theory 
of reference correct. He considers two accounts. On the one hand, his folk semantic
2 See also Stich (1996, pp. 46-8) for a pilot study along the lines suggested with grad students as 
guinea pigs.
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intuitional account according to which the role of a theory of reference is to capture 
the theory of reference that speakers tacitly endorse. An alternative approach to 
reference, Stich notes, would be a scientific theory of reference whose role is to 
construe word-world mappings to be employed by the empirical sciences, such that 
reference is determined by empirical facts regardless—maybe, orthogonally—of the 
intuitions of the layman. Stich dubs this atemative proto-scientific theory of 
reference. Stich argues that we cannot make use of proto-scientific theories of 
reference unless we have an up-and-running empirical discipline where the 
relational notion of reference does play an active role; and we still lack such a 
discipline.
So, from a practical point of view, the only way to make progress is to 
concentrate on the account that views a theory of reference as an attempt to 
describe the intuitive reference relation, the one specified by folk semantics. 
(Stich, 1996, p. 46)
Those sympathetic to the proto-scientific approach may simply object that 
intuitions and tacit theories of reference miss what’s at stake. The key question is: 
What is the relevant evidence to construct a theory of reference? Stich is 
considering intuitions in response to semantic questions (a) and (b) above, which 
concern theoretical terms. However, the construction of a theory of reference 
requires the employment of many technicalities orthogonal to the intuitions of the 
lay man. The issue of what the notion of reference consists of, someone may 
contend, is not to be settled by a folk psychological theory of reference. It is rather 
to be settled by a scientific theory o f reference; in fact, by the best motivated and
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best regimented theory of reference at hand. It’s an open question what this 
scientific theory of reference is, but folk psychological intuitions, if relevant at all, 
are not relevant in the simple and direct way that Stich’s argument supposes.3
Nevertheless, we may go at least part way with Stich for argument’s sake, and 
assume that people’s commonsense intuitions may play a direct role, and further 
that commonsense intuitions have little to say about the reference of the theoretical 
terms of largely discredited theories. As I shall argue next, Stich’s anti-eliminativist 
conclusion does not follow from this empirical assumption.
Following Stich, we may concede that intutions are partly relevant when 
assigning truth values to sentences. Consider the following sentence:
(s) Santa Claus brings joy to children.
The reference—i.e., truth value—of (s) is determined by the reference of its 
constitutive parts. We have then a number of options available: If the singular term 
‘Santa Claus’ refers to the historical character, Saint Nicholas, we may conclude 
that (s) is false. Saint Nicholas does not bring joy to children. On the other hand, if 
‘Santa Claus’ is an empty singular term, which fails to refer, (s) is neither true nor 
false. And finally, if ‘Santa Claus’ refers to a fictional character (see Evans, 1982, 
pp. 363-6), (s) would be true-in-the-fiction. Clearly, depending on which intuitions 
we have about the referential relation of the singular term ‘Santa Claus’ to the
3 Those uneasy with the employment o f intuitions in the first place may consult Bickle (1993, pp. 
376-ff.) for a formal construal o f  our ontological commitments which undermines the role allegedly 
played by commonsense intuitions.
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objects of our universe of discourse, we will assign different truth values for (s), or 
no truth value at all. In this example, it is reasonable to maintain, as Stich does, that 
speakers’ intuitions do matter. Someone, moreover, may contend that Stich’s 
‘commonsensical’ approach may well generalize to other situations. Plausibly, 
intuitions do matter as well—at least, to some extent—in determining the reference 
of sentences embeding, for example, mass terms.
Consider the mass term ‘caloric’ which, according to XVIII abd XIX 
centuries’ scientists, referred to a fluid substance held in bodies which produces 
melting, boiling, etc. Take the sentence:
(s’) When caloric flows into a body it produces thermal expansion.
Suppose firstly intuition tells us that the extension of ‘caloric’ is not the null class—
i.e., there is at least one object in our universe of discourse which falls under the 
mass term ‘caloric’. Then, if we accept the verdict of intuition, (s’) is false. The 
reason is that nowadays we know that thermal expansion is produced by kinetic 
energy, rather than by caloric fluid. Alternatively, suppose intuition tells us that the 
extension of ‘caloric’ is the null class. And, furthermore, we accept the verdict of 
intuition, (s’) this time will come out true. Notice that (s’) can be read as:
(s*) (x)(y)((x is caloric & x flows into y) —» x produces thermal expansion in y)
Now, if the predicate ‘x is caloric’ has the null class as its extension, then (s*) is 
true. The reason is that for any pair of objects, a and b, in our universe of discourse 
we may wish to consider, such that:
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((a is caloric & a flows into b)-> a produces thermal expansion in b),
the antecedent will always be false. We may then say that (s*) is true by default (see 
below).
The eliminativist, however, need not call into question these considerations. 
With the above proviso in mind, the eliminativist can still argue that an analysis of 
the logical form of belief-sentences drives us to the eliminativist’s conclusion— 
even though intuitions may play the role Stich assignes to them. First, consider a 
fast route that a sympathizer of Stich may try out to obtain Stich’s conclusion. 
Someone may argue, for example, that the sentence
(s” ) Tom’s belief that the cat was on the mat caused him to say that the cat was 
on the mat,
has no determinate truth-conditions. We may interpret (s” ), the suggestion would 
run, as referring to Tom’s belief— i.e., to his belief that the cat is on the mat. It 
would then follow that (s” ) has no determinate truth conditions, since we are 
treating ‘Tom’s belief that the cat is on the mat’ as an empty singular term. 
Therefore, Stich’s conclusion obtains.
This conclusion, however, may have been too rash. We may read the logical 
form of belief-sentences in terms of a quantificational structure that binds a belief- 
variable. Take, for example, the following folk psychological law:
(A) Ifx  believes that P & Q then, ceteris paribus, x believes that P.
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Taking P and Q to be variables for lumps of Home language, we may set out the 
above folk psychological law in formal notation as follows:
(x)(P)(Q) {(3y) (x believes y & y samesays PA&AQ) -» ceteris paribus, (3z) 
(x believes z & z samesays P)}
On this reading, (A) is, by default, trivially true—if the eliminativist is right. Notice 
that the antecedent is false, assuming that the eliminativist is right, whatever values 
we choose for ‘x’, ‘P’, and ‘Q \ However, admitting that the laws of folk 
psychology are (trivially) true does not damage the eliminativist’s position. If we 
now examine a particular folk psychological statement, we shall see why, and see 
which claims of folk psychology the eliminativist rejects as false, not, as Stich 
requires, neither true nor false. Take a particular application of (A):
(A^ (3y) (a believes y & y samesays “the cat is on the mat and someone left the
window open”) -» ceteris paribus, (3z) (a believes z & z samesays “the cat 
is on the mat”)
To explain a’s action, the folk psychologist claims:
(3y) (a believes y & y samesays “the cat is on the mat and someone left the 
window open”) —» ceteris paribus, (3z) (a believes z & z samesays “the cat is 
on the mat”)
(3y) (a believes y & y samesays “the cat is on the mat and someone left the 
window open”)
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(3z) (a believes z & z samesays “the cat is on the mat”)
The explanatory argument is valid, and its major premise is true, the eliminativist 
concedes. But the minor premise and conclusion, the eliminativist claims, are 
simply false because they are existential claims, and there is nothing we can assign 
as a value of y or of z which will make either true.
The reader can now see which claims of folk psychology the eliminativist 
rejects as false—not, as Stich requires, neither true nor false. According to the 
above logical transcription, ‘a’s believing’ is not a singular term. The sentence “a 
believes that the cat is on the mat” does not contain a reference to a particular belief 
of a, but rather is a general existencial statement with respect to believings o f z by a. 
Particular folk psychological statements such as the minor premise and the 
conclusion in the above folk explanatory argument are false. They contain variables, 
bound by existential quantifiers, which range over beliefs. We are thus dealing with 
relational expressions whose reference is, not an object, but a second-level
function. Contra Stich, the question “Does ‘ believes that p ’ refer to anything
at all?” has the determinate answer ‘Yes’. It refers to the relation (3y) believes
y & y samesays p. We don’t obtain truthlessness, as Stich requires, for ‘a believes 
that the cat is on the mat’, but rather falsity, as the eliminativist claims. This 
conclusion, moreover, is perfectly compatible with the claim that general folk 
psychological laws, such as (A) above, are true. The fact that (A) is (trivially) true, I 
contend, is to be seen as a byproduct of the logical apparatus in place when spelling 
out folk psychological laws formally. In short, the fact that (A) comes out true by 
default reveals that no ontological commitment is being made, and is therefore
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compatible with the eliminativist claim that particular applications of (A) contain 
relational expressions which do not fail to refer, and, thus, allow us to dissolve the 
alleged indeterminacy urged by Stich.4
6.4 Eliminativism and the Idiosyncracy o f Reference
Stich is quite prepared to give up the empirical premise he relied on in his first 
argument. Namely, that speakers lack clear intuitions about the reference of the 
theoretical terms of folk psychology. What’s at stake now is not whether the thesis 
of eliminativism lacks determinate truth conditions. Even assuming that the 
eliminativist thesis were true, Stich now contends, that would be philosophically 
uninteresting. Stich sees the notion of reference as ultimately an idiosyncratic word- 
to-world semantic mapping. The idiosyncracy of reference, as we’ll see next, is 
what makes the eliminativist thesis philosophically uninteresting.5
Stich favours a ‘causal-historical’ theory of reference—e.g., Putnam, Kripke, 
etc.6 Put bluntly, after an initial reference-fixing event, reference is transmitted 
along a causal-historical chain. Stich then wonders how we are to discriminate 
between genuine and fake referential transmissions. Since the theory of reference is
4 For a different attack to Stich’s first argument launched by Jackson, see Stich (1996), pp. 52-4.
5 For an origin o f  Stich’s notion o f the idiosyncracy o f  reference see Godffey-Smith (1986).
6 For argument’s sake, I shall go along with Stich and grant a ‘causal-historical’ approach to 
reference. I believe, however, that the case against ‘descriptive’ theories o f  reference is not settled
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a part of the theory of psychology (see section 6.2 above), Stich notes that genuine 
transmissions must be those “sanctioned by intuition” (Stich, 1991, p. 242). 
Intuitions, nonetheless, do not provide us with a homogeneous test of how word-to- 
world mappings are to be transmitted from the original referential baptism 
onwards:7
[When] one looks carefully at [...the] class of transmissions that pass this test 
[i.e., the test of commonsense intuition], it appears that in each category the 
allowable events are a mixed bag having at best a loosely knit fabric of family 
resemblances to tie them together. The causal chain linking my use of the 
name ‘Rebecca’ with my daughter is notably different from the one linking 
my use of ‘water’ with water. And both of these are notably different from the 
chain linking my use of ‘quark’ with quarks. What ties all these causal chains 
together is not any substantive property that they share. Rather, what ties them 
together is simply the fact that common sense intuition counts them all as 
reference fixing chains. {Ibid. pp. 242-3)
And Stich goes on:
But if it is indeed the case that common sense groups together a 
heterogeneous cluster of causal chains, then obviously there are going to be 
lots of heterogeneous variations on the common sense theme. These
yet; though space prohibits me from extending on this matter. For Stich’s distrust o f  descriptive 
theories o f  reference see Stich (1990, pp. 108-ff.; 1992, pp. 254-ff.).
7 Stich calls into question the homogeneity o f  the referential baptism itself, as well as the subsequent 
transmissions. I’ll focus on the transmissions. Nothing in my present argument hangs on ignoring the 
ground-fixing events.
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alternatives will depart from the cluster favored by common sense, some in 
minor ways and some in major ways. They will link some words, or many, to 
objects or extensions different from those assigned by commonsense 
intuition. In doing so, they will characterize alternative word-world links, 
which we might call REFERENCE*, REFERENCE **, REFERENCE***, 
and so on. {Ibid. p. 243)
In Stich’s view, there’s nothing substantially different in our favoured scheme of 
reference—call it REFERENCE—, as opposed to REFERENCE*, 
REFERENCE**, etc. apart from the fact that it is the one intuition guides us 
towards. REFERENCE enjoys no priviledged status over its putative alternatives 
since the tacit rules that according to folk semantics determine our commonsense 
intuitions are themselves, Stich claims, a cultural product.8
The bearing on the eliminativist thesis is straightforward to Stich. The fact
th a tc believes that p’ refers to nothing brings no worry, since REFERENCE is
a highly idiosyncratic mapping. Other relational mappings—e.g., REFERENCE*, 
REFERENCE**—will pick on various word-to-world semantic relations such that
‘ believes that p’ does refer* to, or refer** to, something; and we have no
factual reasons to favour REFERENCE over, say, REFERENCE*, but merely
8 A comparison that Stich draws between folk semantics and the theory o f  grammar illustrates this 
point: “The fact that our intuitions pick out the particular word-world relation that we call reference 
rather than one o f  the many others [...] is largely the result o f  historical accidents, in much the same 
way that details o f  the grammar o f  our language [...] are in large measure the result o f  historical 
accidents” (Stich, 1996, p. 50).
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historical reasons.9 In the remainder of this chapter, I shall elaborate on an argument 
against Stich’s second argument based on the idiosyncracy of reference.
6.5 Rejoinder to Stich’s Second Argument
It strikes me as surprising that Stich does not provide any specific example of an
alternative theory of reference under which the extension of ‘ believes that p’
is not empty. Stich treats beliefs as having content in virtue of causal relations 
linking those beliefs to referents in the world. However, Stich points out, there are a 
lot of causal relations out there, such that we may assign referents to sentences in a 
number of ways. Nevertheless, if it is actually the case that, under a particular word- 
world mapping, believers* and beliefs* do exist, why doesn’t Stich put an example 
on the table, nailing thus down the eliminativist’s coffin forever? As I shall argue 
next Stich does not do so because he cannot do so. The following quote from his 
recent Deconstructing the Mind reveals where Stich’s argument goes astray:
9 I must confess I am a little sceptical about the role played by ‘historical reasons’ in bringing 
support to the idiosyncracy o f  reference. The quote from Stich in fii. 8 above may bring implicitly an 
answer. However, Stich’s position would need to be fleshed out in more detail before submitting it to 
critical scrutiny. Nevertheless, I shalll not press on this point here. The discussion in Part I o f  my 
dissertation clearly shows my bias towards something similar to what Stich dubs ‘the idiosyncracy o f  
reference’. Although I suspect that my motivations for endorsing it are substantially different from 
Stich’s. Spelling out our divergencies on this matter would take us far afield.
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On the account we have been working with, eliminativism is true if and only
if ‘ is a belief refers to nothing. Let ELIMINATIVISM* be a doctrine
that is true if and only if ‘____ is a belief REFERS* to nothing; let
ELIMINATIVISM** be a doctrine that is true if and only if ‘ is a belief
REFERS** to nothing; and so on. Clearly, some o f these ELIMINATIVISM- 
stars are hound to be true, while others will be false. (Stich, 1996, p. 51; 
emphasis added)
The key question is: Why ‘bound to’? How can Stich be certain that there is going
to be a semantic mapping where ‘ is a belief REFERS*•••'••’* to something? It
seems to me that Stich uses the idiosyncracy of reference to give a free ride to his 
anti-eliminativist conclusion. To advance the flavour of my rejoinder, I shall 
contend that if according to our sanctioned theory of reference eliminativism
follows—premise that Stich grants—, then ELIMINATIVISM*•••'•••* will follow as 
well, for any value of i—i.e., for any alternative theory of reference Stich may 
properly consider.
Granting that under REFERENCE eliminativism follows, the eliminativist’s 
fast route to making her case is to argue that there’s just one correct theory of 
reference: Namely, REFERENCE. The anti-eliminativist challenge then comes, as 
we saw, from the idiosyncracy of reference. Nonetheless, Stich’s move unjustifiably 
shifts the burden of proof to the eliminativist. The eliminativist is being indirectly 
forced to argue that REFERENCE is the only correct theory of reference.10 I believe
10 As the careful reader will have guessed, Part I o f  my dissertation clearly illustrates why I wouldn’t 
be keen on pursuing this open possibility in the logical landscape— i.e., arguing that REFERENCE is 
the only correct theory o f  reference— see fh. 9 above.
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however that this is the wrong approach to the issue. An explanation must be 
forthcoming from the anti-eliminativist comer as to how alternative theories of 
reference can deliver results orthogonal to those achieved via REFERENCE 
(orthogonal with regard to truth value assigments). As things stand, the onus is on 
Stich to tell us how different theories of reference can deliver different results as far 
as ontological considerations go, while remaining empirically adequate.
Since Stich does not offer any particular example, we may speculate about 
which alternative word-world mappings would provide him with a best-case 
scenario. In a Quinean fashion, for instance, we may generate an indefinite number 
of mappings that pick out objects and extensions different from those that 
REFERENCE picks out; the only constraint being preservation of stimulus 
meaning.u Our intuitive theory of reference, REFERENCE, axiomatizes belief- 
predicates as follows:
(a) (x) (x satisfies ‘belief iff x is a belief).
However, we may easily produce a number of Quinean alternatives, REFERENCE* 
and REFERENCE**, which contain respectively axioms (a*) and (a**). To wit:
(a*) (x) (x satisfies ‘belief iff x is a temporal stage of a belief);
11 I’ll skip the details. See chapter 1 above.
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(a * * ) (x) (x satisfies ‘belief iff x is an undetached belief part); and so forth.12
It is of course odd to talk of a temporal stage of a belief, and of undetached belief- 
parts. But assuming beliefs are, if they exist, the kind of things folk psychology 
claims them to be—functionally discrete, semantically interpretable and causally 
efficacious states (see chapter 7, below)—then we may take such states to have 
parts and temporal stages.13
Unfortunately, Stich cannot make use of REFERENCE* or REFERENCE**. 
The reason is simply that if beliefs don’t exist, then temporal stages of beliefs, or 
undetached parts of beliefs cannot exist either! Assuming, with Stich, that under 
REFERENCE ELIMINATIVISM is true, it is then difficult to see how under 
REFERENCE* or REFERENCE**, ELIMINATIVISM* or ELIMINATIVISM** is 
going to be false.
What Stich requires then is a more radical way of producing alternative 
theories of reference—i.e., a strategy not constrained by preservation of stimulus 
meaning—, such that ‘ is a belief can refer-star to something. However, to
12 Although Stich may feel uneasy with Quine’s behaviouristic setting, the connectionist rendering of  
Quine’s views on semantics spelt out in chapters 4 and 5 furnishes us with the sort o f  naturalized 
approach that Stich would fmd appealing. See chapter 7 below for Stich’s views on connectionism.
13 Further qualification would be required to make this counter-intuitive view tenable. We need 
nonetheless not worry for present purposes since, were we to discover empirically that temporal- 
belief-stages and undetached-belief-parts don’t exist, we wouldn’t even be able to generate 
alternative referential mappings to REFERENCE, in which case Stich would find him self unable to 
exploit the idiosyncracy o f reference for his purposes. The problems for Stich’s position, however, 
run deeper, and are not dependent on agreement on the above Quinean setting (see below).
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illustrate why Stich’s project is doomed we need not worry about how more radical 
examples would run.14 Rather, let me draw your attention to an issue that has been 
largely ignored in the literature on Eliminativism:
It is standardly assumed among physicalists that the debate between an 
eliminativist and an anti-eliminativist relies on agreement on basic theories such as 
physics. Physics allegedly has the resources to explain everything. The eliminativist 
wishes to eliminate folk psychology. On the other hand, the anti-eliminativist 
wishes to reduce folk psychology to the physical level, or reconcile the two levels in 
some other way. Elimination or reduction is what’s at stake, agreeing thus about the 
priviledged status of physics as an essential part of our scientific explanations.15 
The language of Physics involves notions of reference of various kinds. Note that 
for example reference of observational terms is different from reference of natural 
kind terms, or reference of highly theoretical terms. In like vein, physics involves 
notions of causality and notions of explanation of various kinds. However, and this 
is the key point, we are not to entertain alternative theories of reference which 
change the notions of reference, causation and explanation of our background
14 I have in mind for example Putnam’s (1981, chapter 2) model-theoretic arguments; in particular 
his permutation argument— see below.
15 Obviously, the spectrum o f  possibilities is much broader. Anti-eliminativists may opt for any o f  
the non-reductive materialist options available in the market nowadays. However, as far as my 
present considerations go, the Stich o f  The Fragmentation o f  Reason  is a token-identity theorist, and 
would thus fall within the broad region I outline here— see Stich (1990, p. 103; p. 117). 
Nevertheless, in Deconstructing the M ind  Stich changes his mind on the epistemic status o f  physics. 
For present purposes, we may ignore his recent shift— see chapter 7 below.
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physical theory. Now, granting this, we certainly cannot assume that the referential 
relation which we are holding fixed for the terms of physics (e.g., quarks) will
dictate to us how the reference of ‘ believes that p’ is to be fixed. We may
wonder then what the appropriate referential relation for the distinctive predicates 
of folk psychology is. Trying to provide an answer goes beyond the purposes of this 
chapter. Nonetheless, any naturalistic attempt will grant the fact that there are 
certain associated concepts that we are not allowed to gerrymander, such as 
causation. These considerations have a direct bearing on Stich’s argument.
There are some basic requirements that a ‘causal-historical’ theory of 
reference—which Stich endorses—is not allowed to violate. Terms or predicates of 
a language cannot refer to objects or extensions in the world unless there is an 
appropriate causal relation between the referential expressions in question and the 
referents they allegedly pick out. This brings two further constraints which will 
suffice to drive my point home: On the one hand, any putative theory of reference 
must be able to engage in predictions of linguistic behaviour. On the other hand, the 
causal relation between the terms employed and the objects they pick out must 
facilitate non-linguistic dealings with the objects in question. But how can Stich 
confidently claim that there are theories of reference which meet these constraints, 
and, at the same time, differ in truth value assigments with respect to 
REFERENCE?
Once the Quinean alternative has been discarded, I cannot think of other 
strategies that meet this desiderata. Take, for instance, Putnam’s permutation 
argument. Putnam exploits the notion of an arbitrary permutation—i.e., an arbitrary
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one-to-one mapping of every object in the universe of discourse onto another. In 
this way, we may obtain any arbitrary word-world mapping by making 
compensatory adjustments to the extensions of predicates when assigning referents 
to terms.16 It seems then that Stich has a path to exploit. If I can make any radical 
rearrangement in the referential relations under consideration, we may find out to
our surprise that even though ‘ is a belief fails to refer under REFERENCE, it
does refer* to something under REFERENCE*. Unfortunately, any radical 
rearrangement would miss the causal link between terms and their referents, and 
considering the above constraints, we would lose any ability to predict linguistic 
behaviour, and to amend our own cognitive attitudes (linguistic as well as non- 
linguistic) by using others as a source of information. Hence, it is my contention, 
Stich’s only way out is to gerrymander the notion of causation.17 By changing the 
notion of causality in any bizarre way in the Home language—i.e., the 
metalanguage—, he may stick to his argument. I ignore how such a strategy might 
actually run; however we need not worry since, as we saw, the overall discussion of
16 The reader not familiar may consult Putnam (1981) chapter 2; and pp. 217-ff. for a formal proof 
o f  the argument.
17 Note that the only way for Stich to meet the above desiderata  would be by generating ‘less 
radical’ alternative schemes o f reference— less radical in the sense o f  trying to preserve the causal 
links between terms and their referents in the world. But, how ‘less radical’ can Stich go? Obviously, 
he would need to produce schemes o f  reference which earn their keep empirically— i.e., that remain 
empirically adequate with respect to the standard one (REFERENCE). But, to the best o f  my 
knowledge (although see 6.6 below), that can only be accomplished by endorsing a Quinean 
framework, in which case Stich’s argument wouldn’t go through for the reasons offered earlier.
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Eliminativism pressuposes a common starting point between eliminativists and 
anti-eliminativists as far as the notion of causation is to be fixed in physics.18
In conclusion, if eliminativism is true—premise that Stich grants—, then
ELIMINATIVISM* •••'•••* must also be true, at least for the Quinean alternative 
ways of generating theories of reference considered above.19 This outcome holds, I 
conjecture, unless Stich is willing to give up constraints that govern the 
construction of our semantic apparatus, as well as, the priviledged status of 
physicalism, in which case the price we would be paying to refute eliminativism 
would be far too high.
1 8  To illustrate the point, it might help to look at a case where there is wide agreement. Take 
‘phlogiston’. According to Stich’s line o f  argument, the fact that ‘phlogiston’ fails to refer would be 
uninteresting. The reason is that, pressumably, there is a different theory o f reference according to 
which ‘phlogiston’ does refer to something. The question for Stich is thus: “But what could that 
‘something’ possibly be?”. I fail to find an answer to this question that conforms to our scientific—  
physical— standards. In fairness to Stich it must be noted that precisely this sort o f  considerations 
have made him change his views dramatically on this subject (see chapter 7 below).
1 9  If put under preassure, I would be ready to concede that my conclusion is far more modest than 
the one that the eliminativist should set for herself. Ideally, the eliminativist would like to conclude 
that ELIMINATIVISM* 1 * must be true for any alternative theory o f  reference Stich may consider.
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6.6 Conclusion
Stich (1990; 1991) argued that (i) the thesis of eliminativist materialism, according 
to which propositional attitudes don’t exist, is neither true nor false, and that (ii) 
even in the case it were true, that would be philosophically uninteresting. To 
support (i) and (ii) Stich relied on two premises: (a) that the job of a theory of 
reference is to make explicit the tacit theory of reference which underlies our 
intuitions about the notion of reference itself; and (b) that such a notion of reference 
is a highly idiosyncratic one. In this chapter I tried to show that even if we agreed 
with premises (a) and (b), Stich’s arguments are still doomed.
Before closing this chapter, however, let me expand briefly on an 
aforementioned caveat with regard to Stich’s second argument, and premise (b) 
above—see fn. 19. As I acknowledged earlier, the ideal eliminativist conclusion
according to which if eliminativism is true, then ELIMINATIVISM* •••'•* must be 
true, for any alternative theory of reference Stich may consider, is far too strong. Or, 
better said, it is too strong to be supported by the arguments I’ve offered in section 
6.5. Rather, what I’ve tried to show is that Quinean alternatives won’t do for Stich, 
and that Putnam’s unfettered permutations won’t do either. However, I haven’t 
shown that there is no non-Quinean/Putnamian permutation available which is 
constrained by holding causation, and the rest of our background theoretical 
apparatus—notions of reference, explanation, etc.—fixed. On the other hand, it
Nevertheless, I believe the eliminativist can live with the more modest results achieved in this 
section (see section 6 . 6  below).
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must be stressed that Stich has not shown that there is such an option available. 
Hence, a fairer way to read the results of section 6.5 would be as a stand off 
between the eliminativist and Stich. This, nonetheless, should not be interpreted as 
a partial defeat for the eliminativist. Stich himself has abandoned the views we’ve 
been concerned with in this chapter. As I mentioned in section 6.2, Stich (1990; 
1991) interprets the thesis of eliminativism as the claim that the theoretical terms of 
folk psychology fail to refer. However, according to Stich’s (1996) latest (?!) view, 
the theory of reference just isn’t the place to go to when trying to settle ontological 
disputes. Stich’s latest twist in the eliminativist plot makes of him a ‘social 
constructivist’ or, as he prefers, a Quinean pragmatist—see Stich (1996), pp.55-9, 
p. 72, and chapter 7 (section 7.5) below. If Stich is right, and the theory of reference 
cannot shed any light upon the eliminativist/anti-eliminativst debate, then whether 
my results in section 6.5 are strong enough, or not, becomes a secondary issue. The 
purpose of this chapter has been simply to show that even if semantic 
considerations of the sort Stich considered threw some light over disputes on 
ontology, we still couldn’t turn a blind eye to eliminativism. Although I agree with 
Stich that ontological disputes are not to be settled by looking at our semantic 
commitments, I disagree with the conclusions he arrives at. In the next chapter I 
shall address these considerations in more detail, and set more ambitious limits for 
the friend of eliminativism. The general objective of the next chapter will be to 
produce a connectionist defence of the thesis of eliminative materialism.
7CONNECTIONISM AND THE TWILIGHT OF 
PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT
7.1 Introduction
In chapters 4, and 5 we saw the implications that certain key features of 
connectionist networks had for Quine's Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. 
However, the philosophical implications of connectionism, in my opinion, run 
deeper, having a direct bearing upon the Theory of Mental Representation. The 
discussion in chapter 4 (especially sections 4.7, and 4.8) highlighted a crucial issue 
with regard to the philosophy of mind. Namely, the fact that a connectionist model 
of cognition fails to endorse the ‘computational theory of the mind’. That is, 
cognitive activity in the connectionist guise does not consist of formal operations 
performed on internal representations according to syntactic rules (see 4.8 above).
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Connectionist processing does not exhibit the compositional character of classical 
representations. Hidden representations in fully-superposed neural networks are not 
representations of propositions. Granting this setting, the friend of the thesis of 
eliminative materialism has found an ally in connectionist theory. Some 
philosophers have argued that the above considerations bring support to the 
elimination of folk psychological posits: if connectionism is true, then folk 
psychology must be wrong, and the propositional attitudes should be eliminated 
from our ontology. In this chapter I propose to examine these issues. The purpose is 
to produce a connectionist defence of the elimination of the mental.1
Before getting started, let me briefly outline the programme of this chapter. In 
section 7.2 I shall introduce a conditional argument for the elimination of the posits 
of folk psychology put forward by William Ramsey, Stephen Stich, and Joseph 
Garon (henceforth abbreviated RS&G). In section 7.3 I shall consider an objection 
to RS&G’s eliminativist argument raised by Clark. I shall then review a counter that 
Stephen Stich and Ted Warfield produce on behalf of the eliminativist. The 
discussion in chapter 5 on ‘state space semantics and conceptual similarity’ will be 
used to show that Clark’s argument is not threatened by Stich and Warfield’s 
considerations. Then, in section 7.4, I shall offer a different line of argument to 
counter to Clark. A line that focuses on the notion of causal efficacy. I hope to show 
that RS&G’s eliminativist argument is correct. Conclusions, and review of two
1 It must be noted that the forthcoming discussion assumes a physicalistic spirit towards the 
naturalization o f  content. Worries about qualia  (e.g., Jackson, 1982), and view-from-nowhere 
arguments (e.g., Nagel, 1989) are tangential to the present enterprise.
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other caveats concerning the outcome of the eliminativist/antieliminativist debate 
will follow in section 7.5.
7.2 Propositional Modularity and Fully-Superposed Neural Networks
In their 1990 seminal paper Ramsey, Stich and Garon offered a conditional 
argument for the elimination of the posits of folk psychology—beliefs, desires, etc. 
In a nutshell, RS&G’s conditional argument runs as follows: Folk psychology, 
insofar as it individuates mental states in terms of their propositional content, is 
committed to the thesis of propositional modularity.2 The thesis of propositional 
modularity makes three distinctive claims. Propositional attitudes are (i) 
functionally discrete, (ii) semantically interpretable, and (iii) causally efficacious.3 
But, RS&G contend, i f  fully-superposed connectionist models of cognition turn out 
to be correct, then there are no such entities with such properties. In particular 
RS&G consider the way in which internal states of certain connectionist models of
2  The reader should not confuse the thesis o f  propositional modularity with Fodor’s (1983) notion o f  
modularity— i.e., accounting for high-level cognitive tasks by building complex architectures out o f  
simpler interacting modules which are orchestrated together so as to deliver highly complex 
behavioural outputs (see also Minsky, 1985, and Shallice, 1988). Although the approach to cognition 
advocated in my dissertation (see chapter 4 above) implicitly rejects Fodor’s modularity o f thought, I 
shall not try to spell out the divergencies here.
3  This reading is not forced by the eliminativists themselves, but rather encouraged by defenders o f  
folk psychology’s posits— the reader may care to consult, for example, Fodor, 1987, p. 10. See also 
Stich (1983) for an earlier elaboration o f  the three tenets o f  propositional modularity.
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memory interact amongst themselves, and claim that this is inconsistent with the 
interactions of propositional attitude states, as described by folk psychology (see 
below). The incompatibility between the propositional attitudes’ above features— 
(i), (ii), and (iii)—and some connectionist networks suffices to show, in RS&G’s 
view, that the posits of folk psychology ought to be eliminated from our ontology.
A number of powerful attacks have been launched to cancel RS&G’s 
argument. Addressing all of them wouldn’t be realistic for the purposes of this 
chapter. However, I shall try to counter to one criticism which focuses on a 
particular aspect of RS&G’s argument. The criticism in question is due to Clark 
(1989/90).4 First, let me elaborate on RS&G’s argument, for it will be crucial to 
appraise it in some detail before turning to the reactions it has prompted.
The claim that propositional attitudes are committed to the thesis of 
propositional modularity amounts to saying that: (i) Propositional attitudes are 
functionally discrete to the extent that they can be individually lost or acquired, 
without disturbing other propositional attitudes that an agent might endorse at the 
given point in time. Think, for example, of cases of memory loss. You may forget 
that p, without losing any other of your current memories. The thesis of 
propositional modularity holds that the subject believes (dispositionally) the 
obvious consequences of those propositional attitudes that get tokened in the ‘belief 
box’ (if they are mutually consistent). Functional discreteness suggests a cognitive
4  For other important criticisms which I shall obviate for present purposes, see Stich and Warfield 
(1995), Smolensky (1995), and Stich (1996). In Calvo Garzon (in preparation c) I address Stich and
Warfield s, and Stich’s attacks.
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architecture designed such that propositional attitudes are encoded in separate 
regions, allowing thus for no domino effect when substracting or adding individual 
propositional attitudes. In short, beliefs tokened in the belief box which are 
logically independent of each other are also functionally independent. 5 (ii) 
Propositional attitudes are semantically interpretable to the extent that their content 
is truth-evaluable and projectible—see Goodman (1965). We say that the predicate
‘ believes that p’ is projectible insofar as its semantic properties—i.e., the belief
thatp—bring about generalizations such as:
(1) When people believe that i f  p  then q, and come to believe that p, they will 
typically come to believe that q. (cf. RS&G, 1990, p. 316)
That is, predicates such as ‘ believes that p’ are projectible insofar as they
can figure in causal laws, supporting nomological generalizations. In addition, folk 
psychology crucially identifies the properties expressed by propositional attitudes’ 
predicates with natural kinds. And finally, (iii) propositional attitudes are causally 
efficacious to the extent that they can play a causal role in the production of other 
propositional attitudes, and ultimately in the production of output behaviour— 
crucially (see below), distinct propositional attitudes have distinct causal roles.
5 RS&G are careful not to fall prey to holistic considerations— cf., for example, Davidson, 1980. 
Plausibly, under certain conditions, losing or acquiring the belief that p  may trigger o ff the loss or 
acquisition o f  other semantically related beliefs. However, functional discreteness is not committed 
to denying this. It is sufficient for RS&G’s purposes to note that, at a given time, individual losses or 
acquisitions can, and indeed, do happen— see RS&G, 1990, p. 316.
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Now, since propositional attitudes are functionally discrete, we can talk of their 
causal powers in terms of discrete causal efficacy. Folk psychology allows us to 
understand an agent’s action as caused by one, rather than another, propositional 
attitude. Fully-superposed neural networks (see chapter 4; and below), RS&G urge, 
are incompatible with (i), (ii), and (iii) above. Before we take a look at the reasons 
for this incompatibility, it will be useful to introduce a classical model of cognition, 
that conforms to the thesis of propositional modularity, to be clear about what’s at 
stake, and what the outcome in the debate should be.
There is a number of models of human cognition in the classical literature 
which take for granted the factuality of the thesis of propositional modularity. For 
purposes of illustration, RS&G consider Collins and Quillian’s (1972) ‘semantic
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[Fig. 7.1]: A semantic network representation o f  memory in the style o f  Collins and Quillian 
(1972). (From RS&G, 1995, p. 318)
network representation of memory’.6 Figure 7.1 gives an instance of a section of 
Collins and Quillian’s model. In their model, propositions are represented by nodes 
along with their labeled links to various concepts. Propositions being stored in 
memory form a network of functionally discrete and semantically interpretable 
states. RS&G highlight three key features of Collins and Quillian’s model. On the
PROPO SITIO NS
1 Dogs have fur
2 Dogs have paws
3 Cats have fur
SEMANTIC NETW ORK
DOGS
objectobject
object object
relationrelation*
PAWS HAVE FUR
relation
object
object
CATS
[Fig. 7.2]: Semantic netwotk with one proposition removed. (Ibid., p. 319).
one hand, as figure 7.2 above illustrates, individual propositions can be added or 
removed from memory discretely—i.e., without causing readjustments elsewhere in
6  For another classical illustration, see Newell ans Simon (1972). See also the references in RS&G 
(1990, fii. 7).
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the network. Secondly, predicates are treated as projectible. That is, they are treated 
as the sort of predicates whose semantic properties allow us to include them in the 
statements of law-like regularities. In this sense, these semantic properties are taken 
to constitute genuine natural kinds. And finally, given a certain task such as 
memory retrieval, we may monitor the network’s performance by tracking down the 
individual propositions that become activated. Some propositions may never get 
activated during the whole process.
RS&G contend that a certain class of connectionist networks are incompatible 
with the sort of features that classical models of cognition, such as Collins and 
Quillian’s above semantic model of memory, exploit. We may distinguish two 
different, although closely related, arguments in RS&G’s defence of eliminativism 
which highlight this incompatibility: An argument regarding superpositional 
storage and discrete causal efficacy, and an argument concerning natural kinds.1 
Let us take them in turn.
The Superpositional Storage/Discrete Causal Efficacy Argument RS&G employ a 
connectionist model of memory which is incompatible with two of the three 
features of propositional modularity. The model—call it Net A—is a three-layered 
feedforward network consisting of 16 input units, 4 hidden units and one output 
unit (see RS&G, 1990, p. 325). The task is to answer affirmatively or negatively to 
each of the first 16 propositions in table 7.1 below, being fed to the network at the 
input layer.
7 The taxonomy and the dubbing are due to Clark, 1989/90, p. 343.
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Proposition Input
1 Dogs have fur 1100001100001111 1 true
2 Dogs have paws 11000011 00110011 1 true
3 Dogs have fleas 11000011 00111111 1 true
4 Dogs have legs 1100001100111100 1 true
5 Cats have fur 1100110000001111 1 true
6 Cats have paws 1100110000110011 1 true
7 Cats have fleas 11001100 00111111 1 true
8 Fish have scales 11110000 00110000 1 true
9 Fish have fins 11110000 00001100 1 true
10 Fish have gills 11110000 00000011 1 true
11 Cats have gills 11001100 00000011 0 false
12 Fish have legs 11110000 00111100 0 false
13 Fish have fleas 11110000 00111111 0 false
14 Dogs have scales 11000011 00110000 0 false
15 Dogs have fins 1100001100001100 0 false
16 Cats have fins 11001100 00001100 0 false
Added proposition
17 Fish have eggs 11110000 11001000 1 true
[Table 7.1]: Propositions Network A and Network B. {Ibid., p. 324)
The output consists of a single unit which is read as ‘Yes’ if it’s on, or as ‘No’ if it’s 
off. Net A learns to perform this task by backpropagation—see chapter 4, section 
4.4 above. If fed, for example, with the coded sentence ‘Dogs have fur’, activations 
will spread forward in such a way as to produce a ‘Yes’ at the output level. In this 
way, the network shows proficiency in the same task performed by classical 
cognitive models of memory such as Collins and Quillian’s model (see figure 7.1).
This simple feedforward network has two key features which suffice to drive 
RS&G’s point home. The representations that Net A develops in hidden space are 
fully-distributed (see chapter 4, section 4.6), and furthermore, information is stored
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in a superpositional fashion (see section 4.9). To remind the reader, in fully- 
distributed neural networks, individual units do not represent particular items. Each 
sentence being fed to Net A is encoded in hidden state space as a 4-dimensional 
vector. The network represents sentences as fully-distributed set of values, such that 
individual hidden units defy semantic interpretation. On the other hand, Net A 
learns its task by adjusting a single set of weights to produce the appropriate 
input/output correlation for any of the 16 sentences. All the knowledge the network 
acquires is stored superpositionally in one single set of weights (see chapter 4, 
section 4.9 above).8 In short, the key point to bear in mind is that individual units 
and connection weights embody subtler—subsymbolic—information than the one 
being represented and processed symbolically.9
Net A, insofar as it employs fully-distributed representations and 
superpositional storage techniques, is incompatible with the thesis of propositional 
modularity.10 In particular, it is incompatible with thesis (iii): that logically 
independent propositional attitudes have distinct causal roles. Since information is
8  I shall talk quite freely o f  connectionist nets as knowing or believing  propositions. Though, as my 
argument unfolds (see also chapters 4, and 5 above), it should be clear that these licences are no 
more than a faqon de parler.
9  For a lucid elaboration o f  the subsymbolic/symbolic dichotomy, see Smolensky (1988).
1 0  The careful reader will have realized that the incompatibility won’t arise unless the above 
connectionist model is interpreted as a rival cognitive model to classical systems, and not merely as a 
neural implementation o f  them. The discussion in chapter 4 (section 4.8) reveals that in fact this is 
the case. RS&G are careful to make o f  this crucial property one o f  their pivotal premises in their 
conditional argument— see RS&G (1990), pp. 320-ff.
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stored in a fully-distributed superpositional fashion, it makes no sense to talk of the 
distinct causal efficacious role played by the representation of a particular 
sentence. Notice that each hidden unit and each weight encode information about 
every single sentence that has been presented at the input level. Figure 7.3 shows 
the network’s fully-superposed solution to the problem.
Network A
[Fig. 7.3]: Weights and biases in network with 16 propositions. (Ibid., p. 326)
Therefore, it makes no sense to maintain that the net’s belief that dogs have fur, 
encoded by a sentence, say, ‘Dogs have fur’ is causally responsible—in isolation— 
for the output ‘Yes’. If the belief that dogs have fur is meant to play a causal role in 
the production of a particular output, so does the belief that cats have paws, and, for 
that matter, any other propositional state the net has stored in hidden space. The 
content of each different proposition is determined by the superposition of all the 
available representational resources; resources which are a function of the whole
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range of input/output patterns that the network has been trained on (see table 7.1). 
Thus, as figure 7.3 illustrates, the resources the network employs to represent the 
belief that dogs have fur  are the same as those required to represent, say, the belief 
that cats have paws. The conclusion RS&G draw is that the connectionist model 
considered is incompatible with features (i) and (iii) of propositional modularity. 
That is, propositional attitudes lack discrete causal efficacy.11
The Natural Kinds Argument To illustrate the alleged incompatibility more
vividly, RS&G considered a different network (call it Net B) which is trained, again
Network B
[Fig. 7.4]: Weights and biases in network with 17 propositions. (Ibid. p. 328)
11  It is noteworthy that connectionist models need not lack semantic interpretability— feature (ii) o f  
the thesis o f  propositional modularity. Fully distributed representations are semantically 
interpretable, though not in a localist way. The friend o f  connectionism is willing to interpret the 
subsymbolic states o f  a neural network as genuinely representational. The quarrel is rather with the 
propositional approach to semantic interpretability advocated by folk psychologists— although see 
chapter 4, fn. 5 above, and chapter 5, section 5.7.
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by backpropagation, on the same 16 sentences Net A was trained on, plus one more 
sentence—see table 7.1 above. Since information is fully superposed across the 
hidden set of units and weights, we won’t be able to find a functionally discrete 
element in Net B which represents the 17th sentence. And so, no element, which 
can be added or subtracted from the network, that does not disturb other elements of 
the network. Figure 7.4 above shows the overall solution Net B finds in order to 
accommodate the 17th proposition.
These considerations support the argument against discrete causal efficacy 
just reviewed. However, by contrasting Net A with Net B, the case against the 
propositional modularity of folk psychology can be strengthened. As I mentioned 
earlier, folk psychology claims that propositional attitudes’ predicates are 
projectible. This allows us to talk of beliefs as constituting, single kinds. 
Nevertheless, since Net A and Net B have no states that can be characterized as 
functionally discrete, we can say that the representations they encode lack any 
commonality, at the weights-and-units level, which is projectible (compare fig. 7.4 
with fig. 7.3 above). Information is highly distributed, and connection weights 
embody information relevant to many propositions. We cannot thus identify 
subregions in Net A and Net B that represent one and the same proposition. The 
conclusion that RS&G find appealing is that connectionist beliefs—whatever they
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happen to be—do not constitute a single kind. Connectionist beliefs are rather 
‘chaotically disjunctive sets’—see RS&G, 1990, p. 329.12
RS&G draw a twofold conclusion from the above two arguments: (a) If 
connectionist models in the line o f  Net A and Net B turn out to be correct,13 then 
the requirement of propositional modularity cannot be fulfilled and, therefore, folk 
psychology is false. And (b), if folk psychology is false, then its posits—i.e., the 
propositional attitudes—should be eliminated from our scientifically favoured 
ontology. According to RS&G the fact that the networks under consideration lack 
two of the three constitutive features of propositional modularity shows that the
1 2  For the reader less familiar with connectionist theory, the following passage from Clark (1993) 
nicely echoes, at an intuitive level o f  understanding, the essence o f  RS&G’s argument: “Imagine the 
following two ways o f  storing sentences. In the first way, you keep a discrete token o f  each sentence 
on a slip o f  paper in a drawer. It is then easy to see how to use the tokens one at a time. In the second 
way, you token each sentence as a pot o f  colored ink. You then take a vat o f  water and throw in all 
the pots. It is now not easy to see how to use the colors separately; worse still, the resultant overall 
color will vary according to the global set o f  pots o f  ink put in. The commonality among various vats 
which token the same sentence is now lost to view. The question then is: How could a vat-and-inks 
(read superpositional connectionist) style o f  storage be compatible with the assumption o f  
propositional modularity?” (Clark, 1993, p. 195).
1 3  We already know that Net A and Net B have little or no biological plausibility. There are a 
number o f  neurobiological constraints against simple feedforward architectures, and against learning 
techniques such as backpropagation (see chapter 4, section 4.5). Nonetheless, RS&G’s argument can 
be framed in terms o f  biologically plausible neural models which are functionally similar to full 
distribution and superpositional storage— whatever the correct architecture and the learning 
techniques come to be.
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propositional attitudes are fundamentally unlike the entities posited by connectionist 
theorists. We are thus justified, RS&G contend, in drawing the eliminative 
conclusion, rather than some form of reductionism.14
The careful reader can see that RS&G’s eliminativist argument goes hand in 
hand with the connectionist results achieved in Part I of my dissertation (in 
particular, chapters 4, and 5 above). In Part I, nonetheless, the scope was narrower, 
making use of connectionist theory to call into question the alleged scrutability that 
the semantic notion of reference enjoys—all according to the foes of Quine. The 
target in this chapter is wider, highlighting further philosophical implications of 
connectionism for the theory of mental representation; implications that go well 
beyond Quine’s Inscrutability Thesis (see 7.5 below). In the next two sections, I 
shall consider an objection raised by Clark that calls into question a crucial aspect 
of RS&G’s eliminativist argument.
7.3 Higher Levels o f Description, NETtalkers, and NETtalk-structures
Clark (1989; 1989/90) disagrees with the first part of RS&G’s argument—(a) 
above—, and contends that the networks that RS&G deploy to illustrate the alleged
1 4  It must be stressed that RS&G don’t offer any formal criterion to back up the second more radical 
part o f  their argument. That is, a criterion that lets us distinguish potential cases o f  elimination from 
cases o f  mere redution. The contention that the eliminativist conclusion is guaranteed because fully- 
superposed neural networks lack two o f  the three core properties characteristic o f the thesis o f  
propositional modularity is in the opinion o f  many commentators the weakest point o f  RS&G’s 
argument (see section 7.5 below).
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incompatibility with the thesis of propositional modularity are in fact consistent 
with the three features characteristic of propositional modularity—(i), (ii), and (iii) 
above. To appraise Clark’s contention we need to drop the idea that the only kind of 
description available to the cognitive scientist is the one at the level of the weights 
and units.15 Beyond this low level of description of connectionist systems, Clark 
(1989) considers the status of various other higher-level descriptions. Among these 
we have the spatial reorganization of hidden space created by performing a 
statistical cluster analysis, and the symbolic—conceptual-level—descriptions of 
folk psychology (see Clark, 1989, pp. 188-ff. for a taxonomy of the several low, as 
well as high, levels of description of connectionist networks). In a nutshell, Clark’s 
misgivings with RS&G’s eliminativist argument stem from the fact that post hoc 
statistical techniques such as cluster analysis may reveal that connectionist 
processing can be subject to a symbolic treatment.16 For purposes of illustration,
1 5  The reader may care to consult Smolensky (1988; sections 1 and 2) for a formal appraisal o f  the 
low level description o f connectionist networks (numerical specification o f  connection weights, and 
subsymbolic interpretation o f hidden units). See also chapter 4 above (sections 4.4-4.7).
1 6  In a stronger reading suggested by Clark, a symbolic evaluation o f  connectionist systems is not 
meant to serve simply as a useful ‘approximation’ o f the underlying weight-and-units mechanisms, 
but rather as a virtual high-level correlate o f  those mechanisms. Connectionist networks or cognizers 
themselves, Clark speculates, create symbolic representations for the purposes o f  reinterpreting 
clusters o f features o f  the sort developed at the subsymbolic level. A somewhat straightforward way 
to accomplish this may be by building a dual, connectionist-cum-classical, neural network (see for 
example Miikkulainen’s DISCERN network— a distributed neural network that processes simple 
stereotypical narratives— see Miikkulainen, 1993). Clark him self acknowledges the speculative 
character o f his remarks and does not elaborate on the argument further. I shall not attempt to flesh
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Clark (1989/90) considers NETtalk—a very well-known neurosimulation in the 
connectionist literature developed by Sejnowski and Rosenberg (1986). For the 
reader not familiar, let me briefly describe NETtalk, for its appraisal will be crucial 
for the purposes of this and the next section.
NETtalk is a relatively large network trained to perform text-to-speech 
transformations. The network has a simple feedforward architecture, and contains 
145 input units, 60 hidden units, and 27 output ones—see Sejnowski and Rosenberg 
(1986) for the details. Being fed with a string of letters, NETtalk learns by 
backpropagation to yield a coding for each phoneme corresponding to every letter in 
the text. The text is fed to the network by using a fixed window size for the letter 
strings. In this way, NETtalk learns to map each letter being presented in the center 
of the input window onto a given ‘phonetic’ unit at the output layer (the rest of the 
window acts as ‘context’). The codings are then fed to a speech synthesizer 
producing the relevant spoken signals. The hidden representations obtained after 
backpropagation learning are highly distributed. In like vein, the distribution of 
connection weights presents a homogeneous structure across the network’s 
connections. These fully-superposed representational resources allow NETtalk to 
lay hold of a number of interesting text/speech regularities. In order to analyze what 
regularities NETtalk exploits, Rosenberg and Sejnowski developed, as part of their
out Clark’s line o f  thought here (the reader may care to consult Clark, 1989, Appendix (section 5) for 
a quick appraisal o f  his position). For present purposes I shall focus instead on the less controversial 
reading according to which higher-level descriptions are simply useful approximations o f  lower-level 
mechanisms (see below; see also the discussion in section 4.7 above).
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methodology, the statistical technique of cluster analysis. A cluster analysis consists 
in pairing each hidden pattern of activation with its closest neighbour. An average 
activation value is then calculated, and the process of pairing neighbours is repeated 
for the new patterns of activation. Responses to different inputs are accounted for 
by spatially partitioning the internal representational space (see section 4.5 above). 
In this way cluster analysis can compare the relation of hidden units to different 
inputs, and their effects on oncoming outputs. This technique is hierarchically 
applied, arriving in the end at a final clustering in space where points are located in 
several specific regions as a function of the similarities shared with other points. In 
this way, all the vectors whose activation values correspond, for example, to vowels 
will be seen as points in a vowel-region, and the same goes for the consonant 
vectors (see figure 7.5 below). The consonant-region, moreover, appears divided in 
several subregions which include bilabials (p, b), dentals (d, t), etc. Other 
subregions comprehend, for example, a voiceless, palatal group. In short, cluster 
analysis reveals that NETtalk navigates successfully the text-to-speech domain by 
organizing sets of stimuli in terms of the articulatory features characteristic of 
different phonemes (e.g., voiced, palatal, liquide)—see Sejnowski and Rosenberg 
(1986), or Rosenberg and Sejnowski (1987), for the details.
According to Clark, cluster analysis furnishes us with a level of analysis 
which is able to reconcile the connectionist subsymbolic level of description with a 
straightforward, higher-level, classical approach. NETtalk’s hierarchical clustering 
(see figure 7.5 above) is meant to make manifest the profile of the ‘semantic metric’ 
(see 4.5 above) that the network constructs in order to master its task. In short,
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[Fig. 7.5]: Hierarchy o f partitions on hidden-unit vector space o f  NETtalk. (From Churchland, 
1989, p. 176, after Rosenberg and Sejnowski, 1987)
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cluster analysis sets forth the representational configuration developed by NETtalk, 
described at a more abstract level than the neural one, by finding a hierarchy of 
partitions in hidden space. By pairing together all those inner states as a function of 
the (spatial) similitude between the diverse activation patterns, cluster analysis 
offers a clear example of how neural networks can satisfy a demand for a form of 
commonality; a commonality which is absent at the individual level of the weights 
and units—see section 4.7 above.
As the reader may have guessed by now, the bearing of these considerations 
upon RS&G’s eliminativist argument is pretty straightforward. In the first plank of 
their general argument (the ‘superpositional storage/discrete causal efficacy 
argument’—see 7.2 above), RS&G argued that since the number of active weights 
prompting any output involves the whole network (i.e., full distribution) and given 
that each weight participates in the storage of many items of data (i.e., 
superposition), it is not possible to isolate an individual belief as causing a 
particular output. However, according to Clark, appealing to the higher level of 
description of the activation states via cluster analysis shows that fully distributed, 
superpositional representations are structured enough to be compatible with the 
requirements of propositional modularity. If the network goes into a hidden unit 
activation state within the domains o f a subcluster which we have rightly identified 
with, say, the symbolic label ‘dogs have fur’ then, in spite of the superpositional 
storage of information, Clark contends, we are justified in claiming that the network 
has arrived at a certain output because at that moment it believed that dogs had
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fur.17 On the other hand, the second part of RS&G’s general argument (the ‘natural 
kinds argument’—see 7.2 above) highlighted the lack of any genuine kind, at the 
level of the units and weights, uniting Net A and Net B. But again, Clark insists, 
this is not a problem. Thanks to cluster analysis we may discover that different 
networks define a unique class by dividing their respective hidden spaces into 
significantly similar sub-spaces. We may then assign common kinds to different 
networks regardless of their units-and-weight’s idiosyncrasies. Clark reminds us of 
a salutary maxim:
The basic philosophical point here is a very familiar one. Good explanations 
may demand the grouping together of systems which, at a low enough level of 
physical description, form a ‘chaotically disjunctive set’. (Clark, 1989/90, p. 
349)
Summing up, Clark’s point is that beyond the connectionist fine-grained level 
of analysis, there is a higher statistical level of understanding which provides us 
with the conceptual stability that propositional modularity demands, in which case, 
the friend of the propositional attitudes has nothing to fear. In this section and 7.4
1 7  The reader particularly interested in this first argument is encouraged to consult RS&G (1990), 
and Clark (1989/90). It would require some more work to flesh out fully Clark’s reasons for rejecting 
the ‘superpositional storage/discrete causal efficacy argument’. I believe, nevertheless, that the 
discussion in chapter 4 (especially sections 4.7 and 4.9) bears directly on Clark’s response to 
RS&G’s argument. Fleshing out this issue would take us far afield. In what follows, I shall 
concentrate exclusively on the ‘natural kinds’ argument (see below) since it is more relevant to my 
overall purposes.
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below, I shall concentrate exclusively on how to rebut to Clark’s second attack— 
i.e., his rejoinder to RS&G’s ‘natural kinds argument’ (see above).
Clark’s argument depends crucially upon an empirical bet. Namely, that all 
cognitive systems complex enough to count as believers will exhibit certain higher- 
level commonalities with all other such systems. So, Clark writes:
The bulk of [my argument] has amounted to an unabashed empirical bet that 
any system complex enough to count as a believer will reveal (under some 
post hoc analysis) semantically clustered patterns of activation. Such 
reasonably complex models as we have available (e.g., NETtalk) lend support 
to this contention. (Clark, 1989/90, p. 352)
In the remainder of this section I shall reflect upon a criticism due to Stephen Stich 
and Ted Warfield (1995) that precisely calls into question Clark’s ‘empirical bet’. I 
shall argue that Stich and Warfield’s considerations are wrong, and cannot threaten 
Clark’s anti-eliminativist conclusion. But before that, let me briefly rehearse an 
interesting line of response that the careful reader may have thought of.
In fairness to the connectionist-eliminativist, it is not a straightforward matter 
for the anti-eliminativist to make her case, or at least it would require more 
elaboration than Clark offers. A key issue in the current dialectic relates to the 
status we ascribe to high-level descriptions of the kind exploited statistically via 
cluster analysis (see chapter 4, section 4.7). Notoriously, Churchland has argued at 
length that cluster analysis cannot describe accurately connectionist processing. As 
we saw in chapter 4, cluster analysis can provide no more than a high-level 
approximation of a neural network’s gross behaviour, failing thus to describe
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accurately the dynamical processing undergone by the system. The reason for this 
failure, as Churchland emphasizes, is that the network itself lacks any information 
about the clusterings being generated statistically.18 To put it more dramatically, 
those clusterings won’t take a part in the laws—i.e., learning algorithms (see section
4.4 above)—that exercise control over the behaviour of the network. Thus, 
Churchland notes:
the learning algorithm that drives the system to new points in weight space 
does not care about the relatively global partitions that have been made in 
activation space. All it cares about are the individual weights and how they 
relate to apprehended error. The laws of cognitive evolution, therefore, do not 
operate primarily at the level of the partitions [...] The level of the partitions 
certainly corresponds more closely to the “conceptual” level [...], but the point 
is that this seems not to be the most important dynamical level. (Churchland, 
1989, p. 25)19
1 8  To keep the record straight, the reader should notice that, although deeply entrenched, the ‘anti- 
approximationist’ line o f response stressed by Churchland differs from the reasons rehearsed in 
chapter 4 (section 4.7). There, I argued that Servan-Schreiber et al.'s neurosimulations lent support 
to the view that connectionist processing tends to preserve ‘redundant’ information; information 
which is averaged out when performing post hoc statistical analyses— the stress lies in the fact that 
the results obtained are statistical, and thus inherently loose processing o f  idiosyncratic detail. 
Churchland’s aformentioned point, by contrast, emphasizes the p ost hoc, rather than the statistical 
part o f  the equation.
1 9  A side exegetical issue, although noteworthy, is whether Churchland’s above comments are 
consistent with his latest defence o f  connectionist semantics (see chapter 5 above). Unlike the 
Churchland o f  A Neurocomputational Perspective who stresses the cleavage between subsymbolic 
and symbolic processing, more recently Churchland (1998) makes o f  higher-level descriptions a
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The above considerations, nevertheless, are too general, and do not target 
specifically the heart of Clark’s attack. That is, Clark’s aforementioned empirical 
bet. In what follows I shall examine a rejoinder to Clark’s argument due to Stich 
and Warfield which calls into question Clark’s empirical bet. Stich and Warfield— 
henceforth abbreviated S&W—argue that Clark’s empirical bet has no chance of 
being ‘realistically’ realized. To remind the reader, Clark is betting that neural 
networks, or cognitive systems, will share the same cognitive profile, when 
observed at the appropriate level of description. So, two networks that learn to 
navigate the same domain will always enjoy a common macrodescription at the 
level of their respective clustering profiles. In short, their hidden spaces will be 
partitioned similarily when subject to a hierarchical cluster analysis. S&W reject 
Clark’s empirical bet, and argue that in the case of systems like NETtalk, finding 
such higher-level commonalities is the exception, rather than the rule. They then 
conclude that NETtalks—or, extrapolating, believers—form anything but a natural 
kind. In the remainder of this section I shall rebut to S&W’s argument, arguing that
pivotal factor in bringing robustness to State Space Semantics— see section 5.4 above. This does not 
mean that there is an unresolvable inconsistency in Churchland’s position. It may well expose an 
intellectual evolution towards a more moderate position in the debate. However, to the best o f my 
knowledge Churchland has not acknowledged such a change o f  gears in print. I suspect that a strong 
will to have it both ways— i.e., deny processing accuracy to statistical analyses while employing 
them to bring robustness to semantic discourse— may ultimately force him to reconsider his general 
approach to connectionist semantics. I shall not press on the issue here— see Calvo Garzon (in 
preparation a; in preparation b).
Connectionism and the Twilight o f  Propositional Content 269 
their considerations fail to deliver the goods to the sympathiser of eliminativism. 
Let us consider their argument in more detail before submitting it to critical 
scrutiny.
To make their case, S&W draw a distinction between what they call 
NETtalkers and NETtalk-structures. A NETtalker is any neural network that can 
transform text into speech beyond a certain level of accuracy. That is, behaviourally 
or functionally speaking, any system that delivers the same outcome as Sejnowski 
and Rosenberg’s (1986) NETtalk. On the other hand, a NETtalk-structure is any 
system that, apart from delivering the correct results, is architecturally speaking 
similar to Sejnowski and Rosenberg’s NETtalk. That is, it has the same number of 
units and connections, which are distributed in the same, or similar, way. Now 
given this distinction, S&W argue that Clark’s empirical bet is either a sure looser, 
or is irrelevant to the debate over the fate of the folk.
Clark’s only chance of winning the bet, S&W believe, is by considering 
NETtalkers with the same NETtalk-structure. In that case, it is obvious that they 
will display the relevant higher-level commonalities at the level of their clustering 
profiles.20 However, if an argument that relies on connectionist networks is to have
2 0  This is not straightforward, or at least it requires some qualification. NETtalkers with the same 
NETtalk-structure could still have disimilar clustering profiles due to idiosyncracies in their 
respective training regimes— e.g., different learning rate, momentum, etc. Therefore, besides sharing 
their architectures, two NETtalkers with similar NETtalk-structures will manifest the relevant high- 
level commonalities only if  they are similar to Sejnowski and Rosenberg’s NETtalk in some other 
aspects. S&W are careful enough in bearing these considerations in mind, although they are not very 
explicit about it.
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any bearing in the debate over the propositional attitudes, we must be ready to 
compare networks with different NETtalk-structures (unless, of course, we are 
willing to admit by extension that all believers—whatever they happen to be—have 
the same ‘BRAINtalk-structure’). Granted that, S&W point out that we could model 
many different NETtalkers, none of which has a NETtalk-structure similar to the 
one of Sejnowski and Rosenberg’s NETtalk. Now, given that networks with 
different internal dimensionality—i.e., different number of hidden units—tend to 
find different solutions to their overall problem, S&W argue, we will find many 
different NETtalkers which don’t have a clustering profile in common.21 The 
bearing of S&W’s considerations upon Clark’s empirical bet is now obvious. Clark 
holds that any two cognitive systems complex enough to count as believers will 
have a number of high-level commonalities; commonalities which highlight a 
natural kind beyond the personal idiosyncrasies of the systems. Clark, however, 
cannot characterize the systems that configure this natural kind in terms of their 
shared architectures. In that case, the fact that they share certain high-level 
commonalities would be uninteresting. What he needs is a behavioural or functional 
characterization that gathers all ‘architecturally-divergent’ believers. Unfortunately,
2 1  The discussion o f  Servan-Schreiber et al.'s neurosimulations (chapter 4; section 4.7 above) 
clearly illustrates the reason for this. Networks with higher dimensionality have more 
representational resources, and can thus process finer-grained detail than networks with scarcer 
representational resources. Hierarchical clusterings will thus tend to diverge, the bigger the 
difference in dimensionality between the networks— although see below.
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as S&W’s distinction between NETtalkers and NETtalk-structures shows, natural 
kinds don’t necessarily emerge in that case.
In the remainder of this section I shall argue that S&W’s rejoinder is unable to 
show that Clark’s empirical bet has only a minimal chance of winning. Indeed, as 
we’ll see next, Clark’s bet may have already been backed empirically (indirectly) by 
the hand of Laakso and Cottrell’s neurocomputational results reviewed in chapter 5. 
By the time S&W wrote their rebuttal to Clark (1995), it wasn’t clear how 
representational spaces of different dimensionality could be objectively compared 
across networks. Fortunately, the discussion in chapter 5 on ‘conceptual similarity 
and state space semantics’ brings new light to our current concerns, highlighting the 
fact that different partitions of hidden space across networks can still reveal a 
common strategy despite the functional and structural idiosyncracies inherent to 
connectionist processing.22 Let me explain.
The picture offered by S&W is far too simple. Two NETtalkers with different 
NETtalk-structures can have a hierarchical clustering profile in common, despite 
the fact that hidden space gets partitioned differently in each network. Churchland
22 Many different post hoc statistical techniques had already been successfully deployed in order to 
compare representational spaces across networks. However, the task became increasingly difficult, 
the more the clustering profiles tended to diverge. Lack o f  measurement techniques wasn’t the 
problem. The problem was rather lack o f objective measurement techniques. As Cottrell pointed out 
when presenting Laakso and Cottrell’s neurocomputational results (see chapter 5 above): “When I 
eyeball the dendograms [i.e., the tree-structured hierarchical clusterings] for two distinct networks, I 
may say, ‘yes, they are fairly close’, but that’s just my reaction. We need an objective measure o f  
such things” (quoted from Churchland, 1998, p. 18).
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(1998) illustrates how this can happen with a simple example.23 Imagine two simple 
feedforward networks with identical architectures, which are trained on a 
classification task on a base data set composed out of 100 photos of each of 100
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[Fig. 7.6]: The locations o f  four prototype points within the hidden-layer activation spaces o f  
two (imaginary) neural networks for recognizing the faces o f four different extended families. 
The four points represent a prototypical Hatfield face, a prototypical McCoy face, a 
prototypical Wilson face, and a prototypical Anderson face. (Churchland, 1998, p. 9)
23 Churchland develops the example below for different purposes— answering Fodor and Lepore’s 
challenge to State Space Semantics (see chapter 5 above). However, we may easily transport 
Churchland’s dialectic to the current discussion on NETtalkers and NETtalk-structures.
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members of four families. Figure 7.6 above shows the different arrangement in the 
respective hidden spaces of the two networks of the prototypical faces of the four 
families.
As figure 7.6 illustrates, the two imaginary networks have arrived at 
(apparently) different solutions in order to succeed in their common discriminatory 
task. However, as Churchland notes, we can help ourselves to a higher level of 
understanding in which the two networks’ strategies do converge. In particular, 
Churchland proposes that we look at the relative position of each prototypical point 
against the position of the other three prototypical points within each space (cf. 
chapter 5, section 5.2 above). Indeed, if we pay attention to those relative positions 
we can see that they are identical across the two networks. If we consider the 3- 
dimensional solids formed by taking the prototypical points as vertexes, we can see 
that they are identical (see figure 7.6 above). The reader can see that by translating 
and rotating one solid with respect to the other, we obtain the same irregular 
tetrahedron.24 The interesting point for our purposes is that this intuitive higher- 
level form of similarity—i.e., translating and rotating n-dimensional figures in 
hyperspaces to check whether they highlight an isomorphic configuration of 
points—can be extended into an objective numerical criterion of similarity. The 
following measure offered by Churchland (1998, p. 12) permits us judge how 
similar or disimilar two solids are. A value of 1 indicates that the two solids are 
identical.
Similarity =  1 -  Average A ^  1
7 6 |_ (^  + A'B ')J
24 The reader interested in the fine-grained detail is urged to consult Churchland (1998).
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(AB and A ’B ’ stand for the lengths of the edges between pairs of prototypical points 
belonging to two different solids—see Churchland, 1998, pp. 11-12 for the details). 
This numerical measure allows us to compare objectively any pair of solids across 
hidden spaces.25
Churchland’s numerical measure of similarity across representational spaces 
may then throw some light upon our present worries, hopefully showing whether 
Clark’s bet can obtain empirical support or not. The idea is that we can objectively 
compare different NETtalkers. A value close to 1 will show that two NETtalkers 
have landed on a similar solution to their shared problem—i.e., that they have 
partitioned their hidden spaces similarity. The networks, we may expect, will 
organize similarly sets of stimuli in terms of the articulatory features characteristic 
of different phonemes so that they can navigate the text-to-speech domain 
successfully.26 These considerations contain the gist for a rejoinder to S&W.
25 The careful reader will have noticed that the above numerical measure has a shortcoming. 
Namely, that it is sensitive to differences in scale. Two shape-identical solids which differ in absolute 
size will obtain a similarity rating closer to 0 than to 1. Nevertheless, we need not worry about that. 
The above equation can be repaired by inserting a ‘correction factor’ (see Churchland, 1998, p. 19 
for the details).
26 Someone may argue that the only way to back empirically Clark’s bet would be to obtain a 
measure o f similarity across networks o f  1. That is, showing a perfect identity in their clustering 
profiles. This may be the case in the toy-example that Chuchland makes use of, where a translation 
and rotation o f one figure with respect to the other produces a perfect fit. This however is not 
realistic. The more complex the networks under consideration are, the more difficult it will be to
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Unfortunately, the imaginary simulations Churchland makes use of to illustrate his 
measure of conceptual similarity are too simple. Indeed they cannot serve to address 
fully S&W’s challenge by themselves. The reason is that Churchland is considering 
networks with the same architecture. S&W’s point was precisely to compare 
NETtalkers with different NET folk-structures (see above). So, even though 
different NETtalkers may obtain a value close to 1, using the above measure of 
similarity, it is only so, S&W would contend, because of having a similar NETtalk- 
structure.
This, however, should not cause any concern. Bearing in mind the results of 
chapter 5 above, we may go beyond Churchland’s imaginary neurosimulations, and 
especulate about what might happen by looking at real simulations along the lines 
of the ones developed by Laakso and Cottrell. To remind the reader, Laakso and 
Cottrell—see chapter 5, section 5.3—ran an experiment on a colour-categorization 
task employing networks with different internal dimensionality, as well as different 
input codings. The networks employed had between 1 and 10 hidden units. Once 
the networks mastered the categorization task, certain mathematical measurements 
were computed,27 and the correlations obtained were very high, independently of
obtain a perfect fit. However, S&W only call into question the alleged similarity (not identity) o f  
NETtalkers with different NETtalk-structure. We can thus relax our demands, and hope for a value 
close ‘enough’ to 1.
27 The numerical measurement deployed by Laakso and Cottrell is related to Chuchland’s above 
measure, although computationally more demanding— see Churchland (1998) and Laakso and 
Cottrell (2000) for the detail.
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the number of hidden units employed by the networks. From these results, Laakso 
and Cottrell concluded:
Our measure is a robust criterion of content similarity, of just the sort that 
Fodor and Lepore demanded in their critique of Churchland. It can be used to 
measure similarity of internal representations regardless of how inputs are 
encoded, and regardless of number of hidden units. Furthermore, we have 
used our measure of state-space similarity to demonstrate empirically that 
different individuals, even individuals with different “sensory organs” and 
different numbers of neurons, may represent the world in similar ways. 
(Laakso and Cottrell, 1998, pp. 595-6)
The reader can see that Laakso and Cottrell’s results tell against S&W’s 
above argument. The upshot of Laakso and Cottrell’s neurosimulation for our 
current concerns is that different dimensionality, architecture or encoding bring no 
trouble, insofar as correlated distances between points in the respective spaces are 
preserved. If we agree with Churchland’s above contention—namely that fit of 
prototypical trajectories via rotations, translations, etc. provides us with a 
connectionist notion of conceptual similarity—we have a straightforward link to the 
discussion on NETtalkers and NETtalk-structures. Similarity to Laakso and 
Cottrell’s array of architecturally different networks, NETtalkers with different 
NETtalk-structures will presumably have a robust tendency to settle into the same 
abstract solution with regard to how they structure the partitions within their 
activation spaces. So long as the relevant information is somehow implicit in 
whatever sensor-input schemes happen to be employed, and so long as the training
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procedures impose the same requirements on recognitional performance, then 
diverse nets can settle into almost identical abstract organizations.
In conclusion, extrapolating from Laakso and Cottrell’s results, we may 
expect, contra S&W, NETtalkers with different NETtalk-structures to define a 
unique class by dividing their respective hidden spaces into significantly similar 
sub-spaces. We may then assign genuine kinds to different NETtalkers regardless of 
their architectural idiosyncrasies. In fairness to S&W, it must be stressed that 
Laakso and Cottrell's neurocomputational results may not be applicable to the case 
of NETtalkers with different NETtalk-structures. Laakso and Cottrell tested their 
results with networks whose hidden spaces ranged between 1 and 10 dimensions 
(see section 5.3 above). S&W, by contrast, speculate about what would happen with 
NETtalkers containing, for example, 80, 800, or 8,000 hidden units. Being numbers 
much bigger, Laakso and Cottrell’s results may not be directly applicable. It may be 
the case that the degree of correlation across networks may decrease the more 
dimensions we consider—cf. Servan-Schreiber et al. 's results in chapter 4. Bearing 
in mind these considerations, we may read the results of this section as a stand off 
between Clark, and S&W. This conclusion, I must confess, is more modest than the 
one I would have liked to draw. Unfortunately, the question is an open empirical 
one, and more field research ought to be done. This however does not represent a 
handycap for our present discussion. Granting for argument’s sake that Laakso and 
Cotrell’s results may tip the balance in Clark’s favour, the ball is in the court of the 
eliminativist. In the following section I shall offer a rebuttal to Clark’s anti- 
eliminativist argument that does not depend on S&W’s considerations. I shall argue
Connectionism and the Twilight o f  Propositional Content 278 
that the key to unlock the eliminativist/anti-eliminativist debate resides elsewhere, 
the pivotal factor being whether statistical entities are causally inert or not.
7.4 Cluster Analysis, and Causal Efficacy
As we saw in section 7.3 above, Clark urged contra RS&G’s ‘natural kinds 
argument’ that, thanks to post hoc statistical analyses, connectionist networks can 
be seen as compatible with the thesis of propositional modularity. Thanks to cluster 
analysis, Clark argued, we may discover that different, networks define a unique 
class by dividing their respective hidden spaces into significantly similar sub­
spaces. We may then group different networks to the same genuine kind regardless 
of their units-and-weight’s idiosyncrasies. My aim in section 7.3 was to show why 
the eliminativist cannot rebut Clark’s argument by arguing that in the case of 
systems like NETtalk, finding such higher-level commonalities is the exception, 
rather than the rule. If the research due to Laakso and Cottrell (see chapter 5, and 
section 7.3 above) can be extrapolated to architecturally more complex networks 
than the ones Laakso and Cottrell considered, then NETtalks—or believers—may 
well conform a natural kind, as Clark’s argument requires. This, however, does not 
mean that Clark has won the battle. In this section I shall offer, on behalf of the 
eliminativist, a strategy different from S&W’s line of argument (see 7.3 above) in 
order to bypass Clark’s anti-eliminativist conclusion. Put bluntly, the problem, as I 
see it, does not depend on whether statistical analyses can highlight higher-level 
commonalities being shared by networks which, at a lower level of description,
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look radically different. In my view it is likely that commonalities do arise. As a 
matter of fact, that’s the very job that post hoc statistical technniques are supposed 
to do (see chapter 4, section 4.7). The real issue, I contend, boils down to whether 
or not abstractions of the sort generated statistically are causally efficacious in the 
production of the network’s patterns of input/output behaviour. In what follows I 
shall argue that they are not. This lack of causal efficacy, I believe, tips the balance 
in favour of RS&G’s eliminativist argument. Let me elaborate.
Clark’s move (section 7.3 above) is based on a failure to appraise one 
distinction which has lead many philosophers to miscalculate the putative target of 
the eliminativist. As I argued in chapter 4 (section 4.7) post hoc statistical 
techniques of the sort deployed in the neuromodeler’s methodology are causally 
inert, thus failing to play any explanatory role as far as the dynamics of 
connectionist networks is taken as our model of cognition (see section 4.8 above). 
Abstractions of the sort generated statistically provide us with a good way of 
understanding what kind of representations neural networks can encode. However, 
the statistical generation of localized descriptions of the network’s representations 
should be interpreted as no more than an external abstraction posited in an attempt 
to understand what the network is doing. Symbolic understanding is genuinely alien 
to the network itself Positing static symbolic descriptions of a network’s stored 
knowledge merely reflects the modeler’s ‘invasive’ strategy to appraise the 
network’s highly distributed representational resources. What gets activated, at each 
step of processing, is a component of the cluster, not the cluster itself. The network 
works exclusively at the level of the numerous context-dependent and distributed
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patterns of activity in hidden space. Uniting some of these hidden states under 
linguistic labels should not drive us to think that the network actually employs 
entities posited by folk psychology. The reader can see now why these 
considerations lend support to the first part of RS&G’s eliminativist argument. 
Namely, to the conclusion that connectionist processing is incompatible with the 
thesis of propositional modularity. Contra Clark, unlike the properties expressed by 
propositional attitudes’ predicates, the properties of fully-superposed neural 
networks don’t constitute natural kinds. Rather, they are simply chaotically 
disjunctive sets—cf. Clark, 1989/90. The issue, unfortunately for the eliminativist, 
is not that easy to untangle. On behalf of the anti-eliminativist, Clark offers a 
rejoinder to the putative lack of causal efficacy of statistical abstractions. Clark 
argues that denying their causal efficacy may place us in a dangerous position of 
'microphysical worship'. In the remainder of this section I shall address Clark's 
contention.
Clark anticipates the aforementioned point on causation, and denies that the 
eliminativist can exploit the lack of causal efficacy of statistical posits:
Someone might, I suppose, worry that being in a certain cluster cannot, 
properly speaking, be a cause. Thus, they might insist that what actually does 
the causing must always be a particular hidden unit activation pattern and 
hence that, if we have to appeal to clusterings of such patterns to find 
analogues for semantic items, the semantic items cannot figure in the real 
causal story. (Clark, 1989/90, p. 350)
Clark then objects:
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But this is surely a dangerous move. For it places the philosophical feet on a 
slippery slope to physics worship [...] And this is radically revisionary. 
Chemistry, for example, is generally regarded as a respectable special science, 
and yet it is concerned to group different physical structures as instances of 
chemical types and to define causal laws which apply to those types. So, 
unless the sceptic is willing to give up the causal efficacy of chemical 
properties too, he or she would be unwise to object to the very idea of higher- 
level constructs figuring in genuine causal claims. {Ibid., p. 350)
In sum, Clark invites us, in view of the potential disaster of falling into 
physical worshipping, to adopt post hoc statistical techniques as a genuinely causal 
way of appraising the network’s computational capacities. Post hoc statistical 
techniques, Clark claims, are a genuine way of making fully-superposed neural 
networks compatible with the thesis of propositional modularity—a thesis that folk 
psychology relies on crucially (although see below).
I don’t think that Clark’s twofolded picture fully reflects the range of 
possibilities. In the above quote, Clark makes his case by appealing to our intuitions 
regarding a respectable non-basic science such as Chemistry. However, it is not the 
case that either all higher-level causal claims are genuine, or that we must reject all 
such claims altogether—becoming thus ‘microphycical worshippers’. There is, I 
contend, a crucial disanalogy between the case of Chemistry and the putative causal 
efficacy of the statistical entities employed in connectionist theorizing. Whereas 
chemical entities are composed out of microphysical structures (see below)—being 
thus real physical objects in the world—the entities statistically posited to explain 
connectionist dynamic processing are abstractions. Such disanalogy, I believe,
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marks the watershed between causally efficacious higher-level properties and 
causally inert ones. We can thus move the burden of causation safely from a micro 
to a macro-level in certain cases—as usually happens with special science— 
avoiding, therefore, falling into microphysical worship.28 Let me elaborate.
When we are reducing a macrolevel theory to a microlevel one, it is required, 
I conjecture, that the objects in the ontology of the non-basic theory can decompose 
into microparts which belong to the ontology of the basic theory. This requirement 
is met in the case of respectable special sciences such as Chemistry, Biology or 
Genetics. By contrast, the requirement is not fulfilled in the case of folk 
psychology. In the former case we employ scientific causal explanations which 
invoke macrophysical properties, such as solubility, ridigity, gene, etc. The crucial 
contrast resides in the fact that these macroproperties can be explained by deriving 
their respective macro-level laws from laws covering the behaviour of their 
microconstituents. So, for instance, a genuine causal explanation can appeal to the 
behaviour of planets or galaxies, insofar as those macroobjects are built up out of 
their constituent subatomic particles. Or take Genetics. Genes are composed out of
28 It is noteworthy that the above picture does not exhaust the realm o f  possibilities in the logical 
space. Some voices in the philosophy o f science— notoriously Nancy Cartwright (forthcoming)—  
would only attribute causal efficacy to the ‘lowest’ microphysical properties (whichever they happen 
to be). I feel pretty sympathetic with this approach, which is ready to bite the bullet, and 
acknowledge the existence o f  natural kinds only at the most basic level o f  physical description. 
Unfortunately, I currently lack the conceptual apparatus to flesh out this more radical alternative. I 
shall thus limit m yself in this section to exploiting the cleavage between macro— real— objects and 
statistically generated abstracta.
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various physical microconstituents—namely, particular DNA molecules.29 This 
doesn’t commit us to denying the causal efficacy of biological properties. Genetics 
has a characteristic vocabulary—e.g., ‘gene’, ‘phenotype’, etc.—in terms of which 
we can formulate its distinctive causal laws. Genetic causation is nevertheless 
genuine. We can employ sets of biconditional bridge laws which, acting as 
auxilliary premises, connect the vocabulary of Genetics with the vocabulary of the 
underlying microphysical theory, where the microphysical causation takes place. 
Once the laws that cover the behaviour of DNA molecules are conjoined with a 
number of empirically adequate bridge laws, we can obtain genetical 
macroexplanations where talk of causation is certified in virtue of the molecular 
microconstituency of genes. On the other hand, in the case of statistical analyses we 
lack such license since we don’t find the required microconstituents. The statistical 
groupings obtained do not contain the causally active hidden patterns of activation 
as constitutive parts. Statistical analyses do group patterns of hidden activation in 
virtue of their particular causal efficacy—in virtue of which outputs different 
patterns of activity produce. Nevertheless, the entities obtained statistically do not 
have the hidden vectors as parts. In this sense, the higher (symbolic) level posits 
abstracta, rather than real physical entities which preserve their microphysical 
constituents as parts. The former posits, not the latter, I claim, cannot enter into 
genuine causal chains.
29 To be precise, we would have to pick out the very elemental particles that DNA molecules are 
composed of. We can stick to the molecular level, bearing this in mind.
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In conclusion, rejecting the causal efficacy of statistical properties does not 
make of me a microphysical worshipper. Plausibly, I am ready to concede to Clark, 
the causal organization of the world can be taxonomized at many different levels. 
As long as macroobjects are built up out of their real microconstituents, I claim, we 
can rest assured that a genuine causal explanation is in place. We can make sense of 
the causal powers, not only of the scientifically respectable entities basic to the 
ontology of science—e.g., particles, waves, fields—, but also of some higher-level 
ontologies—e.g., common sense objects, such as DNA molecules, tables and chairs, 
or planets and galaxies. We can make true causal statements at the higher-level, in 
virtue of macroobjects being constituted out of microphysical entities with genuine 
causal powers. Unfortunately for the anti-eliminativist, the belief that p  is not a 
whole that decomposes into constitutive parts subject to analysis at a microlevel. 
The belief that p  is a statistical unit that defies any such reinterpretation from the 
macro level into the micro-cognitive level. Hence, I claim, Clark offers no 
compelling reasons to sustain the view that connectionist models are compatible 
with the thesis of propositional modularity.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have defended RS&G’s eliminativist argument according to which 
fully-superposed neural networks are incompatible with the thesis of propositional 
modularity. The intentional representations that we find in the networks considered 
by RS&G (see section 7.2 above) are not representations of propositions. RS&G’s
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argument was aimed to highlight a form of eliminativism: if fully-superposed neural 
networks are a plausible model of cognition, then folk psychology cannot be right, 
and the propositional attitudes ought to be eliminated from our ontology. In sections 
7.3, and 7.4 I focused exclusively upon the first part of RS&G’s argument, trying to 
show that connectionist models of cognition are incompatible with folk 
psychological posits due to the lack of causal efficacy manifested by the 
propositional attitudes. However, on behalf of the anti-eliminativist, I must admit 
that more steps would be required in order to bring about the eliminativist 
conclusion. For one thing, the friend of folk psychology may disagree with the 
thesis of propositional modularity, and claim that the propositional attitudes need 
not be causally efficacious. On the other hand, someone may deny that the 
propositional attitudes must be eliminated, while agreeing with the thesis of 
propositional modularity, and assuming that folk psychology is wrong. In this 
closing section I shall briefly address these two issues.
On a line of response to RS&G’s eliminativist argument, different to that 
reviewed in section 7.3, Clark acknowledges that the fact that the kind of analyses 
that connectionist theory furnishes us with is dissociated from the condition of 
causal efficacy. That concesion, nonetheless, should not cause any distress to the 
foe of eliminativism. Clark claims that even if the above connectionist reading were 
correct, and higher-level constructs remain causally inert, the eliminativist 
conclusion would still not follow. The reason, put bluntly, is that the explanatory 
role allegedly played by folk psychology’s posits in revealing the coarse-grained 
nature of cognition does not need to be subject to the condition of causal efficacy.
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All that is required, according to Clark, is a notion of causal explanation dissociated 
from the requirement of causal efficacy which appears to be crucial for the thesis of 
propositional modularity (see 7.2 above).30
Following Jackson and Pettit (1988), Clark distinguishes between program 
explanations and process explanations. Broadly speaking, an example of a program 
explanation is any high-level explanation that, while gathering a range of cases in 
terms of certain macrofeatures being shared, abstracts away from the actual 
micro features which carry the burden of causation. Following that type of 
explanation, those common macrofeatures are said to ‘causally program’ a given 
pattern of behaviour, without actually being part of the causal explanation of that 
behaviour. By contrast, an example of a process explanation is an explanation that 
picks out the micro features that are causally efficacious. Clark’s claim then is that 
those explanations that employ the various higher-level constructs of connectionist 
theory may be fully accurate program explanations, while, on the other hand, fail to 
be genuine process explanations. In short, we may say that cluster analysis (see 7.3 
above) causally programs the network’s performance, although it does not play any 
role as part of the process explanation of the behaviour of the network.
Someone may reply to Clark by exploiting a distinction between two types of 
program explanations: Derivative, although genuine, program explanation, as 
opposed to abstract program explanation. The dichotomy would be aimed to reflect
Other authors who would disagree with the core properties o f  folk psychology, as framed under 
the thesis o f  propositional modularity are Horgan and Graham (1991), and Jackson and Pettit (1988; 
1990).
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the distinction highlighted in section 7.4 between real macrophysical objects in the 
world, and abstractions generated statistically. In this way we may identify 
‘genuine’ program explanations with those high-level explanations which, although 
failing to be part of the causal explanation of a given pattern of behaviour, posit 
entities that can be decomposed into the actual microfeatures that carry the burden 
of causation. On the other hand, ‘abstract’ program explanations would be 
indentified with those high-level explanations that posit entities that defy such 
decomposition from a macrophysical level to the microphysical one. I am aware 
that the above distinction ought to be fleshed out in more detail. However, for 
present purposes we don’t need to do so. The reason is that RS&G’s eliminativist 
argument targets only a reading of folk psychology that conforms to the thesis of 
propositional modularity (see section 7.2 above)31 That is, a reading such that 
beliefs, desires, and the rest of the propositional attitudes are, among other things, 
causally efficacious. In this way, the sympathiser of eliminativism can make use of 
RS&G’s argument, ignoring Clark’s above remarks. Clark himself acknowledges 
that once we grant Fodor’s approach to the debate, the balance is unavoidably 
tipped against the anti-eliminativist:
[Many] defenders of symbolic AI and folk psychology (especially Fodor and 
Pylyshyn) are effectively shooting themselves in the feet. [The] defences they 
attempt make the condition of causal efficacy pivotal, and they try to argue for
31
This reading is encouraged by notorious defenders o f folk psychology, such as Fodor (1987). See 
also Fodor (1998a) for a more recent elaboration that is faithful to his earlier views, reiterating the 
thesis o f  propositional modularity.
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neat, in-the-head correlates to symbolic descriptions (see, e.g., Fodor 1987;
Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988). This is accepting terms of engagement that surely
favor the [eliminativist.] (Clark, 1989, p. 197)
Thus, in the light of these remarks, we may ignore Clark’s aforementioned line of 
argument, and conclude with RS&G that the propositional attitudes are 
incompatible with connectionist models of cognition, insofar as the former are 
defined in terms of the core properties that the thesis of propositional modularity 
exploits.
There is yet another hurdle that may prevent RS&G from reaching their 
eliminativist conclusion. Stich and Warfield (1995)— S&W, abbreviated 
hereafter—agree with Clark that RS&G’s eliminativist argument has a small chance 
of working. However, unlike Clark, S&W claim that the difficulties for RS&G’s 
argument stem from the second part of their twofold strategy—i.e., RS&G’s 
contention that if folk psychology is mistaken then the propositional attitudes ought 
to be eliminated from our ontology (see section 7.2 above). As S&W point out, it 
does not follow straightforwardly from the fact that folk psychology is mistaken— 
assuming the first part of RS&G’s argument—that folk posits should be eliminated. 
Intuitively, we may agree, for example, that although ancient people lacked any 
knowledge about cosmology, they were still referring to the same heavenly bodies 
that modem astronomy studies nowadays. Stars do exist despite the fact that ancient 
stars gazers had extremely erroneous ideas about their constitutive properties. In 
like vein, the fact that fully-superposed neural networks are incompatible with the 
thesis of propositional modularity does not necessarily entail that the propositonal
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attitudes don’t exist. They may play a role as part of a future theory of cognition, 
although probably they will have to be revised under the light of ‘yet-to-untap’ 
developments in neuroscience and connectionist theory. In short, as S&W correctly 
point out, there is a “significant logical gap” to be filled in order to bring about the 
eliminativist conclusion.
A way one might try to bridge this gap, S&W argue, is by turning our 
attention to the theory of reference. In particular, by looking at the way in which the 
theoretical terms of a theory get fixed according to our favoured theory of reference. 
S&W consider whether the ‘description’ theory of reference can fit the bill for the 
friend of eliminativism.32 In a nutshell, the description theory of reference claims 
that the theoretical terms employed by any given theory refer to those entities that 
satisfy most, if not all, of the descriptions that the theory entails about those 
entities.33 The satisfaction of most of these descriptions is taken to provide 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the entities being posited. If 
the theory under consideration is false, such that no causal role is played by the 
entities posited, then the theoretical terms that the theory makes use of do not refer 
to anything at all. It seems at first sight that the description theory of reference 
could furnish us with a way to fill the logical gap that has been missing so far in
32 The reader is urged to visit chapter 6 above for an appraisal o f  Stich’s views on the theory o f  
reference, and its bearing upon ontological disputes. For a different line o f  argument that exploits the 
notion o f a “constitutive property” in order to fill the aforementioned logical gap, the reader may 
care to consult S&W (1995), pp. 407-9. For present purposes we may ignore this other line o f  
response which S&W themselves don’t find very attractive.
33 For an early formulation o f the description theory o f reference see Lewis (1972).
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RS&G’s conditional argument. According to the description theory of reference, the 
term ‘phlogiston’, for example, would refer to nothing since it’s been widely 
acknowledged that XlXth. century phlogiston theory is mistaken. No causal role can 
be ascribed to the core entities that phlogiston theory posits in the explanation of 
combustion. Similarly, by assuming the description theory of reference, the friend 
of the elimination of the mental can make her case. Assuming that folk psychology 
is wrong—once we grant for the sake of discussion the first part of RS&G’s 
conditional argument (see 7.2 above)—the conclusion to draw is that beliefs, 
desires, and the rest of the propositional attitudes don’t exist, since they play no 
causal role in the production and explanation of a cognitive agent’s behaviour.
S&W, however, favour the ‘causal-historical’ theory of reference—e.g., 
Putnam (1975), Kripke (1972)—over the description theory of reference.34 Put 
bluntly, after an initial reference-fixing event, reference is transmitted along a 
causal-historical chain (see chapter 6). A virtue of causal theories of reference is 
that they cope very well with problems of ignorance and error. That makes them 
perfect candidates for the foe of eliminativism. Notice that according to the causal 
theory of reference a person can refer to an object, or kind, despite having wildly 
mistaken views about the object, or kind, in question. Thus, were we to favour a 
causal-historical theory of reference, it would make sense to suppose, for instance, 
that ancient stars gazers and modem astronomers talk about the very same heavenly
34 S&W (1995, p. 407) take it for granted that the burden is on the sympathizer o f the description 
theory o f reference to make her case. For argument’s sake, I shall go along with S&W and grant the 
‘causal-historical’ approach to reference.
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bodies. Plausibly, the same can be said with respect to the theoretical terms 
deployed by folk psychology. S&W’s conclusion is that even though the 
connectionist networks that RS&G considered showed that folk psychology is 
wrong, that would lend no support whatsoever to the more radical eliminativist 
claim that folk psychological posits do not exist.
In my opinion we need not worry about which approach to the theory of 
reference (descriptive, or causal-historical) is correct. As we saw in chapter 6, Stich 
(1990) interprets the thesis of eliminativism as the claim that the theoretical terms 
of folk psychology fail to refer. I am happy to concede that by granting that 
interpretation, and in particular, a causal-historical theory of reference, a logical gap 
in RS&G’s argument may remain to be filled. Stich (1996), nonetheless, changes 
his mind, and claims against S&W that the theory of reference is not the place to go 
to when trying to settle ontological disputes. The following quote reveals the 
reasons that drive Stich to disagree with his previous line of reasoning:
In some situations, it is easier to get a grant or a promotion or to enhance 
one’s reputation in the scientific community by announcing the discovery of 
a new entity or denying the existence of one previously claimed to exist. In 
other situations, it is more politically expedient to conclude that entities of a 
certain sort don’t have some of the properties previously attributed to them 
and that experimental results or other phenomena can best be explained by 
attributing some rather different properties to those entities. Which conclusion 
the scientific community ultimately accepts may well be determined, in some 
cases, by factors like these. (Stich, 1996, p. 68)
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Stich’s latest twist in the eliminativist plot makes of him a ‘social 
constructivist’, or, as he prefers, a Quinean pragmatist (see Stich, 1996, pp. 52-9; p. 
72). Stich’s approach has been winning support, surprisingly, among notorious 
friends of eliminativism. So, Patricia Churchland claims that in order to determine 
whether the entities of a non-basic theory can be identified or not with the entities 
of a new scientific successor, the decision
is influenced by a variety of pragmatic and social considerations. The whim of 
the central investigators, the degree to which confusion will result from 
retention of the old terms, the desire to preserve or to break with past habits of 
thought, the related opportunities for publicizing the theory, cadging for 
grants, and attracting disciples all enter into decisions concerning whether to 
claim identities and therewith retention or whether to make the more radical 
claim of displacement. (Churchland, 1986, pp, 283-84)
Although I don’t feel sympathetic with Stich’s ‘constructivist’ approach, and 
Churchland’s ‘pragmatic’ considerations (see below), we may agree with them for 
argument’s sake that semantics cannot settle ontological disputes. Nevertheless, we 
need not worry about S&W’s considerations. The purpose of this chapter is more 
modest in scope. I have tried to show that the thesis of propositional modularity is 
indeed inconsistent with a fully-superposed connectionist model of cognition. On 
the othe hand, I am happy to acknowledge the existence of S&W’s aforementioned 
logical gap. Something else beyond the above incompatibility must be put forward 
in order to bring about the eliminativist conclusion. The results of this chapter, 
therefore, only represent a partial victory for the eliminativist. I believe however
Connectionism and the Twilight o f  Propositional Content 293 
that S&W’s logical gap can be filled by digging elsewhere, delivering thus the 
goods for the eliminativist. As I see the issue, we must ignore S&W’s 
considerations concerning the theory of reference, as well as Stich’s, and 
Churchland’s pragmatic considerations. In fact, I believe that we may reply to 
S&W’s anti-eliminativist argument by exploiting a formal criterion to bridge the 
logical gap. A criterion that will help us determine objectively whether the posits of 
a discredited theory deserve to be eliminated, rather than retained. In Calvo Garzon 
(in preparation c) I argue that a reformulation of the reductionist/anti-reductionist 
debate, and in particular, a new challenging view of intertheoretic reduction 
developed by John Bickle in his recent Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave, 
can help the eliminativist to complete her argument. But I must leave those matters 
for another occasion.
This chapter ends Part II of my dissertation. The careful reader will have 
noticed the existence of a common thread underlying both my connectionist defence 
of Quine’s inscrutability thesis (Part I, chapters 4, and 5), and my connectionist 
defence of the elimination of the mental (Part II, chapter 7). Succintly, if the ‘mind’ 
of a cognitive agent is a fully-superposed connectionist network, then we shall not 
find discrete analogues of the words employed in a propositional ascription in the 
connectionist processing of the agent’s cognitive system. Thus, the word ‘gavagai ’, 
or the belief that p  will not have discrete connectionist analogues since, as we saw, 
those items are represented by means of highly idiosyncratic patterns of activation 
that defy a context-free symbolic treatment. According to the eliminative materialist 
mental states ought to be eliminated from our ontology. Among others, notorious
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philosophers that have endorsed this position are Feyerabend (1963), Rorty (1970), 
and Churchland (1981). The natural sciences, according to Feyerabend, Rorty, or 
Churchland, have provided manifestable evidence in support of the view that 
propositional content does not exist. In this respect, I must emphasize that the 
results of my dissertation only serve to back a moderate form of eliminativism. 
Ultimately, the target, in my opinion, should be the elimination of content, rather 
than the elimination of propositional content. Most connectionist theorists 
nowadays prefer to frame the classical/connectionist debate as a debate about the 
architecture of cognition. Both sides assume a representationalist framework. 
Content, in the connectionist guise, is non-conceptual (i.e., does not conform to the 
conceptual patterns of classical constituency, and processing; see chapter 4 above).
For strategical reasons, I’ve assumed for the purposes of the current work a 
representationalist framework in connectionist theory. The current debate is an 
exciting one, and a lot is yet to be said. Nevertheless, I believe that the real 
significance of connectionist theory for the philosophy of language, and the 
philosophy of mind has not been fully appraised yet. Quine’s thesis of the 
inscrutability of reference, for instance, aims at the right target. However, the way 
in which Quine tries to defend the thesis is not the most fortunate, and runs the risk 
of missing its real significance. Quine’s strategy is to find more than one scheme of 
reference that fits all possible evidence (see chapter 1). However, the friend of 
semantic scepticism has a faster route to accomplish her task. It is not the fact that 
there is more than one correct theory of reference what threatens semantics. Rather, 
it is the fact that there is no semantic relation of reference at all between a speakers’
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cognitive processes, and the external world. In chapter 4 we saw how to interpret 
semantically the space defined by the hidden units of a simple feedforward network. 
I think, nonetheless, that that furnishes us with a naive interpretation of 
connectionist networks. Put bluntly, I believe that every single pattern of behaviour 
(non-cognitive, as well as cognitive) is to be seen as mere causal correlations 
between inner states, and certain environmental features. Causal correlations that 
obviously do not suffice to establish representational status (cfi, for example, 
Haugeland, 1991). To illustrate, we may say that humans are equivalent to 
sunflowers. The latter chase the sun, but noone would claim that they posses an 
inner representation of the sun. A full physical explanation in terms of causes and 
effects in real time, and real space, suffices to explain the sun-chasing behaviour of 
the sunflower. I believe that the same goes when we try to explain higher cognitive 
abilities. The patterns of behaviour to be explained are more complex 
quantitatively, but the principles are the same: causal correlations in the physical 
world. I just fail to see where the notion of representation can fit in this picture. I 
am aware that this is a radical claim, but unfortunately I still lack the conceptual, 
and technical apparatus to flesh out these thoughts.35 That is a project that I hope I 
can take up soon, and produce a connectionist defence of a General Theory o f Anti- 
Representational ism.
35
The reader may care to consult Beer (1995a); Brooks (1991); Keijzer (1998); Port and Van 
Gelder (1995); Ramsey (1997); Thelen and Smith (1994); and van Gelder (1995) for some pioneer 
research in robotics, and dynamical systems that focuses upon a theory o f  anti-representationalism.
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